Showing posts with label Erikson. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Erikson. Show all posts

Borders and Flow




Life                      -                    Death
Together               -                   Apart
Include                 -                    Exclude
Profane                 -                    Sacred
Everything            -                    Something
Dependence          -                    Independence




Liberalism tends to place emphasis on the individual and on the universal collective that contains all individuals. Groupings - those intermediary levels between the individual and the global collective - are generally deemphasised, or discouraged.

By its nature a group is exclusionary, defining its identity as much by what it is not as what it is. The more vivid the identity of the group, the firmer its boundaries. Because liberalism is predicated on the notion of individual freedom and autonomy, and on the free flow of goods, services, ideas, and people within a universal, global market, it must work against anything that may inhibit this flow. In this context, groupings - with their localised customs and norms - act as circuit breakers, impeding the wider flow.

Accordingly, liberalism tends to focus on the restrictive aspect of groupings, characterising them as systems of oppression that place unnecessary and tyrannical inhibitions on the individual. The project of liberalism is to dissolve the boundaries of the group and to set the individual free within the global market - in other words, to maximise flow. Groupings are permitted to the extent that they do not impede this flow in any serious way.

Liberalism points out that groupings are artefacts of culture, rather than nature, and that our natural state is as autonomous individuals. Groupings are, in other words, constructions. They may once have served a purpose, but most are old relics that can be deconstructed.

When the idea of the group loses its positive meaning then to be ensconced unthinkingly within a group becomes pathological - ‘groupthink.’ The modern person must seek autonomy and is encouraged at all times to think ‘for themselves’, independently of custom and local norms, and to question received wisdom. All affiliation must be propositional, freely chosen. Liberalism is a world of open doors, through which you can come and go as you please. 

Even continuity - prevailing sense - becomes a circuit breaker that must be dislodged. Innovation - constant change - gets things flowing faster.




What the Globalist wants is maximum flow, at the largest scale. Everything flowing at all times, with no circuit breakers.

Nothing settled, or static; only constant consumption, change, movement. 'Prosperity lies in spending, not in saving.'

Any ideas that help maximise flow are welcome; any that hinder flow are unwelcome.

More flow means more wealth and power. A settled culture - with traditions that persevere over time, rather than fashions and technologies that are in a constant state of change - is a hindrance to flow, and to the accumulation of wealth and power.

We can't scale down because this would require borders and constraints on the flow, along with restrictions on technology.




Once upon a time borders played a significant role: they guaranteed the continuation of collective identities. Today, borders no longer guarantee anything and halt (almost) nothing.

Flows of all kinds are the hallmark of our time, making borders redundant.

[Alain De Benoist]
'The European New Right Forty Years Later,' The Occidental Quaterly, vol. 9, no. 1, Spring 2009, p. 72




Group cooperation requires identification and solidarity, which are undermined by too much diversity. 

Liberals emphasize the latter, whereas Traditionalists emphasize the former.

Traditional religion has played a crucial role in the development of group solidarity, which is responsible for cultural-social vitality and commitment to the future. Hence, Haidt says that the decline of religion in modern society might have devastating consequences.

[Michael Zimmerman]
'The Republican Advantage'




The first step forward is that from school-age upward our societies must reassert a shared national narrative—including a common national culture.

Some years ago the German Muslim writer Bassam Tibi coined the term "Leitkultur"—core culture—to describe this. It is the most decent and properly liberal antidote to multiculturalism.

It concedes that in societies that have had high immigration there are all sorts of different cultures—which will only work together if they are united by a common theme.

[Douglas Murray]
'Cameron's Multicultural wake-up call'




Maastricht seeks to create a supranational, centralised, bureaucratic state - a homogenised union. It would destroy the pillars on which Europe was built – its nations. 

It would convert Europe into one multicultural space, in which national identities would be fused and sovereignty abandoned. It would coerce ancient European nations to merge into the ultimate artificial state. 

As George Orwell remarked, it is characteristic of intellectuals to pass over in incomprehension the dominant political passion of the age. Today, that passion is the search for national identity. And this is the moment when European ruling elites are seeking to destroy the identity of every European nation.

[James Goldsmith]
The Trap, p. 62





Tolerant? Oh, God. Yes, I know - that's what they drum into you at school.

No, Blake was not very tolerant. He didn't even think tolerance was a good thing. It was just more slobbering. He thought it blurred all the outlines and muddled everything - that it made all cats gray. So that nobody would be able to see anything clearly and sharply.

[Gregory Bateson]
Steps to an Ecology of Mind, p. 28




Tolerance                      -                    Justice
Agreeableness               -                   Conscientiousness
Anything                       -                    Something


Those who proclaim the virtues of tolerance believe that they’re tolerant but generally that’s not the case. They just don’t want to accept the responsibility that playing by the rules would bring.

And being useless and unable to move towards a valuable goal and failing to hold anyone else accountable as a consequence of their equivalent failures does not make you tolerant, it just makes you unable to move forward in the world in any productive manner.

We know that these two axis of value - tolerance and justice - are associated with two cardinal personality traits: one is agreeableness and the other is conscientiousness.

People on the radical left - politically correct people - tend to be very high in agreeableness but they tend to be very low in conscientiousness. And that begs the question whether or not their tolerance is a consequence of their avowed love of other people or their hatred for the fact that any structured society requires adherence to a shared set of ordered beliefs and the capacity for people to compete within those ordered beliefs to attain success or victory.

[Jordan B. Peterson]
'Tolerance as a vice'




Nationalists feel a bond with their country, and they believe that this bond imposes moral obligations both ways: Citizens have a duty to love and serve their country, and governments are duty bound to protect their own people. Governments should place their citizens interests above the interests of people in other countries.

There is nothing necessarily racist or base about this arrangement or social contract. Having a shared sense of identity, norms, and history generally promotes trust. Having no such shared sense leads to the condition that the sociologist Émile Durkheim described as “anomie” or normlessness.

The trick [...] is figuring out how to balance reasonable concerns about the integrity of one’s own community with the obligation to welcome strangers, particularly strangers in dire need.

[Jonathan Haidt]
'When and Why Nationalism Beats Globalism'




To this day, our lives are largely spent in drawing boundaries. Every decision we make, our every action, our every word is based on the construction, conscious or unconscious, of boundaries. To make a decision means to draw a boundary line between what to choose and what not to choose. To desire something means to draw a boundary line between pleasurable and unpleasurable things and then move toward the former [...]

Every boundary line is a potential battle line, so that just to draw a boundary is to prepare oneself for conflict. Specifically, the agonizing fight of life against death, pleasure against pain, good against evil […] but in seeking to experience the positive and eliminate the negative, we forget that the positive is defined only in terms of the negative. To destroy the negative is, at the same time, to destroy all possibility of enjoying the positive. The root of the whole difficulty is our tendency to view the opposites as irreconcilable, as totally set apart and divorced from one another.

While it is true that buying and selling are in some sense different… they are also—and this is the point—completely inseparable. In other words, buying and selling are simply two ends of one event, namely, a business transaction. In just the same way, all opposites share an implicit identity. That is, however vividly the differences between these opposites may strike us, they nevertheless remain completely inseparable and mutually interdependent, and for the simple reason that one could not exist without the other [...]

[Ken Wilber]
No Boundary, p. 18, 21-2




Contact is not simply a matter of joining or togetherness, but involves a heightened awareness of the distinction between self and not-self;

in other words, contact occurs at a porous boundary, one that holds self and other apart, but at the same time permits interaction and exchange [...]

“The contact boundary is the point at which one experiences the ‘me’ in relation to that which is ‘not me’ and through this contact, both are more clearly experienced”

[Herb Stevenson]
'Paradox: A Gestalt Theory of Change'




Every ‘good' scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.

[Karl Popper]




All societies draw on nationalism of one sort or another to define relations between the state, the citizen and the outside world.

Craig Calhoun, an American sociologist, argues that cosmopolitan elites, who sometimes yearn for a post-nationalist order, underestimate “how central nationalist categories are to political and social theory—and to practical reasoning about democracy, political legitimacy and the nature of society itself.”

["I don’t mean that we should prefer nationalist accounts, but rather that we should take them seriously and see how deeply imbricated they are in our conceptual frameworks rather than trying to wish them away."]

'League of nationalists', with further quote from Craig Calhoun, Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream, p. 8




Another image to which [analysts of postmodernity] return is the collapse of boundaries.

Not just the boundaries between real and unreal, right and wrong, matter and spirit, but the boundaries between people, individually and collectively. In this regard Deleuze refers to “the end of enclosure”.

The fences which we once constructed around our community, our profession, our gender, our economy, our culture, our nation, our humanity, are in the process of disappearing, and this disappearance is a source of anxiety and grief.

