Part / Whole




Part                      -       Whole
Closed                  -       Open
State                     -       Process
Nodes                   -       Connections
Independent         -       Dependent
Free                      -       Constrained




Juarrero points out how the quantum level - those things that "go without saying" - affects the everyday level. For the most part we can ignore it, especially within a cohesive culture in which everyone shares "the same historical background and contextual setting." 

But when humans seek to explain each other, neither comes context free. Each brings their own case history, their own biases, prejudices, etc. 

The world of Heidegger's 'present at hand' - the abstracted world of the left-hemisphere - proceeds from the complex, interconnected world of the 'ready to hand', the right hemisphere. Left is contained by right, the masculine by the feminine.

Context implies connections, relatedness. Connections work like tethers, constraining the freedom of the individual. Freedom is another way of saying 'context independent.' The Free Space of science is freedom from context.




[…] absolutism of conduct can be secured only by means of an absolutism of doctrine, by means of the doctrine that good and evil traits and actions are inherently distinct from one another and that their character does not depends on the character of those who manifest and engage in them on each particular occasion.

[…] this approach creates the view that “there are actions that are good and bad in themselves,” whereas in reality, according to Nietzsche, “an action in itself is perfectly devoid of value: it depends on who performs it,” for what reason and with what effect.

[Alexander Nehamas]
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p. 213-14




[General systems theory’s] fundamental claim is that when living things are embedded in an orderly context, properties emerge that are not present when the things exist as isolated individuals. 

Picking up where Darwin left off, systems theory continued the revival of relational or secondary properties by reminding us that context matters.

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p.108




[…] Zeleny (1980, 20) suggests that the lesson to be learned from the theory of autopoiesis is precisely "the lesson of holism." 

Far from being an inert epiphenomenon, the dynamics of the autopoietic whole serve as the orderly context that structures the behavioral characteristics and activities of the parts, a clear formulation of one of Bunge's (1979, 39) characteristics of a holistic point of view: the dynamics of the global level control the functioning of components at the lower level. 

The whole as whole most assuredly acts on its parts: self-cause - but not, as some would have it, qua other - one part forcefully impressing itself on another. Instead, complex adaptive systems exhibit true self-cause: parts interact to produce novel, emergent wholes; in turn, these distributed wholes as wholes regulate and constrain the parts that make them up. 

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p.130




I propose that explaining complex systems, including human beings and their actions, must […] proceed hermeneutically, not deductively. 

In textual interpretation "the anticipation of meaning in which the whole is envisaged becomes explicit understanding in that the parts, that are determined by the whole, themselves also determine this whole" (Gadamer 1985, 259). Interpreters must move back and forth: the whole text guides the understanding of individual passages; yet the whole can be understood only by understanding the individual passages. 

This interlevel recursiveness, characteristic of hermeneutics, is thus "a continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global of global structure in such a way as to bring both into view simultaneously" (Geertz 1979, 239). The interlevel tacking of the hermeneutic "circle” reproduces the self-organization of complex dynamical processes. By showing the dynamics of complex adaptive systems, hermeneutical narratives are uniquely suited as the logic of explanation of these strange-loop phenomena.

The logic of explanation of hermeneutics is therefore appropriate for explananda whose very nature is a product of that strange circle of whole and part. 

In contrast to covering laws and algorithms and deductions therefrom, that is, interpretation or hermeneutics reproduces the very logic of nature's open, adaptive dynamics. Like intentional actions, interpretations are characterized by strange-loop, interlevel relations and are, in consequence, essentially contextual and historical. Interpretations therefore explain by showing those nonlinear, interlevel processes at work. 

The threat of relativism lurking in the hermeneutic circle has often encouraged philosophers to reject it.

By drawing the explainer and the explanation into its strange loop, hermeneutics appears to forestall the possibility of any claim to truth and certainty. If we live in a dynamical universe, the novelty and creativity such complex systems display do indeed signal the end of eternal, unchanging, and universal certainty. 

Unlike modern science, however, dynamical systems theory provides an understanding of both the construction and integrity of wholes that does not dissolve their unity at that level. According to Gadamer (1985), the resolution to the circularity of hermeneutics is found in Heidegger's recognition that “the circle of the whole and the part is not dissolved in perfect understanding but on the contrary, is most fully realized"

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p.223




Nineteenth-century hermeneuties failed to take into account that the explainer, as much as the phenomenon explained, is embedded in time and space. Twentieth-century students of hermeneutics, in contrast, have finally come to appreciate that interpretation is doubly historical. 

The phenomenon being explained has a history, and so must be understood within that history; but interpreters, too, are situated within history, within a tradition, which their interpretation both reflects and influences. 

This double historicity affects the pragmatics of explanation. When the subject is planetary orbits and billiard balls, that is, when interactions can be ignored, the role of interpreter recedes in importance; not so when the subject is either quantum processes or human actions. Dynamical systems have therefore brought the interpreter back into the pragmatics of explaining action (if not into the metaphysics of explanation, as quantum processes have).

In dynamical terms, the tradition in which interpreters are situated is itself an attractor. As social beings, interpreters are embedded in its dynamics. As Gadamer (1985, 216) notes, "[t]he anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but proceeds from the communality that binds us to the tradition." Jurors as well as the rest of us are located within a tradition, which frames our interpretation. This fact, which even the popular media harp on, need not lead either to paralysis or to the deconstructionist's conclusion that any interpretation is as good as any other. As Umberto Eco (1990, 21) insists and our discussion of top-down constraints has shown, context constrains the range of plausible interpretations. "A text is a place where the irreducible polysemy of symbols is in fact reduced because in a text symbols are anchored in their context."

Following Eco's lead, I submit that two contexts provide an action's "literal" meaning: the historical background and contextual setting in which the action was performed, and the context established by the "small world" of the action itself. Two contexts likewise frame the meaning of a hermeneutical explanation: the historical background and contextual setting in which the interpretation is offered, and the context established by the "small world" of the interpretation itself. 

When both the explainer and the agent whose action is being explained share the same historical background and contextual setting, interpretation usually proceeds smoothly. Not so in a society whose members bring with them radically different backgrounds and perspectives. 

If explainers are as much situated in a context (a tradition) as the phenomenon they are trying to explain, bringing this background-that-goes-without-saying to the foreground is a valuable contribution to the pragmatics of explanation: it helps determine how much the explanatory context itself has contributed to the explanation. 

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p. 237




The individual organism [...] is not fundamental to life, but something that emerges when genes, which at the beginning of evolution were separate, warring entities, gang together in cooperative groups, as 'selfish co-operators'.

The individual organism is not exactly an illusion. It is too concrete for that. But it is a secondary, derived phenomenon, cobbled together as a consequence of the actions of fundamentally separate, even warring agents.

Perhaps the subjective ‘I’, the person that I feel myself to be, is the same kind of semi-illusion ... The subjective feeling of 'somebody in there' may be a cobbled, emergent, semi-illusion analogous to the individual body emerging in evolution from the uneasy co-operation of genes.

[Richard Dawkins]
Unweaving the Rainbow, 308-9
 


[…] atomistic doctrines rest on the idea that competition between separate units is the ultimate law of life.

