Showing posts with label Hayek. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hayek. Show all posts

Simple / Complex





Simple                    -                   Complex
Conscious              -                     Unconscious
Logos                     -                   Chaos
Solid                       -                    Liquid
Permanence            -                    Change
Known                    -                    Unknown
Perfect                    -                   Imperfect
Heavens                  -                     Earth
Pattern                    -                     Matter
Father                     -                     Mother
God                         -                     Man
Birth                        -                     Death






We can only make sense of a fraction of the information that constantly presents itself to us. The stability of the sense that we make is therefore fragile. Our models of experience are limited, incomplete, and chronically prone to failure.

Our essential existential problem [can be] conceptualized as vulnerability to complexity [...]

 […] we are engineers, more than scientists. When we explore, we try to find out what operations work, more than what things are. In fact, we can not find out what things “are,” because they are too complex. We constantly strive, instead, to determine how the difficult and finally incomprehensible circumstances currently obtaining might be bent more effectively towards fulfillment of our biologically-grounded ends.

[…] we will make mistakes (because we do not understand everything, and because things we do “understand” change) and […] whenever we make a mistake, we encounter what we have not properly categorized and are presently ignoring (since, had we categorized it, and properly paid attention to it, we would not have made a mistake).

[…] This “revenge of the unjustly ignored” immediately and thoroughly complicates our simple functional worlds.

George Kelly (1955) first hinted at the uncomfortable relationship we all hold with complexity […] insisting that human beings had an arbitrary, essential, unequivocal desire to be right – right once and for all, without question.

[…] belief regulates and constrains complexity

[…] Individuals are therefore motivated to maintain the structure of their belief systems, because those belief systems are painfully constructed abstracted patterns of action, designed to meet desired motivational ends, in a world complex and anxiety-provoking beyond understanding.

[…] we need to invert our understanding of anxiety, and come to understand it as our default position in the world; come to understand it as something painstakingly brought under partial control, in consequence of effortful learning, and not something added through learning to a normative background of calm competence and security.

[…] the tendency to remain ideologically committed to a given position (associated with failure to explore and update in the face of anomaly) is also motivated by the desire to maintain the current superstructure of belief and tradition, in the face of evidence that a currently-unspecifiably-large portion of it has been rendered dangerously and troublesomely invalid [...]

Events that indicate error in the pursuit of goals are negatively valenced, but informative. Ideologically rigid individuals sacrifice new and potentially useful information […] to avoid short-term negative emotion.

Ideological rigidity is therefore the tendency to avoid emotionally and cognitively-demanding exploration and information-gathering, subsequent to the receipt of an error message, in the interests of maintaining short-term emotional security. 

This makes totalitarianism of belief something that may be indulged in by default, so to speak – a sin of omission – and something that is potently reinforced, negatively, in the short term. This combination of ease and emotional relief might help explain the widespread prevalence of rigid, maladaptive belief.

Dogmatic certainty is a condition that may be thoughtlessly and carelessly indulged in – a condition that lurks constantly as a temptation, as a second-rate alternative to the travail of authentic adaptation.


It is necessary for us to generate simplified, functional models, in order to function in situations constantly beyond our understanding. However, this process of simplified functional modeling can be pathologized by individuals who are unwilling to allow any unconstrained complexity whatsoever to exist – pathologized, that is, by the existential cowards who make ideological purity the hallmark of existence.

What Becker and the neo-Freudians describe as death terror can be more accurately conceptualized as a priori fear of unconstrained complexity.

[Jordan B. Peterson]
‘Complexity Management Theory: Motivation for Ideological Rigidity and Social Conflict’, in Cortex, December 2002, p. 431-2, 440, 444,  450-1, 454-5




The ego refers to the means of organizing the conscious mind. The ego selects those perceptions, thoughts, memories, and feelings that will become conscious.

The organizational structure of the ego provides a sense of identity and day-to-day continuity so that individuals are not a mass of random conscious and unconscious perceptions, thoughts, and feelings.

By screening out great amounts of unconscious material (memories, thoughts, and feelings), the ego attempts to achieve a sense of coherence and consistency, while at the same time being an expression of individuality.

[Richard S. Scharf]
Theories of Psychotherapy and Counseling: Concepts and Cases (2nd Edition), p.91






Since the Psychopathology of Everyday Life things have changed. This book isolated and made analyzable things which had heretofore floated along unnoticed in the broad stream of perception.

For the entire spectrum of optical, and now also acoustical, perception the film has brought about a similar deepening of apperception.

By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring common place milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action.

Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling. With the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended.