We might suggest that [nationalism] has its roots in this grief. The people to whom [its] message appeals are grieving at the loss of the enclosures which once defined who they were and what was their purpose in life. A globalized, multicultural society threatens their reason for being.

It is not surprising that it is in rural communities that the loss is felt most keenly and that [support for nationalist ideas] is strongest.

[Bernie Neville]
Out of Our Depth and Treading Water: Reflections on Consciousness, Culture and New Learning Technologies'




We concluded that only a gradually accruing sense of identity, based on the experience of social health and cultural solidarity at the end of each major childhood crisis, promises that periodical balance in human life which - in integration of the ego stages - makes for a sense of humanity.

But wherever this sense is lost, wherever integrity yields to despair and disgust, wherever generativity yields to stagnation, intimacy to isolation, and identity to confusion, an array of associated infantile fears are apt to become mobilized: for only an identity safely anchored in the 'patrimony' of a cultural identity can produce a workable psychosocial equilibrium.

Industrial revolution, world-wide communication, standardization, centralization, and mechanization threaten the identities which man has inherited from primitive, agrarian, feudal, and patrician cultures.

What inner equilibrium these cultures had to offer is now endangered on a gigantic scale. As the fear of loss of identity dominates much of our irrational motivation, it calls upon the whole arsenal of anxiety which is left in each individual from the mere fact of his childhood. In this emergency masses of people become ready to seek salvation in pseudo-identities.

I have indicated only by a few suggestions that the anxieties outlined reach into adult life, and this not only in the form of neurotic anxiety, which, after all, is recognisable as such, kept in bounds by most, and can be cured in some. More terrifyingly, they reappear in the form of collective panics and in afflictions of the collective mind.

The rapid spread of communication and the increasing knowledge of cultural relativity endanger people who are in marginal position, people who are traumatically exposed to a numerical increase or the closer proximity or the greater power of others-than-themselves.

Among such people the drive for tolerance has its point of diminishing returns: it causes anxiety. 

Similarly, the drive for judiciousness is by no means as immediately conducive to civic peace or, for that matter, to mental health as the new American peace ship 'Mental Hygiene' would have us believe: for the tolerant appraisal of other identities endangers one's own.

[Erik H. Erikson]
Childhood and Society, p. 371-2, 377




This radical transformation of the population of America has taken place with incredible speed. There has been large-scale legal as well as illegal immigration (the latter estimated at between 2 and 3 million each year). What is more, the immigrant peoples, once installed, have a higher birth-rate. 

The twentieth-century writers Oakeshottlo and Santayanall believed that one of the disasters which can befall any community is that its shared understandings, in other words its common culture, be dissipated in too rapid or too sweeping change.

You do not mean to imply that a nation cannot integrate foreigners?

Of course not. Indeed, nations need new blood and new ideas. 

But they can only absorb a limited amount at a time. They cannot allow themselves to be overwhelmed by immigration otherwise they will lose their identity and cease to be nations. 

Newcomers who are welcomed into a nation should want to honour and respect the customs of their new home. 

[James Goldsmith]
The Trap, p. 51, 59




Submarines are built with watertight compartments, so that a leak in one area will not spread and sink the whole vessel. Now that we have globalised the world’s economy, the protective compartments no longer exist. Thus, we have globalised problems. 

A crisis in Mexico has become a ‘potential world catastrophe’.

[James Goldsmith]
The Response, p. 97




The politicians and technocrats who govern us […] find it difficult to distinguish between a nation and a commercial enterprise. Often, they describe their own country as though it were a company, for example, UK plc.

[…] the belief of our power elites [is that the] world economy is to be run for the benefit of footloose corporations, not to serve the fundamental requirements of communities throughout the world.

We know that there are now two different and conflicting economies, the corporate economy and the national economy. Is society going to continue to accept that its true needs are subservient to the interests of the corporate economy? Or will we bring harmony to the two, so that they both prosper within a home economy respectful of free enterprise?

[James Goldsmith]
The Response, p. 119-20




The idolatry of giantism that I have talked about is possibly one of the causes and certainly one of the effects of modern technology, particularly in matters of transport and communications. A highly developed transport and communications system has one immensely powerful effect: it makes people footloose

Everything in the world has to have a structure, otherwise it is chaos. 

Before the advent of mass transport and mass communications, the structure was simply there, because people were relatively immobile […] There were communications, there was mobility, but no footlooseness. 

Now previously, before this technological intervention, the relevance of frontiers was almost exclusively political and dynastic; frontiers were delimitations of political power, determining how many people you could raise for war. Economists fought against such frontiers becoming economic barriers – hence the ideology of free trade. But, then, people and things were not footloose: transport was expensive enough so that movements, both of people and of goods, were never more than marginal. 

Trade in the pre-industrial era was not a trade in essentials, but a trade in precious stones, precious metals, luxury goods, spices and - unhappily - slaves. The basic requirements of life had of course to be indigenously produced. And the movement of populations, except in periods of disaster, was confined to persons who had a very special reason to move, such as the Irish saints or the scholars of the University of Paris.

But now everything and everybody has become mobile. All structures are threatened, and all structures are vulnerable to an extent that they have never been before.

Economics, which Lord Keynes had hoped would settle down as a modest occupation similar to dentistry, suddenly becomes the most important subject of all […] It tends to absorb the whole of ethics and to take precedence over all other human considerations. Now, quite clearly, this is a pathological development, which has, of course, many roots, but one of its clearly visible roots lies in the great achievements of modern technology in terms of transport and communications.

While people, with an easy-going kind of logic, believe that fast transport and instantaneous communications open up a new dimension of freedom (which they do in some rather trivial respects), they overlook the fact that these achievements also tend to destroy freedom, by making everything extremely vulnerable and extremely insecure, unless conscious policies are developed and conscious action is taken, to mitigate the destructive effects of these technological developments.

[E.F. Schumacher]
Small is Beautiful, p. 57-8




Within any field of human interest, liberty is a necessary condition of scientific advance. This follows because science can proceed only where there is complete freedom to advance hypotheses contrary to prevailing opinion.

Pareto, indeed, considers liberty to be an indispensable requirement of scientific method: “It follows that before a theory can be considered true, it is virtually indispensable that there be perfect freedom to impugn it. Any limitation, even indirect and however remote, imposed on anyone choosing to contradict it is enough to cast suspicion upon it.

Hence freedom to express one's thought, even counter to the opinion of the majority or of all, even when it offends the sentiments of the few or of the many, even when it is generally reputed absurd or criminal, always proves favorable to the discovery of objective truth." […]

Experience seems to show that, almost always, liberty is a condition for an advanced “level of civilization," in the sense that Mosca uses this expression. That is, liberty is needed to permit the fullest release of the potential social forces and creative impulses present in society, and their maximum development.

[James Burnham]
The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, p.222




[…] no society can discover an order without a concept of what is normal and what is right. Conceptually, the normal is unromantic because every norm destroys the occasional license of the romantic.

In the face of a normative concept, even the romantic qualities of antithesis and contrast break down. The courage of a brave man is not the higher unity formed from depression and exaltation. The rationally ordered state is not a synthesis of anarchy and despotism.

As such, legal ideas are unromantic in the same way. 

Viewed romantically, injustice is only a dissonance that is aesthetically resolved “in a sacred music, an endless feeling of the higher life.” This is not spoken in a metaphorical sense, but rather in the only category that is accessible to the experience of the romantic.

That is why there is neither a romantic law nor a romantic ethics, just as it would be confused to speak of a lyrical or a musical ethics.

[Carl Schmitt]
Political Romanticism, p. 161




A core feature of liberal philosophy and politics is recognition of the arbitrariness of almost every border.

This runs as a golden thread in considerations not only of the political understanding of borders-primarily national borders—but of any existing differentiation, distinction, boundary, and delineation, all of which come under suspicion as arbitrarily limiting individual freedom of choice.

All such “borders” are interrogated for their arbitrariness, and few can ultimately withstand the pressure of such interrogation - even those that are not arbitrary but are nevertheless limiting. Borders and boundaries based in geography, history, and nature must increasingly be erased under the logic of liberalism.

[Patrick J. Deneen]
Why Liberalism Failed, p.xviii




The global circulation of commodities, information, and populations, far from making everyone affluent, has widened the gap between rich and poor nations and generated a massive migration to the West, where the newcomers swell the vast army of the homeless, unemployed, illiterate, drug ridden, derelict, and effectively disfranchised.

Their presence strains existing resources to the breaking point. Medical and educational facilities, law enforcement agencies, and the available supply of jobs to mention the supply of racial tolerance and goodwill, never abundant to begin with—all appear inadequate to the enormous task of assimilating what is essentially a surplus or "redundant" population, in the cruelly expressive British phrase.