[They] ignore the obviously equal importance of co-operation between organisms - and between the parts of organisms - at all levels. [They] therefore depend on a rather odd piece of metaphysics, namely the 'reductive' assumption that certain parts are, in some sense, always more real and significant than the whole they belong to.

What can it actually mean to suggest that the things that we directly deal with are in some sense less real than certain selected parts – or alleged parts - of them?

This mysterious point is seldom spelt out but it appears to centre on causality. The suggestion is that only these special parts are causally active. They are spontaneous, self-moving movers, while the wholes that they compose are mere passive outcomes of their activity.

Dawkins' wording here suggests that this is a historical truth - that these parts actually existed on their own before these wholes and gave rise to them. But this is not literal fact; it is a piece of symbolism. Memes, if they can be said to exist at all, certainly do so only as emergent aspects of human social life. Even their most fervent supporters have not suggested that they pre-existed as spiritual beings who originally produced that life.

'Reality' turns out to contain many different kinds of pattern at different levels. No one of these discoveries therefore should be expressed in the dramatic metaphysical language of reality and illusion.

Different ways of thinking co-exist and are appropriate on different scales. No one of them dominates or invalidates the others.

[Mary Midgley]
Science and Poetry, p. 4, 5, 8
 



The Pintupi are dominated by immediacy. Nothing seems settled unconditionally.

Thus, a man who deeply desired that a particular girl be married to him could, through intimidation, force her relatives to break a promise of bestowal to another.

A similar context-dependence may underlie their relations with outsiders.

[Fred R. Myers]
Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self, p.17




Heidegger introduces a distinction between two ways of approaching the world: the present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) and the ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit).

Present-at-hand refers to our theoretical apprehension of a world made up of objects. It is the conception of the world from which science begins. The ready-to-hand describes our practical relation to things that are handy or useful.

Heidegger's basic claim is that practice precedes theory, and that the ready-to-hand is prior to the present-at-hand.

The problem with most philosophy after Descartes is that it conceives of the world theoretically and thus imagines, like Descartes, that I can doubt the existence of the external world and even the reality of the persons that fill it – who knows, they might be robots! For Heidegger, by contrast, who we are as human beings is inextricably bound up and bound together with the complex web of social practices that make up my world. The world is part of who I am.

For Heidegger, to cut oneself off from the world, like Descartes, is to miss the point entirely: the fabric of our openedness to the world is one piece. And that piece should not be cut up.

[Simon Critchley]
'Being and Time, part 3: Being-in-the-world', The Guardian




The behaviour of a system is not determined primarily by the properties of individual components of the system, but is the result of complex patterns of interaction.

The structure of the system is not the result of an a priori design, nor is it determined directly by external conditions. It is a result of interaction between the system and its environment.

Self-organisation is an emergent property of a system as a whole (or of large enough sub-systems). The system's individual components only operate on local information and general principles.

The macroscopic behaviour emerges from microscopic interactions that by themselves have a very meagre information content (only traces).

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.91-2




The theory of evolution attempts to explain how biological systems, from generation to generation, develop certain capabilities that enhance their survivability. This theory largely explains the predetermined side of biological systems' behaviour, and does not really say anything about the adaptive behaviour of any specific organism.

To ensure its survival, an organism must not only learn to cope with its changing environment, but it must do so within its own lifetime, in what is known as 'somatic time'.

If we can link the notion of self-organisation to that of evolution, i.e. if we can develop a more general understanding of the notion of selection, it would be possible to argue that the distinction between predetermined and adaptive behaviour is not rigid.

How can a system respond to its environment? Changeaux et al. (1984) mention two mechanisms similar to those referred to above:

An instructive mechanism where the environment imposes order directly on the structure of the system.

A selective (Darwinian) mechanism where the increase in order is a result of an interaction between the system and the environment. The environment does not determine the structure of the system, but influences the development, as well as the transformation, reinforcement and stabilisation of patterns in the system.

In neural network terminology, the above distinction can be made in terms of supervised and unsupervised learning. The meaning of these terms will become clear in the process of analysing why both Changeaux and Edelman reject the first option.

The rejection results from a denial of the idea that the world is pre-arranged in an informational fashion, i.e. of the idea that things are categorised in an a priori fashion, and that these categories can be known objectively.

It is thus a rejection of that family of ideas that includes Platonism and logical positivism - the same family that forms the theoretical framework for classical AI.

One of the fundamental tasks of the nervous system is to carry on adaptive perceptual categorisation in an ‘unlabelled’ world - one in which the macroscopic order and arrangement of objects and events (and even their definition or discrimination) cannot be prefigured for an organism, despite the fact that such objects and events obey the laws of physics (Edelman 1987: 7)

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.100-1




Garfinkel (1987: 202-203) discusses the relationships between parts and whole in a biological context:

We have seen that modeling aggregation requires us to transcend the level of the individual cells to describe the system by holistic variables. But in classical reductionism, the behavior of holistic entities must ultimately be explained by reference to the nature of their constituents, because those entities 'are just' collections of the lower-level objects with their interactions.

Although it may be true in some sense that systems ‘are just’ collections of their elements, it does not follow that we can explain the system's behaviour by reference to its parts, together with a theory of their connections.

In particular, in dealing with systems of large numbers of similar components, we must make recourse to holistic concepts that refer to the behavior of the system as a whole. We have seen here, for example, concepts such as entrainment, global attractors, waves of aggregation, and so on.


[…]

[Blackwell (1976)] emphasises that a structure is ‘a system of transformations, rather than a system of parts or elements.’ The self-maintenance (read self-organisation) of the system is aimed at maintaining the dynamic structure and not the existence of any specific element.

In developing scientific theories, one should not fall for the temptation of identifying basic elements and then ask how they are combined to form a theory. ‘This is precisely the wrong approach and, in our opinion, is the main reason for the failure of contemporary philosophy of science to formulate an adequate account of theories.’

According to his ‘mid-stream principle’, theories have no ultimate elements, only intermediate ones. One should focus not on the elements, but on the system. Theories are hereby ‘designated as processes, not as static, logical formalisms.’

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.106, 131




Well, there's a whole number of reasons, but the simplest starting point is something called human exceptionalism. There's a kind of philosophical underpinning to the whole of […] mainstream techno industrial society. It goes way, way back, several hundred years, but flourished in the enlightenment and scientific revolution, that kept humans separate from nature.

We are not like the other species. We are in denial of our animal nature. And so this isolation or separation of humans from the rest of the nature is why ecologists don't study human beings. And economists in setting up the economy, don't consider it as part of the natural environment.

Another problem about human beings we can talk about later, something called the social construction of reality. That is we develop mental models of how things are […] based on our beliefs, values, assumptions, and experience in some cases.

We articulate these models, we discuss them, and they become formal theories. People buy into them [and] we start to live out of these models as if they were real.

So if we look at economics, we start from the position that humans aren't part of nature. It's called the exchange value model, where you have firms and households - the households spend money on products produced by firms, but then the firms pay the household salary and dividends so that money comes back to the households.