The enlargement of a snapshot does not simply render more precise what in any case was visible, though unclear: it reveals entirely new structural formations of the subject. So, too, slow motion not only presents familiar qualities of movement but reveals in them entirely unknown ones “which, far from looking like retarded rapid movements, give the effect of singularly gliding, floating, supernatural motions.”

Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye – if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored by man [...] The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.

[Walter Benjamin]
The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, section XIII





You should move to a small town, somewhere the rule of law still exists. You will not survive here. You are not a wolf, and this is a land of wolves now.

['Alejandro']
Dialogue from the film 'Sicario'




One reason why economists are increasingly apt to forget about the constant small changes which make up the whole economic picture is probably their growing preoccupation with statistical aggregates, which show a very much greater stability than the movements of the detail.

This is, perhaps, also the point where I should briefly mention the fact that the sort of knowledge with which I have been concerned is knowledge of the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics and therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical form.

The statistics which such a central authority would have to use would have to be arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, by lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards location, quality, and other particulars, in a way which may be very significant for the specific decision.

It follows from this that central planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot take direct account of these circumstances of time and place and that the central planner will have to find some way or other in which the decisions depending on them can be left to the "man on the spot."

[Friedrich Hayek]
'The Use of Knowledge in Society'




“First principle thinkers” or “contrarians”: They hold nuanced positions that oppose the policy on the x-axis, but support the moral virtue on the y-axis.

“These are people who are thinking for themselves, and are not buying baked-cakes. They’re buying the ingredients and they’re saying, well, I want more of this ingredient, I don’t like that ingredient. So they’re attempting to avoid having any pre-baked idea put in front of them.”

1. Peterson, who is in the “First principle thinkers” quadrant, gives a nuanced argument that is opposed to mandated equality of outcome (e.g. mandated income-equality between men and women), but that supports equality of opportunity (e.g. opposed to discrimination based on gender).

2. Newman is in the “Dupes” quadrant. She infers that Peterson’s opposition suggests he condones, or is at least unconcerned, with discrimination based on gender. For example, she said, “You’re saying, basically, it doesn’t matter if women aren’t getting to the top.”

3. As a result, Peterson is portrayed as a misogynist, or insensitive to gender discrimination, effectively moving him from the “First principle thinkers” quadrant to the “Troglodyte” quadrant. However, this is counter to his actual position, which is support for equality of opportunity (and not discriminating based on age, race, gender or sexual orientation), which he said was “eminently desirable.”

[Shane Mottishaw]
'Eric Weinstein’s Four Quadrant Model'




Complex vs. Complicated. 

An aircraft is a complicated system; all of its thousands of components are knowable, definable and capable of being catalogued as are all of the relationships between and among those components, while human systems are complex.

A complex system comprises many interacting agents, an agent being anything that has identity. We all exist in many identities in our personal and work lives. As we move among identities, we observe different rules, rituals and procedures unconsciously.

In a complex system, the components and their interactions are changing and can never be quite pinned down. The system is irreducible. Cause and effect cannot be separated because they are intimately intertwined.

When a rumor of reorganization surfaces: the complex human system starts to mutate and change in unknowable ways; new patterns form in anticipation of the event. If you walk up to an aircraft with a box of tools in your hand, nothing changes.

Another feature of a complex system is retrospective coherence in which the current state of affairs always makes logical sense, but only when we look backwards. The current pattern is logical, but is only one of many patterns that could have formed, any one of which would be equally logical.

Scientific management served well in the revolutions of total quality management and business process re-engineering and continues to be applicable in the domain of the complicated; however, just as Newtonian physics was bounded by the understandings of quantum mechanics, so scientific management has been bounded by the need to manage knowledge and learning.


Complex vs. Chaotic. 

A complex system comprises many interacting identities in which, while I cannot distinguish cause and effect relationships, I can identify and influence patterns of interactivity. In a complex domain we manage to recognize, disrupt, reinforce and seed the emergence of patterns; we allow the interaction of identities to create coherence and meaning.

With a chaotic system all connections have broken down and we are in a state of turbulence.  In a chaotic domain no [...] patterns are possible unless we intervene to impose them; they will not emerge through the interaction of agents.

[Dave Snowden]
'Complex Acts of Knowing: Paradox and Descriptive Self-Awareness'




We, members of the human variety of primates, have a hunger for rules because we need to reduce the dimension of matters so they can get into our heads […] 

The more random the information is, the greater the dimensionality, and thus the more difficult to summarise. The more you summarise, the more order you put in, the less randomness.

Hence the same condition that makes us simplify pushes us to think that the world is less random than it actually is.