[Christopher Lasch]
The True and Only Heaven, p.169




According to the editor of the New Age, A. R. Orage, the reduction of labor to a commodity - the essence of "wagery" - required the elimination of all the social bonds that prevented the free circulation of labor.

The destruction of the medieval guilds, the replacement of local government by a centralized bureaucracy, the weakening of family ties, and the emancipation of women amounted to "successive steps in the... cheapening of the raw material of labor," all achieved under the "watchword" of progress.

Since wage labor depended on the "progressive shattering to atoms of our social system," those who opposed it would have to make the unions into agencies of social cohesion and civic trust.

[Christopher Lasch]
The True and Only Heaven, p.321




Capital grows inasmuch as people engage in free competition. Hereby, individual freedom amounts to servitude inasmuch as Capital lays hold of it and uses it for its own propagation. That is, Capital exploits individual freedom in order to breed: 'It is not the individuals who are set free by free competition; it is, rather, capital which is set free.’

The freedom of Capital achieves self-realization by way of individual freedom.

In the process, individuals degrade into the genital organs of Capital. Individual freedom lends it an 'automatic' subjectivity of its own, which spurs it to reproduce actively. In this way, Capital continuously 'brings forth living offspring'.

Today, individual freedom is taking on excessive forms; ultimately, this amounts to nothing other than the excess of Capital itself.

[Byung-Chul Han]
Psychopolitics, p.4




Under the immaterial mode of production that now prevails, more information and more communication mean more productivity, acceleration and growth. Information represents a positive value; inasmuch as it lacks interiority, it can circulate independently, free from any and all context. Accordingly, the circulation of information admits acceleration at will - for purely arbitrary reasons.

Secrets, foreignness and otherness represent impediments to unbounded communication. In the name of transparency, they are to be eliminated. Communication goes faster when it is smoothed out - that is, when thresholds, walls and gaps are removed.

This also means stripping people of interiority, which blocks and slows down communication. However, such emptying-out of persons does not occur by violent means. Instead, it occurs as voluntary self-exposure. 

The negativity of otherness or foreignness is de-interiorized and transformed into the positivity of communicable and consumable difference: 'diversity'.

The dispositive of transparency effects utter exteriorization in order to accelerate the circulation of information and speed communication. Ultimately, openness facilitates unrestricted communication - whereas closedness, reserve and interiority obstruct it.

The dispositive of transparency has the further consequence of promoting total conformity. The economy of transparency seeks to suppress deviation. Total networking - total communication - already has a levelling effect per se.

[Byung-Chul Han]
Psychopolitics, p.9-10




The mole moves through predetermined spaces; as such, it subordinates itself to spatial restrictions. The mole is a subjugated subject. But the snake is a project inasmuch as it creates space through the course it steers.

The passage from the mole to the snake - from subject to project - does not amount to setting out for an entirely new way of life; instead, it represents a mutation, indeed an intensification, of capitalism, which remains one and the same.

The mole's restricted movements impose limits on productivity. Even when it labours in disciplined fashion, it cannot exceed a certain level of productivity.

The snake eliminates such limitations through new forms of movement. Accordingly, the capitalist system is switching from the mole-model to the snake-model in order to generate more productivity.

[Byung-Chul Han]
Psychopolitics, p.18




When communication is to be accelerated, idiosyncrasy poses an obstacle inasmuch as it amounts to an immunological defence against the Other. Idiosyncrasy stands in the way of unbounded communicative exchange.

Accordingly, immunosuppression is necessary for acceleration to proceed. But now, immune responses are subjected to massive suppression so that information will circulate faster and capital will accelerate.

Communication achieves maximum velocity when the Same reacts to the Same. In contrast, the resistance and recalcitrance of otherness, of foreignness, troubles and impedes the smooth communication of the Same. In the Inferno of the Same, communication attains its highest speed.

[Byung-Chul Han]
Psychopolitics, p.82-3




Since the most important aspect of self-organisation is the emergence of structure through the activity of microscopic units that do not have access to global patterns, the principles that determine the behaviours of weights and nodes locally are very important.

[One of the preconditions for self-organisation is that there] is competition among the units. Competing for limited resources is the basic driving force behind the development of structure. Stronger units thrive at the expense of others.

If resources were limitless, i.e. if growth could take place unrestricted, no meaningful structure would evolve. Boundaries, limits and constraints are preconditions for structure.

[…] There is also co-operation among at least some units. If only single units won, the resulting structure would be too simple for self-organisation to evolve. Co-operation is also necessary to form associations among patterns. Mutual reinforcement and co-operation are preconditions for a rich, meaningful structure.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.94-5




It would be simplistic, however, to link ‘power’ with specification and aggregation, and ‘resistance’ with movements of generalisation and disaggregation (cf. Patton, 2000: 65–6).

Though the former are frequently the means whereby relations in assemblages assert control and thus power over other relations, we cannot assume that resistance is always associated with generalisation and singularity.

As noted earlier, a capitalist marketplace is actually a radically unconstrained space, in which anyone can trade with anyone (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 222). Resisting the forces of the free market in such circumstances may actually entail individual consumers aggregating together and re-specifying themselves as a ‘workers’ collective’ that refuses to accept the anarchy of the marketplace.

[Nick J. Fox & Pam Alldred]
‘Social structures, power and resistance in monist sociology: (New) materialist insights’




The theory behind factor substitution in economics is that firms will substitute one input for another in response to changes in their relative prices.

This is based on the idea of production being subject to the law of diminishing returns, meaning that as more of a single input is used, its marginal productivity will eventually decrease. As a result, if the price of one input increases, firms may switch to using more of a cheaper input to maintain the same level of production.

This substitution of inputs is known as the factor substitution effect, and it helps to explain why changes in the prices of inputs can impact the cost of production and ultimately affect the supply of goods and services in the market.

ChatGPT




Communication without community can be accelerated because it is additive. Rituals, by contrast, are narrative processes that do not allow for acceleration […] A narrative is a form of closure: it has a beginning and an end and is characterized by a closed order.

Information by contrast, is additive, not narrative. It does not combine into a story, a song, that could form the basis of meaning and identity. Information can only be endlessly accumulated.

Symbols stand still [but] information exists by circulating. Stillness only means that communication ceases, stands still. It does not produce anything.

In the post-industrial age, the noise of the machines gives way to the noise of communication. More information and more communication holds out the promise of more production. Thus, the compulsion of production expresses itself in the compulsion of communication.

Beneath the old wild pear tree, silence rules, because everything has already been told. Today, the noise of communication replaces the silence.

[Byung-Chul Han]
The Disappearance of Rituals, p.13, 31




The neoliberal imperative of optimization and performance does not allow for any completion. Everything is provisional and incomplete; nothing is final and conclusive.

It is not only computer software that is subject to the compulsion of optimization. All areas of life are subordinated to its dictates, even education. Life-long learning does not involve completion. It amounts only to life-long production.

The neoliberal regime abolishes all forms of closure and completion in the name of increased productivity.

Ties and bonds, as forms of closure, are also increasingly cut. Flexibility is enforced by the ruthless destruction of bonds. The isolated subject of performance exploits itself most efficiently when it remains open to everything - in other words, when it is flexible.

The excessive opening up and removal of boundaries is present at all levels of society. It is the imperative of neoliberalism.

Globalization also dissolves all closed structures in order to accelerate the circulation of capital, commodities and information. It removes boundaries, de-sites [ent-ortet] the world, turning it into a global market.

Tourists […] travel through the de-sited world. They circulate incessantly, like commodities and information.

[Byung-Chul Han]
The Disappearance of Rituals, p.28-9




Rituals give form to the essential transitions of life. They are forms of closure. Without them, we slip through.

Thus, we age without growing old, or we remain infantile consumers who never become adults. The discontinuity of autonomous time gives way to the continuity of production and consumption.

Rites of passage give structure to life in the same way seasons do. Whoever passes a certain threshold has concluded a phase of life and enters into a new one. Thresholds, as transitions, give a rhythm to, articulate, and even narrate space and time. They make possible a deep experience of order. Thresholds are temporally intense transitions.

Today, they are being erased and replaced by an accelerated and seamless communication and production. This is making us poorer in space and time.

In our attempt to produce more space and time, we lose them. They lose their language and become mute. Thresholds speak. Thresholds transform. Beyond a threshold, there is what is other, what is foreign. In the absence of the imagination of the threshold, the magic of the threshold, all that is left is the hell of the same.

The construction of the global is premised on the ruthless destruction of thresholds and transitions. Information and commodities prefer a world without thresholds: unresisting smoothness accelerates circulation. Today, temporally intense transitions are disintegrating into speedy passages, continuous links and endless clicks.

[Byung-Chul Han]
The Disappearance of Rituals, p.35




Liberalism is perhaps the ultimate propositional identity. To be a liberal is not to have what David Goodhart calls ‘ascribed’ identities […] As a Lululemon yoga pant wearing wine aunt, your tribe is your belief.