And so it's a circular self-perpetuating circular flow of exchange value. But the basic models in every single economics textbook, that we're still teaching in class, […] make no connection to anything outside themselves. We have the economy operating in complete isolation from the environment as a separate discreet, non-dependent system.

Attached to it [is] the notion that human ingenuity is our most important natural resource, [and] that technology will help us out of any kinky situation we might get into with respect to the natural environment.

The two beliefs - that we're separate from nature and that technology can handle any residual problems - are all you need as a mental construct, a social construct to develop a whole world economy based on the idea that there's no limits to growth that technology can't resolve.

And so we have now underpinned our belief in human exceptionalism. It's now moving forward on a foundation of economic thinking that completely ignores the natural environment. We have an economy and a set of economic paradigms, and laws and strategies and so on, that sees us separate from nature; when any material flows analysis of the kind we've done in my work shows that humans are the single most important and major species in terms of material flows through every ecosystem on the planet.

How can you possibly imagine governing a planet where we are the single largest component of every ecosystem using models that don't even consider us to be connected?

[...] every growth of the economy, every growth in income increases the human demand on the shrinking biocapacity of Earth. It's a perfect example of how the mental models from which we live often have no correlate in the natural world upon which we are living.

So the new paradigm, the new vision, the new cultural narrative has to be one which sees human beings as an integral component of the ecosystems upon which we literally [depend]. Currently, we're parasitic, but we now have to become commensalist.

[William Rees]
‘William E. Rees: "The Fundamental Issue - Overshoot" | The Great Simplification #53’, Nate Hagens, YouTube




Empiricists, such as Locke or Hume, tried to give an account of personal identity solely in terms of psychological states or events. Analytical philosophers, in so many ways their heirs as well as their critics, have wrestled with the connection between those states and events and strict identity understood in terms of Leibniz's Law.

Both have failed to see that a background has been omitted, the lack of which makes the problems insoluble. That background is provided by the concept of a story and of that kind of unity of character which a story requires.

Just as a history is not a sequence of actions, but the concept of an action is that of a moment in an actual or possible history abstracted for some purpose from that history, so the characters in a history are not a collection of persons, but the concept of a person is that of a character abstracted from a history.

The concepts of narrative, intelligibility and accountability presuppose the applicability of the concept of personal identity, just as it presupposes their applicability and just as indeed each of these three presupposes the applicability of the two others. The relationship is one of mutual presupposition.

It does follow of course that all attempts to elucidate the notion of personal identity independently of and in isolation from the notions of narrative, intelligibility and accountability are bound to fail. As all such attempts have.

[...] any specific account of the virtues presupposes an equally specific account of the narrative structure and unity of a human life and vice versa.

[Alasdair MacIntyre]
After Virtue, p.251-3, 282



Fragile / Resilient





Fragile           -           Resilient
Optimism      -           Hope
Simple           -           Complex
Abstract         -           Concrete
Ideal              -           Real




[...] what makes a complex adaptive system resilient is its learning and transformational capabilities, not its ability to merely resist a shock.

As phrased by Folke: “[R]esilience is not only about being persistent or robust to disturbance. It is also about the opportunities that disturbance opens up in terms of recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence of new trajectories”

Resilience enables the system to cushion the effects of unforeseen disturbances by absorbing the shock and adapting to changing conditions, thus bouncing not back but forward to a more advanced level better suited for future hazards.

[Rasmus Dahlberg]
'Resilience and Complexity: Conjoining the Discourses of Two Contested Concepts', Culture Unbound, Vol. 7, p. 545, 553




Consider all the different manifestations of pressure on a system, which Taleb calls the “disorder brothers”: uncertainty, variability, imperfect knowledge, chance, chaos, volatility, disorder, entropy, time, the unknown, randomness, turmoil, stressors, error.

If something doesn’t “like” any one of these, it’s not going to like the others (and will therefore be short-lived before failure). On the other hand, if something is made stronger by these, it is antifragile—and therefore also displays the “Lindy” effect (the longer it lasts, the longer it is expected to continue lasting).

The insights are useful to check the ambitions of modern power. Should we trust a model that recommends engineering drastic change in the atmosphere, or should we defer to and protect the Earth’s proven, inscrutable systems of climactic balance? Should we tinker with DNA to design a new kind of pest-resistant crop, or should we respect the nucleic wisdom encoded in long-proven varieties?

Risk management’s “precautionary principle” can be understood as respecting essential systems that are Lindy and making sure one doesn’t interfere with whatever makes them antifragile: solve world hunger with better distribution logistics (low downside, huge upside), not by playing God with crop genes (huge possible downside).

In social life, this suggests a bias in favor of traditionalism (including respect for religion) as well as encouragement for experimenters and entrepreneurs (tinkerers, who actually try new technology, not scientists and economic “experts” who merely theorize).

In political organization, it shows the wisdom of localism—or what Taleb calls “fractal localism,” to distinguish it from simplistic decentralization [...] Political community is healthiest when people making decisions also have the most at stake in their outcomes (“skin in the game,” the title of Taleb’s fifth book).

[Joshua P. Hochschild]
'Optionality and the Intellectual Life: In Gratitude for the Real World Risk Institute'




If progressive ideologies have dwindled down to a wistful hope against hope that things will somehow work out for the best, we need to recover a more vigorous form of hope, which trusts life without denying its tragic character or attempting to explain away tragedy as "cultural lag."

We can fully appreciate this kind of hope only now that the other kind, better described as optimism, has fully revealed itself as a higher form of wishful thinking. Progressive optimism rests, at bottom, on a denial of the natural limits on human power and freedom, and it cannot survive for very long in a world in which an awareness of those limits has become inescapable.

The disposition properly described as hope, trust, or wonder, on the other hand - three names for the same state of heart and mind - asserts the goodness of life in the face of its limits. It cannot be defeated by adversity. In the troubled times to come, we will need it even more than we needed it in the past.

[Christopher Lasch]
The True and Only Heaven, p.530




When a specific concept or feature is encoded by a specific neuron, that concept or feature would be lost should that specific neuron be damaged.

However, when the representation is distributed, no specific feature of the network is tied to any specific neuron. Should neurons be damaged, it would degrade the overall operation of the network only slightly. The more distributed the network, the more graceful the degradation.

Robustness [resilience] may be less important to a system that has to deal with idealised abstractions, but it is vital for a system that has to deal with the contingencies of the real world.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.70



Related posts:
Sailing the Turbulent Seas
Do Not Disturb

Global / Local




Universal          -          Particular
Global               -          Local
Tepid                 -          Vivid
Mono                 -          Poly
Many                 -          Few
Disconnected    -          Connected
Definitive          -          Relative
Tourist               -          Pilgrim
Impersonal        -          Personal
Abstract            -          Concrete




In dissolving tradition, Modernity abolished every level in between the individual and the universal/global. First and foremost we are members of the global collective, united by the principles of liberal democracy (“egalitarianism, individualism, rationalism”…), but we can only be members of the global collective by forsaking any intervening identity. ‘Englishness’ detracts from ‘European’, which in turn detracts from ‘Global Citizen.’ Under liberalism each intervening identity becomes backwards and parochial compared to the all-embracing Global Citizen (the 'individual broadly construed' as Haidt puts it).