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
The Black Swan, p. 69




It happens all the time: a cause is proposed to make you swallow the news and make matters more concrete. 

After a candidate’s defeat in an election, you will be supplied with the “cause” of the voter’s disgruntlement. Any conceivable cause can do. The media, however, go to great lengths to make the process “thorough” with their armies of fact-checkers.

It is as if they wanted to be wrong with infinite precision (instead of accepting being approximately right, like a fable writer).

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
The Black Swan, p. 74




“Rorschach, I don’t know very well. I believe he’s a man of great integrity, but he seems to see the world in very black and white, Manichean terms. I personally believe that to be an intellectual limitation.”

['Adrian Veidt']
Watchmen, Chap. XI




Life is being kept going by divergent problems which have to be ‘lived’ and are solved only in death. Convergent problems on the other hand are man’s most useful invention; they do not, as such, exist in reality, but are created by a process of abstraction. When they have been solved, the solution can be written down and passed on to others, who can apply it without needing to reproduce the mental effort necessary to find it. 

If this were the case with human relations - in family life, economics, politics, education, and so forth - well. I am loss how to finish the sentence. There would be no more human relations but only mechanical reactions; life would be a living death. Divergent problems, as it were, force man to strain himself to a level above himself; they demand, and thus provoke the supply of, forces from a higher level, thus bringing love, beauty, goodness, and truth into our lives. It is only with the help of these higher forces that the opposites can be reconciled in the living situation.

The physical sciences and mathematics are concerned exclusively with convergent problems. That is why they can progress cumulatively, and each new generation can begin just where their forbears left off. The price, however, is a heavy one. Dealing exclusively with convergent problems does not lead into life but away from it.

'Up to the age of thirty, or beyond it, wrote Charles Darwin in his autobiography, 'poetry of many kinds ... gave me great pleasure, and even as a schoolboy I took intense delight in Shakespeare, especially in the historical plays. I have also said that formerly pictures gave me considerable, and music very great, delight. But now for many years I cannot endure to read a line of poetry: I have tried lately to read Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me. I have also lost almost any taste for pictures or music. ... My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of fact, but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone, on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive. ... The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature.'

This impoverishment, so movingly described by Darwin, will overwhelm our entire civilisation if we permit the current tendencies to continue which Gilson calls 'the extension of positive science to social facts'. All divergent problems can be turned into convergent problems by a process of 'reduction'. The result, however, is the loss of all higher forces to ennoble human life, and the degradation not only of the emotional part of our nature, but also, as Darwin sensed, of our intellect and moral character. The signs are everywhere visible today.

The true problems of living - in politics, economics, education, marriage, etc. - are always problems of overcoming or reconciling opposites. They are divergent problems and have no solution in the ordinary sense of the word. They demand of man not merely the employment of his reasoning powers but the commitment of his whole personality. 

Naturally, spurious solutions, by way of a clever formula, are always being put forward; but they never work for long, because they invariably neglect one of the two opposites and thus lose the very quality of human life. 

In economics, the solution offered may provide for freedom but not for planning, or vice versa. In industrial organisation, it may provide for discipline but not for workers' participation in management, or vice versa. In politics, it might provide for leadership without democracy or, again, for democracy without leadership.

To have to grapple with divergent problems tends to be exhausting, worrying, and wearisome. Hence people try to avoid it and to run away from it. A busy executive who has been dealing with divergent problems all day long will read a detective story or solve a crossword puzzle on his journey home. He has been using his brain all day; why does he go on using it? The answer is that the detective story and the crossword puzzle present convergent problems, and that is the relaxation. They require a bit of brainwork, even difficult brainwork, but they do not call for this straining and stretching to a higher level which is the specific challenge of a divergent problem, a problem in which irreconcilable opposites have to be reconciled. 

It is only the latter that are the real stuff of life.

[E.F. Schumacher]
Small is Beautiful, p. 79-81




The collapse of superstructures - of all that can henceforth be regarded as superstructures - did not manifest only in the sociological form of denouncing the lies and hypocrisy of bourgeois life […] or in moral and philosophical nihilism.

It is prolonged and completed today by means of a science that, though false and contaminating if applied to men of other times and other civilisations, has the power of persuasion when applied to traumatized modern man; this science is none other than psychoanalysis.

The impassioned effort of that philosopher who sought out the secret origin, the “genealogy” of predominant moral values at the very roots of all those vital impulses that morality avoids or condemns, who sought thus to “naturalise” morality by denying it any autonomous or preeminent dignity, this impassioned effort has given place to the cold, cynical, and “scientific” methods of “depth psychology,” of the exploration of the subconscious and the unconscious.