The problem with propositional identities […] is that they exclude no one, because a belief is open to anyone. But any identity needs boundaries to be meaningful (and especially, to confer status).

[Imperium Press]
‘The Epistemic Divorce’, Imperium Press, Substack




On the dominant liberal view, government is to be neutral as between rival conceptions of the human good, yet in fact what liberalism promotes is a kind of institutional order that is inimical to the construction and sustaining of the types of communal relationship required for the best kind of human life.

[Alasdair MacIntyre]
After Virtue, p. xvii




The Round Tablers, who had no firsthand knowledge of native life or even of tropical Africa, were devoted supporters of the English way of life, and could see no greater benefit conferred on natives than to help them to move in that direction.

This, however, would inevitably destroy the tribal organization of life, as well as the native systems of land tenure, which were generally based on tribal holding of land.

The white settlers were eager to see these things disappear, since they generally wished to bring the native labor force and African lands into the commercial market. Oldham and Lugard opposed this, since they felt it would lead to white ownership of large tracts of land on which detribalized and demoralized natives would subsist as wage slaves.

[Carroll Quigley]
Tragedy and Hope, ‘The Buffer Fringe,’ p.95




The interest of the United States in multilateral trade rather than in bilateral trade was to be found in the fact that her surpluses existed in all types of goods - foodstuffs, raw materials, and industrial products - and the markets for these would have to be sought in all kinds of foreign economies, not in any single type.

Accordingly, the United States became the world’s chief defender of freer and multilateral trade. Her chief argument was based on the fact that such trade would contribute to a higher standard of living for all parties. To the United States, whose political security was so sound that it rarely required a moment’s thought, a higher standard of living was the chief aim of existence. Accordingly, it was difficult for the United States to comprehend the point of view of a state which, lacking political security, placed a high standard of living in a position second to such security.

In sharp contrast to the United States in its attitude toward the problem of international trade was Nazi Germany. This and other countries were seeking “independence” (that is, political goals in the economic sphere), and they rejected “dependence” even if it did include a higher standard of living.

They frequently rejected the argument that autarky was necessarily injurious to the standard of living or to international trade, because by “autarky” they did not mean self-sufficiency in all things, but self-sufficiency in necessities. Once this had been achieved, they stated their willingness to expand the world’s trade in nonessentials to an extent as great as any standard of living might require.

The basic key to the new emphasis on autarky is to be found in the fact that the advocates of such economic behavior had a new conception of the meaning of sovereignty. To them sovereignty had not only all the legal and political connotations it had always held, but in addition had to include economic independence.

[Carroll Quigley]
Tragedy and Hope, p.230



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The Principle of Polarity

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There is no consciousness without discrimination of opposites [...] Nothing can exist without its opposite; the two were one in the beginning and will be one again in the end.

[C. G. Jung]
Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (CW 9), par. 178


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"Everything is Dual, everything has poles; everything has its pair of opposites; like and unlike are the same; opposites are identical in nature, but different in degree; extremes meet; all truths are but half-truths; all paradoxes may be reconciled."

This Principle embodies the truth that "everything is dual"; "everything has two poles"; "everything has its pair of opposites," all of which were old Hermetic axioms.

It explains the old paradoxes, that have perplexed so many, which have been stated as follows: "Thesis and anti-thesis are identical in nature, but different in degree"; "opposites are the same, differing only in degree"; "the pairs of opposites may be reconciled"; "extremes meet"; "everything is and isn't, at the same time"; "all truths are but half-truths"; "every truth is half-false"; "there are two sides to everything," etc., etc., etc.

It explains that in everything there are two poles, or opposite aspects, and that "opposites" are really only the two extremes of the same thing, with many varying degrees between them.

To illustrate: Heat and Cold, although "opposites," are really the same thing, the differences consisting merely of degrees of the same thing. Look at your thermometer and see if you can discover where "heat" terminates and "cold" begins! There is no such thing as "absolute heat" or "absolute cold" — the two terms "heat" and "cold" simply indicate varying degrees of the same thing, and that "same thing" which manifests as "heat" and "cold" is merely a form, variety, and rate of Vibration.

The Kybalion, Chapter 2: "The Seven Hermetic Principles"

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They drew special attention to the fact that polarity, that is to say, the sundering of a force into two qualitatively different and opposite activities striving for reunion, a sundering which also frequently reveals itself spatially by a dispersion in opposite directions, is a fundamental type of almost all the phenomena of nature, from the magnet and the crystal up to man.

Yet in China this knowledge has been current since the earliest times in the doctrine of Yin and Yang.

[Arthur Schopenhauer]
The World as Will and Representation, p.143-4


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All movement is defined in terms of an oscillation between two opposite polarities.

Implicit in the idea of oscillation, however, is the related concept of differences.

Differences convey information to an observer and therefore provide the basis for a response.

Without differences between structures, and between states of being, there would be nothing to perceive, nothing to respond to, and therefore no movement or evolution.

[Tony Plummer]
The Law of Vibration, p. 17

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A signal is digital if there is discontinuity between it and alternative signals from which it must be distinguished. Yes and no are examples of digital signals.

In contrast, when a magnitude or quantity in the signal is used to represent a continuously variable quantity in the referrent, the signal is said to be analogic.

Numbers are the product of counting. Quantities are the product of measurement.

This means that numbers can conceivably be accurate because there is a discontinuity between each integer and the next. Between two and three, there is a jump.

In the case of quantity, there is no such jump; and because jump is missing in the world of quantity, it is impossible for any quantity to be exact. You can have exactly three tomatoes. You can never have exactly three gallons of water. Always quantity is approximate.

In other words, number is of the world of pattern, gestalt, and digital computation; quantity is of the world of analogic and probabalistic computation.

[Gregory Bateson]
Mind and Nature, p. 59, 241

Number = can be exact = separate = heaven
Quantity = can't be exact = connected = earth


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[...] Gestalt theory recognizes that all choices exist on a continuum between one extreme and another (authoritarian or collegial, open-minded or closed-minded) and represent a decision, however unconscious, to position oneself nearer to one pole than to the other. This is what is meant by polar differentiation: seeing options on the continuum between poles.

[...] all meaning manifests through the creation and dissolution of polarities.

"In order for a phenomenon to be perceptible and appreciable, it must stand for the opposite of something else; it must be different from some other thing. This distinction constitutes, in the most elementary way, the figures of the world, the forms of phenomena. The elementary principle of creation that structures this distinction of phenomena is that of polarities, the original opposite."

The individual is himself or herself "a never-ending sequence of polarities. Whenever an individual recognises one aspect of him [or her] self, the presence of the antithesis, or polar quality, is implicit."

Because the pairs of opposites (polarities) are actually extremes on the same continuum of possibilities, the nearer one gets to the mid-point of the continuum, the more difficult it is to differentiate one pole from another.

Friedlaender calls this midpoint the point of "indifference." It is at this point – the point at which the full continuum of possibilities is fully known -- that creativity becomes possible and where the polarity dissolves or, if you prefer, transforms into a higher order of understanding.

[Herb Stevenson]
'Paradox: A Gestalt Theory of Change'


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Polarity creates moving body forms in pairs of opposites, and places the opposite of each pair on opposite sides of a mutual equator. It likewise makes each mate so dependent on the other that neither could survive without constant interchange.

No living body could survive without receiving its inward breath from its spatial counterpart, nor could the spatial mate survive without the outbreathing of its opposite body to recharge it.

[Walter Russell]
A New Concept of the Universe, p. 80


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[...] each value complex's need for both 'challenge and support,' as illuminated by the insights of polarity theory, is best fulfilled by a form of opposition that recognizes its own inherent interdependency with the political counterpart it seeks to moderate.

In other words, the ability to influence and potentially persuade a given political constituency is almost always tied to an acknowledged degree of sympathy for that constituency's positions.

Stated yet another way, the partisans of any given position are far more likely to listen to and respect the opinion of opponents who are willing to affirm at least some of the strengths of their position.

[Steve McIntosh]
'Overcoming Polarization by Evolving Both Right and Left'


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What all these point to is the fundamentally divided nature of mental experience.

When one puts that together with the fact that the brain is divided into two relatively independent chunks which just happen broadly to mirror the very dichotomies that are being pointed to – alienation versus engagement, abstraction versus incarnation, the categorical versus the unique, the general versus the particular, the part versus the whole, and so on – it seems like a metaphor that might have some literal truth.

But if it turns out to be ‘just’ a metaphor, I will be content. I have a high regard for metaphor. It is how we come to understand the world.