We need to be able to define levels in between Individual—Universal, but on what basis do we form these groupings? How, for instance, do you define a nation as distinct from other nations? How do you reassert a ‘national identity’ under the dissolutive influence of Globalism?

If the distinction is simply defined by the mere happenstance of location (i.e. anyone within these borders is ‘English’) then 'Englishness' simply becomes a co-ordinate, a segment of the larger whole - meaningless, in other words. There must be a binding element, a set of commonalities, that gives meaning and character to a grouping. Some have proposed ethnicity as this element.

Because liberalism acts against groupings (between Individual—Global) there can be no shared sense-making framework other than reason/science, which is abstract and universal (‘objective’, the same for everyone) rather than particular to a place or people.

Ideas are permitted within the marketplace - a superficial churning of views and interests - as long as they don’t threaten the sanctity of the liberal order (Popper’s ‘Paradox of Tolerance’). There must always be a rotation - no single idea can win. A tradition (in this context, the perseverance of a set of ideas over time) can never take root. If it doesn’t work at the universal level it is no good, hence any parochial sense-making framework is rejected out of hand. Lacking in subsidiary levels, the global scale is inherently anti-tradition.

Liberalism is a fundamentally dissolutive force. It works to dissolve any non-universal programme i.e. any tradition (because tradition is by its nature specific and exclusive).

Any attempt at an alternative sense-making framework at the global level is automatically felt as fascist or totalitarian, which points towards the need for subsidiary levels - national, local - where tradition can take root. Tradition works best at smaller scales - when imposed beyond a certain scale (‘human scale’) it becomes inappropriate. Monoculture is not in itself a bad idea, but monoculture-at-scale is.

When there are no subsidiary levels between Individual—Global then every contagious idea threatens to become a global pandemic (every idea is seen in the context of global, rather than local). Subsidiarity prevents spread, keeps things 'in their place,' and helps define a place for things.




Most of the tension resides between

1) Embedded, complexity-minded, multiscale/fractal localism (politics as an ecology/complex adaptive system), and
2) Abstract one-dimensional universalists and monoculturalism (politics as a top-down engineering project).”

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
Twitter




The tide is out, and globalism is exposed. In its place, watch for the rise of localism.

This won’t be some Jeffersonian agrarian world where we’re all threshing our own wheat, but a complex, locally–adapted system that is vibrant and resilient because it’s interconnected but not centrally controlled. 

Our current supply chain and financial system evolved by using standardization to create efficiencies. Finding “synergies” led to geometric growth of certain companies, lowering nominal costs for customers and concentrating decision-making among few. For example, four companies are now responsible for 70% of the pork production in the U.S.

The sticker price might appear lower at the grocery store, but hidden costs exist.

Think of it this way: A $4 Mr. C’s hotdog sounds like a deal, but it comes with the low-probability kicker that if a virus/terrorist/cyber-attack occurs, we might be sheltering in place for an extended period of time and our economy could go down the toilet along with millions of jobs. Now consider a locally–sourced hotdog that costs $5, $6, or even $15. Localism would likely result in higher nominal cost, but if localized decision-making, supply chains and finance prevented being shut-in at home, hoping centralized governments and corporations can avoid being overwhelmed, what is that worth?

Some things are better managed at scale, just not ALL things. By pushing most decision-making to the locally-dispersed, what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls “fractal localism”, we can maximize customization, adaptation, and responsiveness while still keeping those systems and institutions that are most effective across locales.

[Eric Weatherholtz]
'Localism: Retail’s Coronavirus Hangover Cure'




Things appeared to be getting better and better but our prosperity was built on credit. The things we gained came at the price of an increasingly fragile system, caused by ever-increasing imbalances.




Localism


1. The principle of subsidiarity which holds that the state should undertake only those initiatives which exceed the capacity of individuals or private groups acting independently.

2. If a complex function is carried out at a local level just as effectively as on the national level, the local level should be the one to carry out the specified function.

3. Subsidiarity assumes that people are by their nature social beings, and emphasizes the importance of small and intermediate-sized communities or institutions, like the family, the church, trade unions and other voluntary associations, as mediating structures which empower individual action and link the individual to society as a whole.

4. But the principle of subsidiarity also allows for some decisions to be taken at regional or national (or indeed international) levels, for example in order to protect human rights or for reasons of social or economic justice.

'Localism'




What kind of Europe do you believe in?

It would be built on the strengths, cultures and heritage of its constituent nations. 

The fundamental principle which would guide its institutions would be that everything that can be done at family level would be entrusted to the family, everything that can be done at the local or regional or national level would be decentralized accordingly.

I believe that democracy functions properly when it is local and participatory.

[James Goldsmith]
The Trap, p. 65




What is the meaning of democracy, freedom, human dignity, standard of living, self-realisation, fulfilment? Is it a matter of goods, or of people? Of course it is a matter of people. But people can be themselves only in small comprehensible groups. 

Therefore we must learn to think in terms of an articulated structure that can cope with a multiplicity of small-scale units. 

If economic thinking cannot grasp this it is useless. If it cannot get beyond its vast abstractions, the national income, the rate of growth, capital/output ratio, input-output analysis, labour mobility, capital accumulation; if it cannot get beyond all this and make contact with the human realities of poverty, frustration, alienation, despair, breakdown, crime, escapism, stress, congestion, ugliness, and spiritual death, then let us scrap economics and start afresh.

[E.F. Schumacher]
Small is Beautiful, p. 62



In the United States, both classical and progressive liberals placed liberal nation-building at the core of its mission, particularly the transfer of political devotions from concrete localities to the abstraction of the nation.

One of the key differences between "conservatives” and “progressives” today is over whether liberalism can and should see its primary locus as the nation or the world.

Both sides share the view that liberalism is a universalist philosophy, but they differ over how best to advance that universalism. Mainstream conservatives have sought to advance liberal universalism through the vehicle of the nation, primarily through globalized economic policy and aggressively interventionist and even imperialist militarism.

Liberals believe that the nationstate must eventually be superseded by global governance, best represented today by the European Union.

[Patrick J. Deneen]
Why Liberalism Failed, p.xix
 



A core ambition of liberalism is the liberation of such appetites from the artificial constraints of culture either to liberate them entirely as a condition of our freedom, or, where they require constraint, to place them under the uniform and homogenized governance of promulgated law rather than the inconstant impositions and vagaries of diverse cultures.

From the outset, proponents of liberalism understood that cultural constraints over expression and pursuit of appetite were obstacles to the realization of a society premised upon unleashing erstwhile vices (such as greed) as engines of economic dynamism, and that state power might be required to overturn cultural institutions responsible for containing such appetites.

Today, with the success of the liberal project in the economic sphere, the powers of the liberal state are increasingly focused on dislocating those remaining cultural institutions that were responsible for governance of consumer and sexual appetite-purportedly in the name of freedom and equality, but above all in a comprehensive effort to displace cultural forms as the ground condition of liberal liberty.