In the latter, the irrational subsoil of existence, it has recognized the motive force essential to the whole life of the soul; from that it deduces the proofs that make an illusion of the upper world of moral and social conscience with all its values, all its inhibitions and prohibitions, and its hysterical will to dominate. Meanwhile, in the subterranean zone nothing is at work but a mess of compulsions toward pleasure and death: Lustprinzip and Todestrieb.

This, as everyone knows, is the essence of Freudianism. Other psychoanalytic currents that diverge in part from Freud are not substantially different. The evident theme in all of them is the regression to the psychic subsoil, together with a profound traumatization of the human personality.

It is one further aspect of contemporary nihilism, and, moreover, the symptom of a sickly consciousness, too weak to hold in check the lower regions of the soul with their so-called archetypes, and which might well be compared to Goethe's “world of the Mothers.”

[Julius Evola]
Ride the Tiger, p. 32




Biological theories involve no principles that are fundamental in this way, so biological theory has a certain complexity and messiness about it: but theories in physics, insofar as they deal with fundamental principles, aspire to simplicity and elegance.

[David Chalmers]
'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness', Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, 1995
 



The reductive pattern has been so successfully used to connect the various physical sciences that it always seems seductive […]

It is the pattern that tells us, when we encounter several different ways of thinking, to arrange them in a hierarchy, a linear sequence, running from the superficial to the fundamental, which occupies the whole logical space available for explanation. The more fundamental thought-patterns are then called hard while the upper layers are soft.

The upper or softer layers are then ranked as relatively superficial because they do not give an ultimate explanation. 

They are considered amateurish, non-serious - as Berkeley put it, the property of the vulgar, now called folk-psychology. They are makeshifts to be used when the real scientific account isn't available, or when it is too cumbersome to use.

In fact, they are just stages on the way down to the only fully 'mature' science, which is physics.

[Mary Midgley]
Science and Poetry, p.168




The pursuit of science is a matter of taking stock and formulating recipes for action. Every recipe is a conditional sentence of the type, ‘If you want to achieve this or that, take such and such steps’. The sentence should be as concise as possible, without any ideas or concepts that are not strictly necessary (‘Occam's razor’), and the instructions should be precise, leaving as little as possible to the judgment of the operator.

The test of a recipe is purely pragmatic - the proof of the pudding being in the eating. The perfections of this type of science are purely practical - the objective, i.e. independent of the character and interests of the operator, measurable, recordable, repeatable.

At the higher levels, the very ideas of prediction and control become increasingly objectionable and even absurd. The theologian who strives to obtain knowledge of Levels of Being above the human does not for a moment think of prediction, control or manipulation. All he seeks is understanding.

He would be shocked by predictabilities. Anything predictable can be so only on account of its 'fixed nature', and the higher the Level of Being, the less is the fixity and the greater the plasticity of nature.

With God all things are possible' (Matt. XIX.26), but the freedom of action of a hydrogen atom is exceedingly limited. The sciences of inanimate matter - physics, chemistry and astronomy - can therefore achieve virtually perfect powers of prediction; they can in fact be completed and finalised, once and for all, as is claimed to be the case with mechanics.

Human beings are highly predictable, as physicochemical systems, less predictable as living bodies, much less so as conscious beings and hardly at all as self aware persons.

The reason for this unpredictability does not lie in a lack of adaequatio on the part of the investigator, but in the nature of freedom. In the face of freedom, 'knowledge for manipulation' is impossible; but 'knowledge for understanding' is indispensable.

The almost complete disappearance of the latter from Western civilisation is due to nothing but the systematic neglect of traditional wisdom, of which the West has as rich a store as any other part of mankind.

[E. F. Schumacher]
A Guide for the Perplexed, p.69, 70




The small town looked more attractive to Anderson now that the “big world outside" was "so filled with confusion.”

Even Theodore Dreiser found the small-town myth intermittently appealing, reaffirming it in his attempt to disavow it. Having "seen Pittsburgh," he explained, he could no longer weave village "charms and sentiments” into an “elegy or an epic.”

A visit to his fiancée's Missouri homestead reawakened memories of his own boyhood in Indiana and "enraptured” him with the "spirit of rural America, its idealism, its dreams," its belief in "love and marriage and duty and other things which the idealistic American still clings to."

But a writer who had lived in the larger world, Dreiser argued, could not hope to memorialize the American village.

In the American imagination, the small town never changes: it dreams on, in a world where everything else has changed, and for that reason an observer uprooted from those scenes, himself completely and irrevocably changed by acquaintance with the larger world, can no longer take part in its life or share its ideals.