[Iain McGilchrist]
The Master and His Emissary, p. 462


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It has long been argued that the wisest crowds are the most diverse [...] in a theoretical model of group decision-making, a diverse group of problem-solvers made a better collective guess than that produced by the group of best-performing solvers. In other words, diverse minds do better, when their decisions are averaged, than expert minds.

Could there also be ways to make an existing crowd wiser?

Previous work might imply that you should add random individuals whose decisions are unrelated to those of existing group members. That would be good, but it’s better still to add individuals who aren’t simply independent thinkers but whose views are ‘negatively correlated’ – as different as possible – from the existing members. In other words, diversity trumps independence.

If you want accuracy, then, add those who might disagree strongly with your group. 

[Philip Ball]
'‘Wisdom of the crowd’: The myths and realities'


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The polarity Big-Small is the first in the inventory of existential oppositions such as Male and Female, Ruler and Ruled, Owner and Owned, Light Skin and Dark, over all of which emancipatory struggles are now raging both politically and psychologically.

The aim of these struggles is the recognition of the divided function of partners who are equal not because they are essentially alike, but because in their very uniqueness they are both essential to a common function.

Exploitation exists where a divided function is misused by one of the partners involved in such a way that for the sake of his pseudo-aggrandizement he deprives the other partner of whatever sense of identity he had achieved, of whatever integrity he had approached.

The loss of mutuality which characterizes such exploitation eventually destroys the common function and the exploiter himself.

[Erik H. Erikson]
Childhood and Society, p. 376-7


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Related posts:-
Shades of gray
In-between
Joining the dots
Everything is connected
Exclusion
Boxed off
A Difference that makes a Difference
This, Not That 
Assuming a position
All is Change
The Colour Wheel
The Eternal Ideas 
Giving and Receiving 
The Middle Path 
Balance 
Life and Death (and everything in between)  

Short Cuts




Concrete                     -                   Abstract
Simple                        -                   Complex
One                             -                    Many
Low resolution           -                    High resolution




In interpreting the world we're constantly faced with the decision of what level of resolution - or level of analysis - to use.

If we take it as a given that we're always missing something, then the question is, exactly how much can we miss before it becomes a problem? The answer, it seems, depends on context - in other words, what are our goals, and what level of analysis do they demand? In other words, what level of detail is appropriate to this situation?

Complexity can be seen as noise, or entropy. It is a breaking-apart into ever more detail. The more detail we see the truer our picture. In this sense, the best map of the territory is the territory itself. And yet, we need our maps, our simple representations.

Sometimes short-cuts - low resolution interpretations - are useful and appropriate. But sometimes they prevent us from seeing something vital.

What are we leaving out? And is it important?




As soon as we look into something - i.e. remove the lid, the capstone, and see what lurks inside or beneath - we find that we are much less able to make simple generalisations about it.

From the outside, from a distance, it is easy to characterise things - perhaps due in large part to the fact that we are largely ignorant to their inherent complexity. A distant view gives the comforting illusion of simplicity.

So, for instance, I can speculate about the various problems of the education system, or the problems with teachers, but were I to become a teacher myself, I would not, generally speaking, find it as easy to make the same sweeping pronouncements. The field would suddenly have become much more complex, and I may find myself pulling back from definitive statements; easing on the brake instead of the accelerator.

The more I experience of life, the more I realise this seems to apply to everything. It may even lie behind Conquests Third Law: Everyone is conservative about what he knows best.

This implies that any firm judgement or pronouncement is always made in ignorance - by overlooking complexity - and as such every judgement, every bold move, can be criticised by making reference to the many details that have been overlooked - to all those things that have necessarily been ignored in order to provide the illusion of solidity and to make the judgement firm.




Definitions do not contain any knowledge [...] they are simply shorthand labels introduced in order to cut a long story short.

[Jeremy Waldron]
Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, p. 222




"Why can't they get it together, they're so lazy"


"Laziness."

What is "laziness"? Does "laziness" describe an element of reality, a "real" phenomenon? Does "laziness" actually exist?

"Laziness" is, amongst other things, an explanatory principle that we use to describe a category of behaviours.

From the endless profusion of reality - the continuum of events and things - we sketch out some borders, and tell ourselves that everything in between them will be referred to as "lazy." It is a handy fiction. Like all explanatory principles, laziness is a shortcut, a label we wheel out to stop us from having to dig any deeper, from spending any time. It is an adaptive invention that conserves energy, allowing us to get from A to B in the shortest possible time. If we can only cram so much information into our consciousness - concentrate on a finite amount of things - then our shortcuts allow us to get on with things, to get things done. They bypass the long route, because the long route is wasteful.

And so more often than not, we take the short one: "he is lazy." But if we use "lazy" then we should be aware that we are using a placeholder; that we are, in fact, marking something for further examination. The problem with a fiction like "lazy" is when it is literalised; when we begin to believe that the dragon really exists, and that it is embodied by this person, or that person.

When we look beneath "lazy" we begin to see a number of other things; more words rush in. We begin to see "preoccupied," "depressed," "afraid." We see these and much more. And then these words begin to crack and crumble, revealing further intricacies.

"Laziness" is not designed to hold reality, or to reflect it. Whilst pretending to describe reality, "laziness" actually works to keep us at arms length from it. The actuality that lies beneath "laziness" in an unexploded bomb: remove the lid - the label - and it detonates into a million pieces; a million fragments of reality - so many that we cannot hold them all, understand them all. They whirl around us, spinning us into a confusion. Perhaps then, it is best not to remove the lid, to look beneath "lazy."

But if we care about this person - this lazy so and so - then perhaps we owe them more than "lazy." Is "lazy" ever excusable? Maybe it just needs untethering from the reality that we hang around it, so that it can float up and take its rightful place, among all the other nebulous words.

Perhaps to use terms like "lazy" might just be plain ... lazy.




“I saw him every once in a while pass by, he was a very shy guy and tall, about 6ft 2in [1.88 metres]. He wasn’t very sporty, rather a little chubby,” said Stephan Baumanns, the 47-year-old owner of the Treemans bakery and coffee shop in the leafy Maxvorstadt neighbourhood.

“He seemed like a lazy guy. He had a job distributing a free newspaper, Münchener Wochenblatt, but I often saw him rather than deliver them, throw them all away into the garbage bin.”

''He seemed like a lazy guy': locals describe Munich shooter'




The choice is always the same. You can make your model more complex and more faithful to reality, or you can make it simpler and easier to handle.

Only the most naive scientist believes that the perfect model os the one that perfectly represents reality. Such a model would have the same drawbacks as a map as large and detailed as the city it represents, a map depicting every park, every street, every building, every tree, every pothole, every inhabitant, and every map.

Were such a map possible, its specificity would defeat its purpose: to generalise and abstract. Mapmakers highlight such features as their clients choose. Whatever their purpose, maps and models must simplify as much as they mimic the world.

[James Gleick]
Chaos, p. 278-9




Kinds, and sameness of kind -what colossally useful denkmittel for finding our way among the many!

The manyness might conceivably have been absolute. Experiences might have all been singulars, no one of them occurring twice. In such a world logic would have had no application; for kind and sameness of kind are logic's only instruments.

Once we know that whatever is of a kind is also of that kind's kind, we can travel through the universe as if with seven-league boots. Brutes surely never use these abstractions, and civilized men use them in most various amounts.

[William James]
'Pragmatism and Common Sense', Pragmatism and Other Writings, p. 80




[The historian] is back in his proper place when he takes us away from simple and absolute judgements and by returning to the historical context entangles everything up again.

The whole process of historical study is a movement towards historical research - it is to carry us from the general to the particular, from the abstract to the concrete, from the thesis that the Reformation led to liberty to an actual vision of all the chances and changes which brought about the modern world.

The volume and complexity of historical research are at the same time the result and the demonstration of the fact that the more we examine the way in which things happen, the more we are driven from the simple to the complex.

If history could be told in all its complexity and detail it would provide us with something as chaotic and baffling as life itself; but because it can be condensed there is nothing that cannot be made to seem simple, and the chaos acquires form by virtue of what we choose to omit.

There is a danger in all abridgments that acquire certainty by reason of what they omit, and so answer all questions more clearly than historical research is ever able to do.

Perhaps the greatest of all the lessons of history is this demonstration of the complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men; and on the face of it this is a lesson that can only be learned in detail.

If history can do anything it is to remind us of those complications that undermine our certainties, and to show us that all our judgments are merely relative to time and circumstance.

So the last word of the historian is not some fine firm general statement; it is a piece of detailed research. It is a study of the complexity that underlies any generalisation that we can make [...] Indeed the historian is never more himself when he is searching his mind for a general statement that shall in itself give the hint of its own underlying complexity.

[Herbert Butterfield]
The Whig Interpretation of History, p. 69, 73-5, 97, 101-2




One of the main themes on which Taleb touches in The Black Swan, is "Platonification", or our tendency as humans to simplify.