Only constraints approved by the liberal state itself can finally be acceptable. The assumption is that legitimate limits upon liberty can arise only from the authority of the consent-based liberal state.

[Patrick Deneen]
Why Liberalism Failed, p.69
 



Community begins with the family but extends outward to incorporate an appropriate locus of the common good. For [Wendell] Berry, the common good can be achieved only in small, local settings.

These dimensions cannot be precisely drawn, but Berry seems to endorse the town as the basic locus of commonweal, and the region mainly in the economic and not interpersonal realm. He is not hostile toward a conception of national or even international common good, but he recognizes that the greater scope of these larger units tends toward abstraction, which comes always at the expense of the flourishing of real human lives.

Larger units than the locality or the region can flourish in the proper sense only when their constitutive parts flourish.

Modern liberalism, by contrast, insists on the priority of the largest unit over the smallest, and seeks everywhere to impose a homogenous standard on a world of particularity and diversity. One sees this tendency everywhere in modern liberal society, from education to court decisions that nationalize sexual morality, from economic standardisation to minute and exacting regulatory regimes.

[Patrick Deneen]
Why Liberalism Failed, p.80-1



[Tocqueville] stressed that it was the nearness and immediacy of the township that made its citizens more likely to care and take an active interest not only in their own fates but in the shared fates of their fellow citizens.

By contrast, he noted a striking lack of attentiveness to more distant political centers of power, including both state and an even more distant federal government, where only a few ambitious men might govern but which otherwise was of little concern to the active citizens within the township.

Tocqueville would have regarded a citizenry that was oblivious to local self-governance, but which instead directed all its attention and energy to the machinations of a distant national power, not as the culmination of democracy but as its betrayal.

Tocqueville argued that self-rule was the result of practice and habituation, and the absence of such self-rule would bring not the flourishing of freedom but reduction to servitude to distant rulers. Democracy, in his view, was defined not by rights to voting either exercised or eschewed but by the ongoing discussion and disputation and practices of self-rule in particular places with familiar people over a long period of time.

Today's liberals who call for encouraging democratic participation through more extensive forms of civic education focused on national politics neglect the extent to which their cure is the source of the ills they would redress.

It remains unthinkable that redress of civic indifference would require efforts to severely limit the power of the central state in favor of real opportunities for local self-rule. But those who readily display evidence of civic indifference or ignorance as evidence either for the need to limit or educate the citizenry unavoidably do so in the deeper commitment to strengthening the identification of politics with the actions of the liberal state, and by so doing, ensure the further degradation of citizenship.

[Patrick Deneen]
Why Liberalism Failed, p.176-7




Globalist vs Internationalist


Globalist - no intermediate levels, a free flow of information between states that essentially turns the world into one large market. All cultures are dissolved in favour of the One True Culture (‘Globohomo’). Nothing between Individual—Global; no tariffs, protectionist policies, or local currencies and cultures.

Globalism is imperialist. It wants a single idea to become universal, a global monoculture.

Internationalist - a recognition of the need for coordination at the global level (a need for a global level), combined with subsidiary levels that allow multiple unique identities to emerge and that provide circuit-breakers between Individual—Global.

Internationalism is anti-imperialist - it does not want any single idea to scale up and take over. Local monocultures over global monoculture. No global pandemics.




Although he held out the hope that "the Great Society may become the Great Community," Dewey knew that it could "never possess all the qualities which mark a local community.” “In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse.... Vital and thorough attachments are bred only in the intimacy of an intercourse which is of necessity restricted in range."

What Dewey could not explain was just how loyalty and responsibility would thrive in a world dominated by large-scale production and mass communications. 

He took for granted the "disintegration of the family, church and neighborhood." What was to fill the resulting “void”? Dewey did not say. "It is outside the scope of our discussion,” he wrote, "to look into the prospect of the reconstruction of face-to-face communities.” His commitment to the idea of progress prevented him from pursuing the point.

In a 1916 essay on progress, he argued that although the replacement of a "static" social structure by a "dynamic or readily changing social structure" did not guarantee progress, it created the preconditions of progress - of "constructive intelligence" and "constructive social engineering." In any case, there was "no way to 'restrain' or turn back the industrial revolution and its consequences.”

Under these circumstances, it was impossible to defend his belief in the possibility of a "return movement ... into the local homes of mankind.” Since nothing in Dewey's social philosophy justified any such hope, the subjects of work and loyalty had to be relegated to the margins of his work, as, increasingly, they were relegated to the margins of the liberal tradition as a whole.

[Christopher Lasch]
The True and Only Heaven, p.368




Like the romantic sociologists, social democrats insisted that individuals had no being apart from society. They too regretted the decline of "community," but they relied on the state, not on small intermediate groups or voluntary associations, to restore a sense of connection.

When Lynd asked whether it was possible to "build urban people into vital communities," the grammatical structure of his sentence revealed more than he may have intended. People were the objects, not the subjects, of "community," as he understood it.

[Christopher Lasch]
The True and Only Heaven, p.427




Syndicalists and guild socialists, as we have seen, believed that small-scale proprietorship conferred moral independence, self-respect, and responsibility. 

They did not seek to restore proprietorship as such, but they never lost sight of the virtues associated with it. They envisioned a society of small workshops, in which effective control over production remained at the local level.

Syndicalism (like populism) fell outside the broad consensus in favour of progress, centralisation, and distributive democracy. It undercut the Marxist claim to offer a radical alternative to the capitalist regimentation of the workplace. It forced Marxists to justify their program on grounds of superior efficiency, on the increasingly implausible grounds that only a socialist state could assure prosperity for all, or on vague appeals to the progress of the human race.

[Christopher Lasch]
The True and Only Heaven, p.335




Today scientists are beginning to study the remarkable farming methods practiced by Indigenous peoples in the Americas. Their aim is to discover techniques that could be transferred to the Third World and employed by ecologically minded farmers in the West.

But this should be done in a cautious and watchful way, for Indigenous science was developed by people living in a particular landscape.

[F. David Peat]
Blackfoot Physics, p.306-7




In a world of categories and abstractions a game is just a game, and it does not much matter from what materials a pack of cards, or a chess board is made. 

By contrast, Indigenous science deals in direct experience and these things do matter.

[F. David Peat]
Blackfoot Physics, p.172




Unlike Western science, the importance of the landscape, and specific places in it, is a characteristic of all Indigenous science.

A mound, rock, medicine wheel, river, or tree may be of deep significance to a people. Even the language spoken by a people arises out of the land they live in and and of the "map in the head" they all carry.

Within Indigenous science there is an association of spirit or energy with particular places, and it is important to visit these places and carry out ceremonies there. Fasts and vision quests are carried out on particular hilltops. At other locations, medicine wheels can be found whose alignments connect to movements and harmonies within the sky.

This idea of the significance of place and the energies associated with it is common to Indigenous sciences all over the world.

[F. David Peat]
Blackfoot Physics, p.265-6




We should also recognize that raising our own food has many benefits beyond healthy eating. Most importantly, it is a skilled practice rooted firmly in reality.