Note the crucial assumption that “idealism and faith” flourish only in a state of innocence. It is this assumption, so radically at odds with the view that childhood experience is the basis of mature conviction, that unavoidably gives rise to the nostalgic attitude in the first place.

If a belief "in goodness, in virtue and duty” cannot survive exposure to experience, the past can be seen only as a lost Eden, where illusions alone sustain the capacity for belief - a lovely dream that had to die.

[Christopher Lasch]
The True and Only Heaven, p.101, 103




“With the close-up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended … clearly, it is another nature which speaks to the camera as compared to the eye. 'Other' above all in the sense that a space informed by human consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious …

We are familiar with the movement of picking up a cigarette lighter or a spoon, but know almost nothing of what really goes on between hand and metal, and still less how this varies with different moods. This is where the camera comes into play, with all its resources for swooping and rising, disrupting and isolat- ing, stretching or compressing a sequence, enlarging or reducing an object. It is through the camera that we first discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious through psychoanalysis.”

One may understand Big Data in analogy to a movie camera. As a digital magnifying glass, data-mining would enlarge the picture of human actions; behind the framework of consciousness it would then disclose another scene shot through with unconscious elements.

[Byung-Chul Han]
Psychopolitics, p.64




Lyotard's description of the postmodern condition is in fact a description of the network of our society and of the manner in which it produces and reproduces knowledge. His point is that this network has become too complex for general or overarching descriptions.

There may indeed be a crisis of knowledge, but, and this must be underscored, the crisis is not the result of the disruptive activity of 'subversive' theoreticians like Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida.

It is a direct result of the complexity of our postmodern society.

The argument for a multiplicity of discourses is not a wilful move; it is an acknowledgement of complexity. It allows for the explosion of information and the inevitable contradictions that form part of a truly complex network.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.116




[Lyotard] argues for a narrative understanding of knowledge, portraying it as a plurality of smaller stories that function well within the particular contexts where they apply. Instead of claiming the impossibility of knowledge, 'it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable. Its principle is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's paralogy.’

These two forms of knowledge - scientific and narrative - Lyotard claims, have been kept apart so long that they have become incommensurable.

Narrative knowledge may include some aspect of scientific knowledge, but scientific knowledge is legitimated separately. Narrative statements cannot be the subject of argumentation and proof. The separation of the two has, however, led to a legitimation crisis for scientific knowledge in the postmodern era during which metanarratives are treated with incredulity.

The decline of the scientific metanarrative is, however, not merely the result of some kind of theoretical approach, but a necessary result of the diversity and complexity that science has to deal with now.

“The ‘crisis’ of scientific knowledge, signs of which have been accumulating since the end of the nineteenth century, is not born of a chance proliferation of sciences, itself an effect of progress in technology and the expansion of capitalism.

It represents, rather, an internal erosion of the legitimacy principle of knowledge. There is erosion at work inside the speculative game, and by loosening the weave of the encyclopedic net in which each science was to find its place, it eventually sets them free.”

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.114, 129




Mind, which has enabled humanity to adapt and flourish as a species, has also infinitely complicated our functioning as physical beings. We see too much, and so have to stringently limit our seeing. Desire is besieged on all sides by anxiety and doubt. Beauty, an ecstasy of the eye, drugs us and allows us to act. Beauty is our Apollonian revision of the chthonian.

Repression is an evolutionary adaptation permitting us to function under the burden of our expanded consciousness. For what we are conscious of could drive us mad.

Sexual necessity drives man back to that bloody scene, but he cannot approach it without tremors of apprehension. These he conceals by euphemisms of love and beauty. However, the less well-bred he is—that is, the less socialized—the sharper his sense of the animality of sex and the grosser his language. The foulmouthed roughneck is produced not by society’s sexism but by society’s absence. For nature is the most foulmouthed of us all.

[Camille Paglia]
Sexual Personae, p.16




I think I should not go far wrong if I asserted that the amount of genuine leisure available in a society is generally in inverse proportion to the amount of labor-saving machinery it employs.

If you would travel, as I have done, from England to the United States and on to a country like Burma, you would not fail to see the truth of this assertion. What is the explanation of the paradox? It is simply that, unless there are conscious efforts to the contrary, wants will always rise faster than the ability to meet them.

I say, therefore, that it is a great evil - perhaps the greatest evil - of modern industrial society that, through its immensely involved nature, it imposes an undue nervous strain and absorbs an undue proportion of man's attention.