We like to explain history by using general themes when, in fact, history is very complex and cannot be simplified into one theme and a few pages. We not only simplify history, but we also generalize problems and make simplifying forecasts. Our tendency to Platonify also leads us to depend on averages and to believe that the future will be average. We then miss the "Black Swans".

'The Black Swan, by Taleb'





When I wondered about the cause of the estuary die-off, an hypothesis may have jumped into your mind – climate change, the culprit du jour for nearly every environmental problem.  

If we could identify one thing as THE cause, the solution would be so much more accessible. 

As I was doing research for my book, I googled “effect of soil erosion on climate change,” and the first two pages of results showed the converse of my search – the effect of climate change on soil erosion. The same for biodiversity.

No doubt it is true that climate change exacerbates all kinds of environmental problems, but the rush to name a unitary cause to a complex problem should give us pause.

The pattern is familiar. Do you think the “fight against climate change,” which starts by identifying an enemy, CO2, will bring better results than the War on Terror, the War on Drugs, or the War on Poverty?

[Charles Eisenstein]
'Of Horseshoe Crabs and Empathy'




Innumerable kinds of causes and conditions are necessary to bring about [a person’s] action - social causes, educational causes, economic, political, climatic, nutritional, genetic, medical causes, besides the subjective and neural angles that we have noticed. Each of these sets of causes may partially explain the action. But none of them invalidates the others; there is room for them all.

The question which of them counts as the explanation in a given case depends entirely on our interests, on what we want to find out.

Current notions of determinism, however, allow specialists in any of these topics to feel that the whole logical space is theirs - that they alone possess the explanation. Thus we get the odd spectacle of many competing determinisms - genetic determinism, economic determinism, neurological determinism and so forth - where the claim seems to be that a single discipline has finally found the engine which runs all the other causes.

That is another trouble about current notions of determinism which needs to be sorted out. On large topics, this kind of tribal narrowness is always disastrous.

[Mary Midgley]
Science and Poetry, p.166
 



Let’s take a moment to define the difference between a behaviour that’s simple and [a behaviour that's] complex.

A very practical way to think about this is that when you’re presented with [a pattern], how easily can you summarise what you see?

If it’s just a uniform [pattern], you’re done. You have a quick description that gets you the complete specification of the pattern.

When we see things as complex, what’s really going on is that we, as human analysers of what we’re seeing, don’t get very far. We can’t [capture] the thing we’re seeing with some simple description. We’re just stuck with saying, ‘it is what it is’.

We may be able to give some ornate description of what’s there, but we don’t get to summarise everything in a sentence or two.

[Stephen Wolfram]
'Stephen Wolfram - What is Complexity in the Cosmos?'




[...] in the use of reason lies the eternal temptation to do with human data in experiment and argument what the child does with them in play: namely, to reduce them to a size and an order in which they seem manageable.

Thus human data are treated as if the human being were an animal, or a machine, or a statistical item. Much naive sense of power can be derived from the fact that, properly approached, the human being up to a point is all of these things, and under certain conditions can be reduced to being nothing but their facsimiles.

But the attempt to make man more exploitable by reducing him to a simpler model of himself cannot lead to an essentially human psychology.

[Erik H. Erikson]
Childhood and Society, p. 378




Society is composed of persons who cannot design, build, repair, or even operate most of the devices upon which their lives depend […]

In the complexity of this world people are confronted with extraordinary events and functions that are literally unintelligible to them. They are unable to give an adequate explanation of man-made phenomena in their immediate experience. They are unable to form a coherent, rational picture of the whole.

Under the circumstances, all persons do, and indeed must, accept a great number of things on faith […] Their way of understanding is basically religious, rather than scientific; only a small portion of one’s everyday experience in the technological society can be made scientific […]

The plight of members of the technological society can be compared to that of a newborn child. Much of the data that enters its sense does not form coherent wholes. There are many things the child cannot understand or, after it has learned to speak, cannot successfully explain to anyone […]

Citizens of the modern age in this respect are less fortunate than children. They never escape a fundamental bewilderment in the face of the complex world that their senses report. They are not able to organize all or even very much of this into sensible wholes […]

[Langdon Winner]
Autonomous Technology: Technics-Out-Of-Control




In the modeling of physics, a toy model is a deliberately simplistic model with many details removed so that it can be used to explain a mechanism concisely. It is also useful in a description of the fuller model.

In "toy" mathematical models, this is usually done by reducing or extending the number of dimensions or reducing the number of fields/variables or restricting them to a particular symmetric form.

In Macroeconomics modelling, are a class of models, some may be only loosely based on theory, others more explicitly so. But they have the same purpose. They allow for a quick first pass at some question, and present the essence of the answer from a more complicated model or from a class of models. For the researcher, they may come before writing a more elaborate model, or after, once the elaborate model has been worked out.

In "toy" physical descriptions, an analogous example of an everyday mechanism is often used for illustration.

'Toy model'
Wikipedia




Models have to reduce the complexity of the phenomena being described, they have to leave something out.

However, we have no way of predicting the importance of that which is not considered. In a non-linear world where we cannot track a clear causal chain, something that may appear to be unimportant now, may turn out to be vitally important later. Or vice versa, of course. Our models have to “frame” the problem in a certain way, and this framing will inevitably introduce distortions.

This is not an argument against the construction of models. We have no choice but to make models if we want to understand the world. It is just an argument that models of complex systems will always be flawed in principle, and that we have to acknowledge these limitations.

My conclusion is that it is impossible to have a perfect model of a complex system. This is not because of some inadequacy in our modelling techniques, but a result of the meaning of the notions “model” and “complex”. There will always be a gap between the two. This gap should serve as a creative impulse that continually challenges us to transform our models, not as a reason to give up.

[Paul Cilliers]
'Boundaries, Hierarchies and Networks in Complex Systems'




NNT (that is, me): Assume that a coin is fair, i.e, has an equal probability of coming up heads or tails when flipped. I flip it ninety-nine times and get heads each time. What are the odds of my getting tails on my next throw?

Dr. John: Trivial question. One half, of course, since you are assuming 50 percent odds for each and independence between draws.

NNT: What do you say, Tony?

Fat Tony: I’d say no more than 1 percent, of course.

NNT: Why so? I gave you the initial assumption of a fair coin, meaning that it was 50 percent either way.

Fat Tony: You are either full of crap or a pure sucker to buy that “50 pehcent” business. The coin gotta be loaded. It can’t be a fair game. (Translation: It is far more likely that your assumptions about the fairness are wrong than the coin delivering ninety-nine heads in ninety-nine throws.)

NNT: But Dr. John said 50 percent.

Fat Tony (whispering in my ear): I know these guys with the nerd examples from the bank days. They think way too slow. Any they are too commoditised. You can take them for a ride.

Dr. John thinks entirely within the box, the box that was given to him; Fat Tony, almost entirely outside the box. 

To set the terminology straight, what I call “a nerd” here doesn’t have to look sloppy, unaesthetic, and sallow, and wear glasses and a portable computer on his belt as if it were an ostensible weapon. A nerd is simply someone who think exceedingly inside the box.

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
The Black Swan, p. 124-5





[A] 2D view of [a] cylinder is a circle from one perspective and a rectangle from another. Both are true “slices” of the reality of the cylinder; neither alone give a clear sense of the higher dimensional shape’s reality. Or even that the shape is indeed of higher dimension. Both are necessarily limited because they are reducing the reality (without realizing it) to a view that simply can not adequately contain it.

We can argue over which slice is more right…which once we’ve seen the undeniable partial rightness of each (from their own perspective), is of course just silly. Or we can hold that both are somehow true, despite being mutually exclusive descriptions of reality (from a 2D view)…and surrender to calling it paradox and give up on congruent understanding altogether.

Or we can take another reconciliatory approach and say that they are both partially true so we must find a middle path…which in this case, still embedded in 2D, looks like something half way between a circle and a rectangle… which comes out to be a kind of rounded-corner rectangle. Which is actually further from the reality than either the circle or the rectangle had been, since at least they were each true slices of the cylinder.

The problem of course is in the reductionism.

There is no 2D slice of a 3D object that gives a real sense of what it is. Neither is any 2D negotiation of slices going to yield something in 3D. The cylinder is not somewhere between the two reductionistic views: 50% circle, 50% rectangle… It is 100% of both descriptions…which are only mutually exclusive and paradoxical if they are trying to be reconciled in the same plane, which is the essential mistake. In the higher dimensional reality the object actually lives in, the simultaneous full truth of both partial descriptions is obvious and non-paradoxical…as is the seamless way they fit together as parts of a congruent whole.

This metaphor points to a clear limit to the extent of reductionism possible without losing truth and creating a basis for perceiving false dichotomies. The key insight is recognizing these differing perspectives as orthogonal to each other rather than opposite ends of a gradient spectrum. 