In the words of Matthew B. Crawford, adopting such practices creates a “situated” man (or woman), one who understands that he is not autonomous or able to escape reality, making him a more rounded individual with far more strength than the desiccated, massified individuals who make up our population today.

[Charles Haywood]
'The Eggs Benedict Option (Raw Egg Nationalist)', The Worthy House




Across Western Europe, ideological battles between the left and right have centered on this tension between universalism and parochialism.

Universalism refers to moral regard directed toward more socially distant and structurally looser targets, relative to socially closer and structurally tighter targets. Parochialism refers to moral regard directed toward socially closer and structurally tighter targets, relative to socially more distant and structurally looser targets.

Liberals care about harm and fairness (individualizing values), whereas conservatives care more about loyalty, authority, and sanctity (binding values). This research again suggests a differing focus such that liberals tend to express compassion toward individuals broadly construed, whereas conservatives emphasize compassion toward their immediate social groups.

Supporting this idea, separate work indeed found that endorsement of individualizing values is positively correlated with moral expansiveness (moral consideration for entities, including plants and animals, beyond one’s immediate in group) whereas endorsement of binding values is negatively correlated with moral expansiveness.

Universalism may reflect favorability toward policies that promote open borders (and encourage immigration) and that promote diplomacy toward ostensibly hostile nations. Such policies represent extending moral regard beyond one’s immediate group (e.g., the nation) and to the world more broadly.

Similarly, parochialism may reflect favorability toward stricter immigration policies and defense spending to protect one’s nation—these policies represent prioritizing the well-being of one’s own nation at the potential expense of others.

[Jonathan Haidt]
‘Ideological differences in the expanse of the moral circle’, p.2




If the cortex consisted only of a homogeneous mass of neurons, it would have been impossible for any structure to develop.

On the other hand, neurons by themselves are incapable of performing complex functions. Neural groups therefore have an optimum size, but unfortunately it is not constant or known a priori.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.103




There may indeed be a crisis of knowledge, but, and this must be underscored, the crisis is not the result of the disruptive activity of 'subversive' theoreticians like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida.

It is a direct result of the complexity of our postmodern society.

This is the point Lyotard also makes when he insists that the conditions for knowledge are locally determined. Reflexivity does lead to paradox, but this is only a problem if all paradox has to be resolved at a meta-level. If one has to remain at the level of the network, one has to cope with the paralogy of the postmodern condition.

The implication is not that it is impossible to interpret information; it merely means that all interpretations are contingent and provisional, pertaining to a certain context and a certain time-frame.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.121-2




Lyotard claims that Habermas’s approach, consisting of what he calls a ‘dialogue of argumentation’, rests on two assumptions: in the first place, it assumes that ‘it is possible for all speakers to come to agreement on which rule or metaprescriptions are universally valid for all language games’; and in the second place, it assumes ‘that the goal of dialogue is consensus.

Lyotard finds neither of these assumptions acceptable, primarily because they deny the complexity of postmodern society—the nature of which he describes in the following way:


It is a monster formed by the interweaving of various networks of heteromorphous classes of utterances (denotative, prescriptive, performative, technical, evaluative, etc.).

There is no reason to think that it could be possible to determine metaprescriptives common to all of these language games or that a revisable consensus like the one in force at a given moment in the scientific community could embrace the totality of metaprescriptions regulating the totality of statements circulating in the social collectivity.

As a matter of fact, the contemporary decline of narratives of legitimation—be they traditional or ‘modern’ (the emancipation of humanity, the realization of the Idea)—is tied to the abandonment of this belief.


The first assumption of the Habermasian approach is directly opposed to Lyotard’s emphasis on the proliferation of heterogeneous discourses and the role of paralogy, while the second is opposed to his insistence on the importance of dissent.

Not that consensus is always impossible; it can be achieved, but only as a local phenomenon limited in both time and space.

Consensus as a goal would attempt to freeze the social system into a particular state. Since it is unlikely that this will be achieved (as well as undesirable), a better (and more just) policy would be to develop a sensitivity for the process of social transformation. This may indicate that ‘consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value’, but, claims Lyotard, ‘justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect.’

Given the complexity of postmodern society, the concept of justice is certainly a problematic one, but Lyotard recognises two important, if predictable, strategies: the recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language games; and the recognition of the fact that all agreements on the rules of any discourse, as well as on the ‘moves’ allowed within that discourse, must be local, in other words, ‘agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation.’

This proposal sketches the outline for a practical theory of justice that can best be understood as follows. It becomes the responsibility of every player in any discursive practice to know the rules of the language game involved. These rules are local, i.e. ‘limited in time and space.’ In following such rules, one has to assume responsibility both for the rules themselves and for the effects of that specific practice. This responsibility cannot be shifted to any universally guiding principles or institutions—whether they be the State, the Church or the Club.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.136-7




Instead of looking for a simple discourse that can unify all forms of knowledge, we have to cope with a multiplicity of discourses, many different language games - all of which are determined locally, not legitimated externally. Different institutions and different contexts produce different narratives which are not reducible to each other.

[The] description of knowledge as the outcome of a multiplicity of local narratives, it must be stressed, is an argument not against scientific knowledge as such, but against a certain understanding of such knowledge. Lyotard rejects an interpretation of science as representing the totality of all true knowledge.

He argues for a narrative understanding of knowledge, portraying it as a plurality of smaller stories that function well within the particular contexts where they apply.

Instead of claiming the impossibility of knowledge, 'it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy.’

Let me summarise Lyotard's position. Different groups (institutions, disciplines, communities) tell different stories about what they know and what they do. Their knowledge does not take the form of a logically structured and complete whole, but rather takes the form of narratives that are instrumental in allowing them to achieve their goals and to make sense of what they are doing.

Since these narratives are all local, they cannot be linked together to form a grand narrative which unifies all knowledge. The postmodern condition is characterised by the co-existence of a multiplicity of heterogeneous discourses - a state of affairs assessed differently by different parties.

Those who have a nostalgia for a unifying metanarrative - a dream central to the history of Western metaphysics - experience the post-modern condition as fragmented, full of anarchy and therefore ultimately meaningless. It leaves them with a feeling of vertigo. On the other hand, those who embrace postmodernism find it challenging, exciting and full of uncharted spaces. It fills them with a sense of adventure.

Which of these two evaluations apply is often determined by whether one feels comfortable without fixed points of reference. The choice between the two is determined by psychological just as much as theoretical considerations.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.113-4




These positions (which for conciseness, we henceforth refer to as ‘materialist’) have in common a commitment to immanence (Deleuze, 1988: 124); in other words, ‘a philosophy of becoming in which the universe is not dependent upon a higher power’ (Connolly, 2011: 178) – powers that might include God, fate, evolution, life-force, Gaia, mechanisms, systems or structures.

Instead we are to explore events and interactions within a ‘plane of immanence’ that possesses ‘no supplementary dimension’ (Deleuze, 1988: 128).

[Nick J. Fox & Pam Alldred]
‘Social structures, power and resistance in monist sociology: (New) materialist insights’




Humans are an evolved species like the others and one thing that we have evolved to be is shortsighted. There's a number of wonderful papers on the nature of myopia […] economists have recognized this in the concept of discounting.