[E.F. Schumacher]
Good Work, p. 25




The contemporary expansion of available information is immeasurable, uncontainable, and destructive to individuals and entire cultures unable to master it.

The radical fundamentalists—the bomber in Jerusalem or Oklahoma City, the moral terrorist on the right or the dictatorial multiculturalist on the left—are all brothers and sisters, all threatened by change, terrified of the future, and alienated by information they cannot reconcile with their lives or ambitions.

They ache to return to a golden age that never existed, or to create a paradise of their own restrictive design. They no longer understand the world, and their fear is volatile.

[Ralph Peters]
‘Constant Conflict’, Parameters, Summer 1997, 4-14



Related posts:-
Abstract / Concrete
Constellating
Ways of Seeing 
All is Change
Escaping Uncertainty
Taking the Rough with the Smooth
Living in Hazard
Certain / Uncertain
Conscious / Unconscious
Order / Chaos
Sailing the Turbulent Seas
Do Not Disturb 
Discrimination
Scale 

Conscious / Unconscious



Conscious       -      Unconscious
Outwards        -      Inwards 
Simple            -      Complex
Narrow           -      Wide
Centralised     -      Distributed  
Rational          -      Intuitive
Cortical           -      Limbic
Reactive          -      Active

 


The conscious, purposeful mind strives for completion. Taken to its extreme, it sees only order and denies anything that may disrupt that order. It is hostile to news of foreign lands. It believes it has a hold on things, that it can see the full picture; it mistakes its limited view for omniscience.

Yet every thing it creates - every story, plan, structure, or theory - has a hole in it, a place where something is missing. This hole is the gateway to everything else, to all those things that have been left out; and through it chaos can be heard, like a whistling wind. It is the gateway to our unconscious mind.




[...] the very meaning of "survival" becomes different when we stop talking about the survival of something bounded by the skin and start to think of the survival of the system of ideas in a circuit.

The contents of the skin are randomized at death and the pathways within the skin are randomized. But the ideas, under further transformation, may go on out in the world in books or works of art. Socrates as a bioenergetic individual is dead. But much of him still lives as a component on the contemporary ecology of ideas.

The individual mind is immanent but not only in the body. It is immanent also in pathways and messages outside the body; and there is a larger Mind of which the individual mind is only a subsystem.

This larger Mind is comparable to God and is perhaps what some people mean by "God," but it is still immanent in the total interconnected social system and planetary ecology.

Freudian psychology expanded the concept of mind inwards to include the whole communication system within the body - the automatic, the habitual, and the vast range of unconscious process. What I am saying expands mind outwards.

And both of these changes reduce the scope of the conscious self. A certain humility becomes appropriate, tempered by the dignity or joy of being a part of something much bigger.

A part - if you will - of God.

[Gregory Bateson]
Steps to an Ecology of Mind, p.467-8




Consciousness operates in the same way as medicine in its sampling of the events and processes of the body and of what goes on in the total mind.

It is organized in terms of purpose.

It is a short-cut device to enable you to get quickly at what you want; not to act with maximum wisdom in order to live, but to follow the shortest logical or causal path to get what you next want, which may be dinner; it may be a Beethoven sonata; it may be sex. Above all, it may be money or power.

[With the capabilities of modern technology] Conscious purpose is now empowered to upset the balances of the body, of society, and of the biological world around us. A pathology - a loss of balance - is threatened.

On the one hand, we have the systemic nature of the individual human being, the systemic nature of the culture in which he lives, and the systemic nature of the biological, ecological system around him; and, on the other hand, the curious twist in the systemic nature of the individual man whereby consciousness is, almost of necessity, blinded to the systemic nature of the man himself.

Purposive consciousness pulls out, from the total mind, sequences which do not have the loop structure which is characteristic of the whole systemic structure. If you follow the "common sense" dictates of consciousness you become, effectively, greedy and unwise - again I use "wisdom" as a word for recognition of and guidance by a knowledge of the total systemic creature.

[Gregory Bateson]
Steps to an Ecology of Mind ('Conscious Purpose versus Nature'), p.439-40




The world of consciousness is inevitably a world full of restrictions, of walls blocking the way. It is of necessity one sided, because of the nature of consciousness itself.

No consciousness can harbour more than a very small number of simultaneous perceptions.

All else must lie in shadow, with drawn from sight.

Any increase in the simultaneous contents immediately produces a dimming of consciousness, if not confusion to the point of disorientation.

Consciousness not only requires, but is of its very nature strictly limited to, the few and hence the distinct [...]

We have to make do, so to speak, with a minimum of simultaneous perceptions and successions of images. Hence in wide areas possible perceptions are continuously excluded, and consciousness is always bound to the narrowest circle.