The recognition of orthogonality…gives us the cylinder, recognizes both lower dimensional perspectives as 100% true from their limited vantage point, and forces the recognition that a congruent picture is possible but requires a fundamentally more complex kind of perspective.

Our perception of existential paradoxes often comes from exactly this kind of process: believing in false dichotomies through reducing reality to conceptual slices that are true but partial to the point of actually requiring a seemingly mutually exclusive perspective to explain the full phenomena.

[Daniel Schmachtenberger]
'Higher Dimensional Thinking, the End of Paradox, and a More Adequate Understanding of Reality'




Fuzzy intersections are the realm of apparent paradox. For instance, they easily yield the set of men who are both tall and short […] Of course it is really an intersection of men who are partly tall and partly short. 

The contradiction arises from assuming crispness.

[Daniel McNeill & Paul Freiberger]
Fuzzy Logic, p.38




Think about a tree in an ecosystem - what is the value of that tree?

It’s providing a home for pollinators and birds, it’s stabilising topsoil, it’s symbiotic with the fungus and bacteria in the soil, it’s proving shade, it’s pulling out CO2 and producing oxygen, it’s proving food for animals. It might have millions of value-metrics as part of this complex ecosystem.

But then we cut it down to make it ten-thousand dollars worth of two-by-fours, and its value is ten-thousand dollars. And the two-by-fours [aren’t] sequestering CO2 and stabilising top soil  - they are serving as a structural strut, as one really simple thing.

So we took this very complex thing and reduced the complexity of it radically, and made it a very simple thing. We downcycled it, because the metric we were seeking to optimise was dollars in my account.

How do I relate the value of an elephant tusk, or a person’s art, or a tree - these should not be fungible, these are fundamentally different things.

But I remove all of the information from them and all of the context [because] I want them to be simply exchangeable in terms of capital, so that I can maximise the ease of transaction. [This] is an extinctionary dynamic.

We’re taking complex value and turning it into simple value.

[Daniel Schmachtenberger]
'46: Daniel Schmachtenberger - Winning Humanity's Existential Game' (23:00)




Consider […] the case of families. How are families established? What constitutes membership in a particular family? […] even in the simplest cases the boundaries of families are far from clear: there isn’t always a definitive answer to the question whether two temporally distant individuals do or do not belong to the same family […]

In many cases this answer will depend on the purpose with which the question is asked and on what is at stake […]

[...] family connections are immensely more complex than our usual representations of family trees can ever suggest. When we appeal to family trees, we are concerned to trace, for particular reasons, an individual’s origin to a particular source though a particular path […]

[…] but a moment’s thought shows how crucial our “particular reasons” always are in such situations. On one occasion, for example, we may want to […] see how all the central characters of The Forsyte Chronicles are related to Old Jolyon, the figure Galsworthy quite arbitrarily chose as the family’s founder […] Galsworthy’s neat [family tree] makes it easy to forget [certain branches in the family tree that are of] no importance to [his] narrative.

None of this implies in any way that Galsworthy was “wrong” to omit this information: he could not have included all of it even if for some strange reason he had wanted to do so. In fact it is impossible to say exactly what “all” the information would be in this [context].

[…] the specific path traced through what are actually indefinitely complex family interconnections is essentially conditioned by background interests and values […] Particular families are generated out of this network by means of operations that are essentially conditioned by specific interests and values.

But “in the actual world, in which everything is bound to and conditioned by everything else,” families are nothing like what these neat representations suggest. It is not just difficult but actually impossible to determine the family to which an individual belongs without assumptions dictated by our conventions, purposes, and values […]

Our concept of the family is tied to the idea of shared behavioural, morphological, or genetic features. But this is only because we are usually concerned with what is really the very short run, with the few generations within which such similarities may be important and obvious.

[Alexander Nehamas]
Nietzsche: Life as Literature, p. 100-2




There has been both over-reaction and under-reaction. Power grabs and abdications of responsibility to use power properly in crisis alike.

As a reaction, no one is thinking in superpositions. They are breaking off whatever pisses them off and reacting to that fragment.

Elon is breaking off the over reactions, power grabs and alarmist messaging creating panic. Those are real. But there are also under reactions and failures to act which he is ignoring. It’s multi-variate.

So expect everyone to rebel against the bungling with a simplified take.

[Eric Weinstein]
Twitter




We cannot simply go from saying “things are ordered” to saying “things are un-ordered” and leave it at that; things are both ordered and un-ordered at once, because in reality order and un-order intertwine and interact.

Kostof puts it well in his description of cities: “. . . the two primary versions of urban arrangement, the planned and the ‘organic,’ often exist side by side. . . . Most historic towns, and virtually all those of metropolitan size, are puzzles of premeditated and spontaneous segments, variously interlocked or juxtaposed. . . .”

In other words, it is useful to artificially separate order and un-order so that we can understand the different dynamics involved, but we should not expect to find one without the other in real life.

[Cynthia Kurtz & Dave Snowden]
'The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world'




We like stories, we like to summarise, and we like to simplify, i.e., to reduce the dimension of matters. The [narrative] fallacy is associated with our vulnerability to over interpretation and our predilection for compact stories over raw truths.

Think of the world around you, laden with trillions of details. Try to describe it and you will find yourself tempted to weave a thread into what you are saying. A novel, a story, a myth, or a tale, all have the same function: they spare us from the complexity of the world and shield us from its randomness.

The narrative fallacy addresses our limited ability to look at sequences of facts without weaving an explanation into them, or, equivalently, forcing a logical link, an arrow of relationship, upon them. Explanations bind facts together. They make them all the more easily remembered; they help them make more sense [...] Myths impart order to the disorder of human perception and the perceived “chaos of human experience.” Where this propensity can go wrong is when it increases our impression of understanding.

[...] narrativity comes from an ingrained biological need to reduce dimensionality [...] Information wants to be reduced […] it is impossible for our brain to see anything in raw form without some interpretation [...]  Compression is vital to the performance of conscious work […] By finding the pattern, the logic of the series, you no longer need to memorise it all. You just store the pattern. 

Our propensity to impose meaning and concepts blocks our awareness of the details making up the concept. However, if you zap people’s left hemispheres, they become more realistic - they can draw better and with more verisimilitude. Their minds become better at seeing the objects themselves, cleared of theories, narratives, and prejudice.

Why is it hard to avoid interpretation? It is key that […] brain functions often operate outside our awareness. You interpret pretty much as you perform other activities deemed automatic and outside your control, like breathing.

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
The Black Swan, p. 64-9




When thinking of a category we normally visualise the clear cases, not the vague ones. Chair evokes a dining room chair, not a beanbag chair. 

Why do we focus on prototypes? In 1978, looking back on her work Rosch suggested that the purpose of classes was “to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort.” There is a trade-off: information versus labour. And prototypes ease the burden. For instance, the eye can discriminate 7.5 million colours. If definitions were sharp, if blue ended at a single hue, people would need a pointless acuity of perception.

Cognitive economy also likely increases the speed of the brain, enabling it to work with essences rather than time-consuming fringe items […] words summarise, and prototypes summarise further. They catch the gist of the fuzzy set.

[Daniel McNeill & Paul Freiberger]
Fuzzy Logic, p.88




We evolved to make decisions very quickly based on a partial data scan, privileging our most recent experiences.

In modern cognitive science we don’t call these biases, we call them heuristics. Evolution doesn’t produce things that have no utility. So-called biases are actually heuristics that allow us to make decisions faster.

If you look at all of the so-called ‘cognitive biases’ they’re all about reducing the energy cost of making decisions. On average they pan-out better. Reduction in energy cost is critical in evolution, and particularly for humans because our brain takes up so much energy, disproportionate in many ways to its utility.

[Dave Snowden]
'Dealing with unanticipated needs – Dave Snowden' and 'Naturalising Sense-making w/ Dave Snowden. September 3rd, 2020'




Heuristics are simplified rules of thumb that make things simple and easy to implement.

But their main advantage is that the user knows that they are not perfect, just expedient, and is therefore less fooled by their powers. They become dangerous when we forget that.

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
Antifragile, p. 11




“Anger” is a cultural concept that we apply to hugely divergent patterns of change in the body, and there’s no single facial expression reliably associated with it, even in the same person. (Some cultures don’t have a concept that corresponds to “anger”, such as the Utku Inuit of Canada’s Northwest Territories.) 

The same is true, astonishingly, of “happiness”, “excitement”, “disappointment”, you name it. No emotion is tied to a single, objective state in the body. Rather, emotions are cultural artefacts.