So we tend to prefer our present. We tend to prefer our close relatives and friends, and we tend to prefer our home places over distant futures, other people who are complete strangers in other places.

In fact, if you think of climate change, most people in our country or the United States or Canada think, well, it's probably important, but it's probably mostly going to hit somebody in India or in other lands far away.

If you're a politician, you would much rather risk future damage to somebody else somewhere else than to impose [constraints] on your own people today.

[William Rees]
‘William E. Rees: "The Fundamental Issue - Overshoot" | The Great Simplification #53’, Nate Hagens, YouTube




By equating capitalism and religion, Agamben puts pilgrims and tourists on the same plane: ‘To the faithful in the Temple - the pilgrims who would travel across the earth from temple to temple, from sanctuary to sanctuary correspond today the tourists who restlessly travel in a world that has been abstracted into a Museum.'

In reality, pilgrims and tourists belong to entirely separate orders. Tourists travel through non-sites emptied of meaning, while pilgrims are bound to sites that assemble and connect human beings. The assembly is the characteristic trait of sites […]

[Byung-Chul Han]
The Disappearance of Rituals, p.44




A haiku is subject to strict rules of play, and thus it cannot really be translated into another language. Forms which are proper to the Japanese language resist any kind of translation.

[Byung-Chul Han]
The Disappearance of Rituals, p.63




The liberal will forever be unable to think outside of a universalist frame and must apply the rules equally to all. It's totally foreign to him that an action can be right for A but not for B simply by virtue that A is A and B is B.

So the simple and obvious morality of "it's good when we win and bad when we lose" will always elude him because he wants to boil justice down to a principle that can be abstracted away from the people involved. It guarantees his perpetual defeat and the rule of psychopaths who want to exploit that he "refuses to take his own side".

[Imperium Press]
Telegram




There is indeed in the vocabulary available to Homer's characters no way for them to view their own culture and society as if from the outside. The evaluative expressions which they employ are mutually interdefined and each has to be explained in terms of the others.

[...] that it is only within their framework of rules and precepts that they are able to frame purposes at all [...] All questions of choice arise within the framework; the framework itself therefore cannot be chosen.

There is thus the sharpest of contrasts between the emotivist self of modernity and the self of the heroic age. The self of the heroic age lacks precisely that characteristic which we have already seen that some modern moral philosophers take to be an essential characteristic of human selfhood: the capacity to detach oneself from any particular standpoint or point of view, to step backwards, as it were, and view and judge that standpoint or point of view from the outside.

In heroic society there is no 'outside' except that of the stranger. A man who tried to withdraw himself from his given position in heroic society would be engaged in the enterprise of trying to make himself disappear.

Identity in heroic society involves particularity and accountability. I am answerable for doing or failing to do what anyone who occupies my role owes to others and this accountability terminates only with death. I have until my death to do what I have to do. Moreover this accountability is particular. It is to, for and with specific individuals that I must do what I ought, and it is to these same and other individuals, members of the same local community, that I am accountable. The heroic self does not itself aspire to universality even although in retrospect we may recognize universal worth in the achievements of that self.

The exercise of the heroic virtues thus requires both a particular kind of human being and a particular kind of social structure [...] If the heroic virtues require for their exercise the presence of a kind of social structure which is now irrevocably lost - as they do - what relevance can they possess for us? Nobody now can be a Hector or a Gisli.

The answer is that perhaps what we have to learn from heroic societies is twofold: first that all morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular and that the aspirations of the morality of modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is an illusion; and secondly that there is no way to possess the virtues except as part of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of them from a series of predecessors in which series heroic societies hold first place.

If this is so, the contrast between the freedom of choice of values of which modernity prides itself and the absence of such choice in heroic cultures would look very different. For freedom of choice of values would from the standpoint of a tradition ultimately rooted in heroic societies appear more like the freedom of ghosts - of those whose human substance approached vanishing point - than of men.

[Alasdair MacIntyre]
After Virtue, p.146-8




Thus the first massive fact that we have to reckon with is the difference that it makes to the conception of the virtues when the primary moral community is no longer the kinship group, but the city-state, and not merely the city-state in general, but the Athenian democracy in particular.

[...] the Homeric values no longer define the moral horizon, just as the household or kinship group are now part of a larger and very different unit. There are no more kings, even though many of the virtues of kingship are still held to be virtues.

A second reason for not seeing the difference in the conception of the virtues simply in terms of changed social contexts is that the conception of a virtue has now become strikingly detached from that of any particular social role.

Neoptolemus confronts Philoctetes in Sophocles' play in a way very different from that in which his father confronted Agamemnon in the Iliad. In Homer the question of honor is the question of what is due to a king; in Sophocles the question of honor has become the question of what is due to a man.

To characterize a good man is in crucial part to characterize the relationship in which such a man stands to others and both poets and philosophers for the most part do not distinguish in their account of these relationships what is universal and human from what is local and Athenian.

The claim is often explicit; Athens is praised because she par excellence exhibits human life as it ought to be. Yet in these very acts of praise Athenian particularity is distinguished from Homeric particularity.

For Homeric man there could be no standard external to those embodied in the structures of his own community to which appeal could be made; for Athenian man, the matter is more complex. His understanding of the virtues does provide him with standards by which he can question the life of his own community and enquire whether this or that practice or policy is just.

Nonetheless he also recognizes that he possesses his understanding of the virtues only because his membership in the community provides him with such understanding. The city is a guardian, a parent, a teacher, even though what is learnt from the city may lead to a questioning of this or that feature of its life. Thus the question of the relationship between being a good citizen and being a good man becomes central and knowledge of the variety of possible human practices, barbarian as well as Greek, provided the factual background to the asking of that question.

To be dikaios in Homer is not to transgress that order; thus in Homer the virtue of the dikaios is to do what the accepted order requires; and in this his virtue is like every other Homeric virtue. But by the latter part of the fifth century it is possible to ask if it is or is not dikaiosune to do what the established order requires; and it is possible to disagree radically as to what it would be to act in accordance with dike, to be dikaios.

[Alasdair MacIntyre]
After Virtue, p.154-7




[...] the fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighborhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community.

Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists.

Yet particularity can never be simply left behind or obliterated. The notion of escaping from it into a realm of entirely universal maxims which belong to man as such, whether in its eighteenth-century Kantian form or in the presentation of some modem analytical moral philosophies, is an illusion and an illusion with painful consequences.

When men and women identify what are in fact their partial and particular causes too easily and too completely with the cause of some universal principle, they usually behave worse than they would otherwise do.

[Alasdair MacIntyre]
After Virtue, p.256




Information destroys traditional jobs and traditional cultures; it seduces, betrays, yet remains invulnerable. How can you counterattack the information others have turned upon you?

There is no effective option other than competitive performance. For those individuals and cultures that cannot join or compete with our information empire, there is only inevitable failure … The attempt of the Iranian mullahs to secede from modernity has failed, although a turbaned corpse still stumbles about the neighborhood. Information, from the internet to rock videos, will not be contained, and fundamentalism cannot control its children. Our victims volunteer.