[...] everything subliminal holds within it the ever-present possibility of being perceived and represented in consciousness. The unconscious is an irrepresentable totality of all subliminal psychic factors, a "total vision" in potentia. It constitutes the total disposition from which consciousness singles out tiny fragments from time to time.

[C.G. Jung]
Psychology and the East ('Foreword to the Introduction to Zen Buddhism'), p.167-8




Dr Izutsu suggests thinking of Jung's Collective Unconscious as the consciousness of such a Collective Unconscious [if the Collective Unconscious were a thing, then it would be that thing's consciousness].

Jung chose that name because he was viewing it from the ego's perspective. If, in contrast, we start from the complete nondivision of Mind-Suchness [Buddha Mind, all things, the whole], we would then consider the Collective Unconscious also as conscious but at an extremely deep level where it is transpersonal, expanding to the whole of humankind.

This sort of transpersonal, total-consciousness field in The Awakening of Faith sutra is called "Shujo-shin," or "Collective Mind."

This Collective Mind has two aspects. It has the expansion of cognitive total-unity, which contains every kind of existence, including Jung's Collective Unconscious. At the same time, it has our ordinary daily consciousness.

That is, it is constantly swinging back and forth between ordinary consciousness and the transpersonal, cosmic cognition.

[Hayao Kawai]
Buddhism and the Art of Psychotherapy, p.126




Part of the reason that the bible is full of internal contradictions, is the same reason that a dream is full of internal contradictions.

Imagine you have an impressionist painting: it’s messy, and the image emerges - and you might say, ‘well, we could replace that with a nice clean line drawing, or even a sequence of stick figures, and get the basic point across.’ Well, you would, but the inarticulable richness would be lost in the premature attempt to bring logical closure to the phenomena.

That may be the difference between dreams and waking thought: waking thought sacrifices completeness, for coherence; dream thought sacrifices coherence for completeness.

Precise thought excludes too much, and imprecise thought is not sufficiently coherent. So we do both.

Precise thought: left hemisphere, linguistically mediated, sequential, logical.
Incoherent but complete thought: imagistic, emotion-based, right hemisphere.

The right hemisphere even has a more diffuse structure - it’s like the right hemisphere is trying to get a picture of everything. It’s not going to be a very detailed picture, because it’s a picture of everything, full of contradictions. But at least it’s a picture of everything.

And the left says, ‘that’s not good enough for precise action.’ And it’s not. So we narrow it to precision, but lose the richness.

You need both, so there’s an interplay. The documents that the Bible is composed of are half dream and half articulated thought, and they have the advantages [and] disadvantages of both. To the degree that it’s articulated, it’s in a dogmatic box; to the degree that it’s a dream, it’s still incoherent.

The problem is, you have to move through the entire world, even though you don’t know it in detail. So you need detailed knowledge, where detailed knowledge is necessary; and you need vague-but-complete knowledge where that’s necessary. Its a very uncomfortable balance. We have to face everything, even though we don’t understand anything completely.

[Jordan B. Peterson]
'2017 Maps of Meaning 10: Genesis and the Buddha'




[…] that’s what consciousness is doing all the time. You’re laying out an automatised routine, and if that doesn’t produce the intended outcome, you stop [and] become conscious. There’s nothing like an error to make you conscious. Then you do a high-resolution analysis of the space in which the error emerged, [and] you [recalibrate] to make that error go away.

To some degree the purpose of consciousness is to make you functional unconsciously. You don’t want to be conscious of most things.

If you’re good at something, you hardly have to be conscious of it at all. So consciousness is something like an error-detection-and-rectification system.

[Being conscious means] always attending to your errors. If you’re always attending to your errors, you’re always improving your automated adaptability.

Your consciousness seems to be continually building your unconscious.

[Jordan B. Peterson]
'2017 Maps of Meaning 6: Story and Metastory (Part 2)'




If it is fashionable today to minimize the importance of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place, this is closely connected with the smaller importance which is now attached to change as such.

Indeed, there are few points on which the assumptions made (usually only implicitly) by the "planners" differ from those of their opponents as much as with regard to the significance and frequency of changes which will make substantial alterations of production plans necessary.

Of course, if detailed economic plans could be laid down for fairly long periods in advance and then closely adhered to, so that no further economic decisions of importance would be required, the task of drawing up a comprehensive plan governing all economic activity would be much less formidable.

It is, perhaps, worth stressing that economic problems arise always and only in consequence of change. So long as things continue as before, or at least as they were expected to, there arise no new problems requiring a decision, no need to form a new plan.