Don’t babies and toddlers fuss and bawl at some obstacle long before they have a word to describe the feeling? And don’t the Utku also experience their blood pumping faster and their muscles tensing up when confronted with a difficult problem? The answer is that of course they do, but that “anger” is merely one interpretation of these events, a culturally specific attempt to give them meaning.

[Lisa Feldman-Barrett] argues that the universal components of human experience are not emotions, but changes on a continuum of arousal on the one hand, and pleasantness and unpleasantness on the other. The term for this is “affect”. It is a basic feature of consciousness, and people in different cultures learn to mould this raw material into emotional experiences in different ways.

[David Shariatmadari]




Complex dynamical theory [...] teaches that if you look only at the outside, as behaviourism did, differences both in the way information is generated and in the constrained pathways along which it flows will be overlooked. 

Focusing on the differences in […] starting points and the way these differences interact with the environment, on the other hand, can reveal a dynamical process. Even when the behavioral output (the trajectory's sink) is the same, the pathways taken to get there may be very different.

As a consequence of the modern paradigm, there was no way of explaining how some behaviors can be voluntary and intentional because they flow from an agent's meaning-bearing states, whereas other, empirically indistinguishable behaviors are not. Modern philosophy and science, as we have seen, were unable to account for, say, the difference between an involuntary smile and one commanded, which is now known to be a difference in trajectory […] 

And yet how successful the old modern worldview was! Pretending that everything is a closed, linear system gives the illusion that one can, without penalty, abstract from time and context, starting with the interference of friction. And doing so did indeed make many difficult problems tractable and yielded spectacular results. Who in the fifteenth century would have thought that planetary orbits could be so accurately predicted? 

But this tidy picture was doomed from the start, because the scientific and philosophical problems posed by the nature and behavior of open systems cannot be ignored. Very few people anticipated the mischief - and benefits - that the nonlinearity of positive feedback unleashes on the modern paradigm.

I propose that from now on the covering-law model of explanation (including its probabilistic incarnation) should be considered the limit of explanation, adequate for those phenomena that can be idealized as atemporal and acontextual. 

For isolated, linear systems, the covering-law model often works fine. For those phenomena, the tighter the inference, the better the explanation and the more accurate the prediction. For open, complex dynamical phenomena in which context-dependent constraints (both bottom-up and top-down) create interlevel interactions—that is, for phenomena which that "strange form of causality" progressively individuates and marks as essentially historical and contextual - the deductive model simply won’t do.

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p. 221




Such logic exists within a world of thought that operates using a structure of categories, something our own language does very well. This logic and language tells us that an object cannot simultaneously be a member of two mutually exclusive categories: An action cannot be both bad and good, something cannot be both subjective and objective, an electron cannot be both a wave and a particle.

Today we know that indeed an electron is both a wave and a particle. Niels Bohr suggested that within the quantum world science had to adopt what he called complementary descriptions - rather than having a single description that exhausts the phenomenon in question, science has to employ complementary, mutually contradictory, accounts.

The world, at the subatomic level, does not accord with the traditional way our English-Latin-Greek language structures reality.

As soon as we begin to drop our obsession with categories and boundaries in thought many of these problems and paradoxes fall away. Quantum theory constantly emphasizes that the context in which events occur is of key importance. Set up an experiment in one way and the result is particles. Do it another way and it must be interpreted in terms of waves. It is impossible to separate a phenomenon from the context in which it is observed. Categories no longer exist in the absence of contexts.

Within Indigenous science, context is always important. Nothing is abstract since all things happen within a landscape and by virtue of a web of interrelationships. The tendency to collect things into categories does not exist within the thought and language of, for example, Algonquin speakers.

This leads to a profoundly different way of approaching and thinking about the world. For, in the absence of categories, each thing is mentally experienced on its own merits, and for what it actually is. Rather than indulging in comparison or judgment, Indigenous speakers attempt to enter into relationship with them.

In English we have the general category of "fish," which is the result of classifying, in terms of differences and similarities, the various creatures that live in the water. It therefore becomes convenient within our minds to gather together objects of different shapes, sizes and colors and treat them all as members of the one category "fish."

The Algonquin family of languages, for example, does not make use of such categories or boundaries in thought. Rather, it is concerned with processes that are happening in the water and with the peoples' relationships to such processes. Iroquois languages for their part would tend to picture the world in terms of a complex web of relationships. Instead of using logic to reach a single truth, an Indigenous scientist is more concerned with achieving balance and harmony.

Within Indigenous science, language is irreducibly tied to landscape, culture, and thought. A non-Native linguist, Benjamin Lee Whorf, came to similar conclusions. As a result of his study of the language of the Hopi people, he found that their language reflects the non-Newtonian universe in which they live.

[F. David Peat]
Blackfoot Physics, p.233-4




These things are difficult, I admit; their formulation can be disconcerting. But would there be so many problems and misunderstandings without this complexity and without these paradoxes?

One shouldn’t complicate things for the pleasure of complicating, but one should also never simplify or pretend to be sure of such simplicity where there is none. If things were simple, word would have gotten round, as you say in English.

There you have one of my mottos, one quite appropriate for what I take to be spirit of the type of ‘enlightenment’ granted our time. Those who wish to simplify at all costs and who raise a hue and cry about obscurity because they do not recognize the unclarirty of their good old Aufklärung are in my eyes dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists. No less dangerous (for instance, in politics) are those who wish to purify at all costs.

[Jacques Derrida]
Limited Inc.




Some interesting new perspectives are supplied by the work of Gregory Chaitin (1975, 1987). In his reinterpretation of information theory, in what he has termed 'algorithmic information theory', randomness is defined not in terms of unpredictability, but in terms of 'incompressibility'.

[…] randomness becomes a measure for the amount of information in a sequence, but, and this is vital, randomness understood no longer in terms of unpredictability, but in terms of the denseness with which the information is packed. It also provides us with an interesting definition of complexity: the complexity of a series is equal to the size of the minimal program necessary to produce that series (Chaitin 1975: 49).

In a certain sense we have taken a long route to arrive at a truism: complexity is complex. A complex system cannot be reduced to a simple one if it wasn't simple (or perhaps merely complicated) to start off with.

A complex system cannot be reduced to a collection of its basic constituents, not because the system is not constituted by them, but because too much of the relational information gets lost in the process.

On an intuitive level […] the notion of 'incompressibility' remains very fruitful. It reminds us that when dealing with complexity, there are no short-cuts without peril.

The notion should nevertheless not be used absolutely. The complex systems we are interested in are never completely ‘minimal'; they contain a lot of spare capacity or redundancy. This is necessary for more than one reason: it provides robustness, space for development and the means for plasticity.

A clearer picture of why some 'free space' is necessary will emerge in the next section when we examine two important aspects of complex systems which our models have to capture. For now we can conclude that a strict measure for complexity does not seem feasible. To describe a complex system you have, in a certain sense, to repeat the system.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.9-10




This leads us to an extremely important point: the network used as model for a complex system will have to have the same level of complexity as the system itself.

It will therefore be just as difficult to construct a theory of what the network is doing as it would be to construct a theory of what the system is doing. If certain general principles exist that can assist in describing the behaviour of the system, they could possibly be found by analysing the behaviour of the network. However, if the system is truly complex, a network of equal complexity may be the simplest adequate model of such a system, which means that it would be just as difficult to analyse as the system itself. This has serious methodological implications for scientists working with complex systems.

A model which reduces the complexity may be easier to implement, and may even provide a number of economical descriptions of the system, but the price paid for this should be considered carefully.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.70




Despite the fact that we cannot represent the essence of a complex system in determinate terms, we cannot resist, or perhaps even avoid, the construction of some kind of interpretation of the nature of the system at a given moment.

These interpretations, however, are in principle limited. We are always constrained to taking snapshots of the system. These shots are always taken from a certain angle and reveal some aspect of the system at some moment. Nothing prevents us from attempting explanations of the system - we can take as many pictures as we want - as long as we realise the limitations of each particular one.

Since a complex system is constantly changing, i.e. not in equilibrium, it is also not possible to link a series of pictures together like pieces in a puzzle that fit exactly into their true positions. We can juxtapose, compare, make collages, combine them in sequences that develop a narrative, and thereby, in perhaps a more creative way, develop our understanding of the system. The danger lies in falling under the spell of a specific picture and claiming a privileged position for it.

Since it would not only deny the limitations of the specific angle, but also prevent further explorations, this spell must be broken by relentlessly showing the contradictions that result from fixing the boundaries from one perspective. Pointing out the contradictions that follow from such a closure is an activity that Derrida calls ‘deconstruction.’

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.80-1



Related posts:-
Taking the Rough with the Smooth
Standing the Strain
Digging Deeper
A Difference that makes a Difference
Which difference makes a difference?
How Simple is Too Simple?
Discrimination 
Conscious / Unconscious
Escaping Uncertainty
Simply Put
Scale
Complexity