It is fashionable among world intellectual elites to decry ‘American culture,’ with our domestic critics among the loudest in complaint. But traditional intellectual elites are of shrinking relevance, replaced by cognitive-practical elites–figures such as Bill Gates, Steven Spielberg, Madonna, or our most successful politicians – human beings who can recognize or create popular appetites, recreating themselves as necessary.

Contemporary American culture is the most powerful in history, and the most destructive of competitor cultures. While some other cultures, such as those of East Asia, appear strong enough to survive the onslaught by adaptive behaviors, most are not.

The genius, the secret weapon, of American culture is the essence that the elites despise: ours is the first genuine people’s culture. It stresses comfort and convenience – ease – and it generates pleasure for the masses.

We are Karl Marx’s dream, and his nightmare.

Yes, foreign cultures are reasserting their threatened identities - usually with marginal, if any, success - and yes, they are attempting to escape our influence. But American culture is infectious, a plague of pleasure, and you don’t have to die of it to be hindered or crippled in your integrity or competitiveness.

[Ralph Peters]
‘Constant Conflict’, Parameters, Summer 1997, 4-14




Peters refers to certain cultures trying to reassert their traditions, and again emphasises that the globalist ‘culture’ that is being imposed primarily via US influence is one of ‘infectious pleasure.’ The historical inevitably is re-emphasised, as the ‘rejectionist’ (sic) regimes will be consigned to what in Trotsky’s term is the ‘dustbin of history.’

[Kerry Bolton]
'Constant Conflict'




The economic system cannot not be a source of human conditioning; as such, it must condition (towards) omni-consideration, and in no ways condition towards psychopathy. It must simultaneously condition agency/uniqueness/self-actualization with communion/cooperation/care.

It must condition consideration beyond the dunbar number (similar to how Buddhism or Jainism achieved reliable abstract empathy deeply enough to determine behavior).

[Daniel Schmachtenberger]
'New Economics Series: Part 1', Explorations on the Future of Civilisation




Although parliamentary regimes, in imitation of Britain and France, had been established throughout the Near East, as in much of the world, they never functioned as democratic or even constitutional systems because of the lack of organized political parties and of any traditions of civil and personal rights.

Political parties remained largely personal followings or blocs, and political power, based on the arbitrary autocracy of Semitic patriarchal family life, was also personal, and never took on the impersonal characteristics associated with Western rule of law and constitutional practices.

The weakness of any conception of rules, and of the material benefits which help rules to survive, made it impossible for the Near East to grasp the conventions associated with cooperation in opposition found in the Western two-party system, parliamentary practices, and sports.

The whole range of human and universal relations of the Arabs was monistic, personal, and extralegal, in contrast to that of the West, which was pluralistic, impersonal, and subject to rules. As a result, constitutional and two-party politics were incomprehensible to the Near East, and the parliamentary system, where it existed, was only a facade for an autocratic system of personal intrigues.

The whole of Iranian life was imprinted with leader-follower characteristics of a very personal character, with loyalty and honor two of the outstanding features of all human relationships. Where these did not operate, human relationships were precarious and filled with suspicion, so that many of the patterns of life which form the modern world, such as political or public relationships and impersonal business relationships, were very weak, and, without stable principles, fell readily into nepotism and corruption.

[Carroll Quigley]
Tragedy and Hope, ‘The Future in Perspective,’ p.668, 674




Behind all these ‘meanings’ of globalisation is a single underlying idea, which can be called de-localisation: the uprooting of activities and relationships from local origins and cultures.

Thus, domestic prices - of consumer goods, financial assets such as stocks and bonds, even labour - are less and less governed by local and national conditions; they all fluctuate along with global market prices. Multinational corporations break up the chain of production of their products and locate the links in different countries around the world, depending on which appears at any time to be the most advantageous to them. The products sold by multinationals are identified less and less with any single country and increasingly with a world brand or with the company itself; the same images are recognised - in advertising and entertainment - in many countries.

Globalisation means lifting social activities out of local knowledge and placing them in networks in which they are conditioned by, and condition, worldwide events.

Globalisation is often equated with a trend towards homogeneity. That, again, is just what globalisation is not. Global markets in which capital and production moves freely across frontiers work precisely because of the differences between localities, nations and regions.

Had wages, skills, infrastructure and political risks been the same throughout the world, the growth of world markets would not have occurred. There would not be profits to be made by investing and manufacturing worldwide if conditions were similar everywhere. Global markets thrive on differences between economies. That is one reason why the trend to globalisation has such an irresistible momentum.

[John Gray]
False Dawn, p.57-8



Related posts:

Notes: Dave Snowden - '#12 MANAGING IN COMPLEXITY - DAVE SNOWDEN | Being Human'


................................................................................................................................................................................

'#12 MANAGING IN COMPLEXITY - DAVE SNOWDEN | Being Human'
[Dave Snowden]

................................................................................................................................................................................


39:58 - We’ve got very few polymaths left in the UK under the age of 50, because the education system is now highly specialised. That’s a major mistake, because one of the strengths of British education has been our ability to produce generalists, but we’re not producing them any more.

A collection of specialists is not the same thing as a generalist. A generalist knows a little bit about a lot of things and can integrate disciplines; a specialist can’t integrate.

Exaptation is a process by which you suddenly notice novel side effects and associations.


................................................................................................................................................................................


41:19 - Art comes before language in human evolution - we learned to draw on the walls of caves before we really spoke.

Like everything in evolution, its accident. Basically we draw because it has use for the hunt, but what it also does is allow us to shift up a level of abstraction. If you go up a level of abstraction you make novel associations. I have some of my best ideas either walking or at the opera, because I’ve moved up a level of abstraction. My mind associates things in a less concrete way. Abstraction is key to innovation.

It is one of the arguments most of us from a scientific background are making against the focus on STEM education, because if you don’t have art you don’t have innovation. It is this engineering culture coming through again. Engineers who appreciate art are more likely to be exaptive.


................................................................................................................................................................................


50:28 - The problem with a hypothesis is it’s based on what we understand from the past. So if something novel has happened, it will restrict our ability to see it.

If you have a hypothesis it’s highly risky under conditions of uncertainty because the past is not going to repeat. You have massive asymmetry between the past and the future, so hypothesis based approaches don’t work. You move from deductive logic to abductive logic.

Abductive is sometimes known as the logic of hunches - what is the most plausible connection between apparently unconnected things. Human beings have evolved to think abductively which means we’re brilliantly inventive, but also prone to conspiracy theories. 

We’ve got fifty-five people who come with these wild ideas. [To objectivise these abductive leaps] we present the wild ideas to panels of several thousand, they interpret it - if we get a dominant pattern we know it’s probably okay.

You can’t rely on individual judgement. Human beings evolved to make decisions collectively, not individually. That’s our strength, we can cooperate. We can [also] cooperate outside kinship groups - the advantage of that is that you can have specialists.

So-called educational deficiencies [autism, dyslexia, etc] are actually part of the collective intelligence. This is now called cognitive diversity. If you can increase the number of people in the collective decision cycle you can make it more objective.


................................................................................................................................................................................