But those who clamor for "conscious direction"—and who cannot believe that anything which has evolved without design (and even without our understanding it) should solve problems which we should not be able to solve consciously—should remember this: The problem is precisely how to extend the span of our utilization of resources beyond the span of the control of any one mind; and therefore, how to dispense with the need of conscious control, and how to provide inducements which will make the individuals do the desirable things without anyone having to tell them what to do.

As Alfred Whitehead has said in another connection, "It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them."

[Friedrich Hayek]
'The Use of Knowledge in Society'




In general terms, then, the left hemisphere yields narrow, focussed attention, mainly for the purpose of getting and feeding. The right hemisphere yields a broad, vigilant attention, the purpose of which appears to be awareness of signals from the surroundings, especially of other creatures, who are potential predators or potential mates, foes or friends; and it is involved in bonding in social animals.

It might be then that the division of the human brain is also the result of the need to bring to bear two incompatible types of attention on the world at the same time, one narrow, focussed, and directed by our needs, and the other broad, open, and directed towards whatever else is going on in the world apart from ourselves.

In humans, just as in animals and birds, it turns out that each hemisphere attends to the world in a different way - and the ways are consistent.

The right hemisphere underwrites breadth and flexibility of attention, where the left hemisphere brings to bear focussed attention. 

This has the related consequence that the right hemisphere sees things whole, in and their context, where the left hemisphere sees things abstracted from context, and broken into parts, from which it then reconstructs a 'whole': something very different.

[Iain McGilchrist]
The Master and his Emissary, p. 27-8




Perhaps inevitably Heidegger’s last writings are in the form of poems. Wittgenstein also saw the true process of philosophy as a way of transcending or healing the effects of philosophy in the philosophical mind: philosophy is itself a disease, as Karl Kraus said of psychoanalysis, for which it purports to be the cure. 

Merleau-Ponty, more explicitly than either, held out the hope that we could learn to see things again by a process of surréflexion, hyper-reflection, which would help redress the distorting effects of consciousness by making us conscious of them. This idea had already occurred to the Romantics. 

At the end of his famous essay ‘On the Upper Theatre’, Kleist offers the possibility that the crippling effects of self-consciousness may be transcended through a form of still further heightened consciousness, by which we might regain a form of innocence.

‘Grace appears purest in that human form which has either no consciousness or an infinite one, that is, in a puppet or in a god.’
‘Therefore’, I said, somewhat bewildered, ‘we would have to eat again from the Tree of Knowledge in order to return to the state of innocence?’
‘Quire right,’ he answered. ‘And that’s the last chapter in the history of the world.’

With that his essay closes. In this last phrase Kleist may be warning us, as Holderlin does, that what we crave can be had only in another world, where there are gods. But his essay also confirms that we can move only onward, not backwards, and that by doing so we might transcend our situation and in this way return to something lost.

[Iain McGilchrist]
The Master and His Emissary, 451




Known

Humans, acting collectively, can make systems that might otherwise be complex or chaotic into known systems; we impose order through laws and practices that have sufficient universal acceptance to create predictable environments.

On the negative side, the imposed structure can continue beyond its useful life.

In this domain we categorize incoming stimuli, and once categorized we respond in accordance with predefined procedures. 

Leadership tends to a feudal model, with budget having replaced land as the controlling mechanism.



Knowable

We do not yet know all the linkages, but they can be discovered. This is the domain of experts, whose expertise enables us to manage by delegation without the need for categorization.

Again there is a human imposition of order but it is more fluid than in the space of the known.

A major issue in the space of the knowable is entrainment of thinking. The very thing that enables expertise to develop, namely the codification of expert language, leads inevitably to entrainment of thinking. Exhortations to remain open to new ideas are unlikely to succeed.

Management of this space requires the cyclical disruption of perceived wisdom. The common context of expertise is both an enabler and blocker to knowledge creation, and from time to time context must be removed to allow the emergence of new meaning.

In this space we sense and respond based on our expert understanding of the situation while the leadership models are oligarchic – requiring consent of the elders of the community and interestingly oligarchies are often less innovative than the idiosyncrasies of feudalism.



Complex

The nature of the complex domain is the management of patterns. We need to identify the early signs of a pattern forming and disrupt those we find undesirable while stabilizing those we want. If we are really clever then we seed the space to encourage the formation of patterns that we can control.

These patterns are emergent properties of the interactions of the various agents. By increasing information flow, variety and connectiveness either singly or in combination we can break down existing patterns and create the conditions under which new patterns will emerge, although the nature of emergence is not predictable.

Entrepreneurs manage in this space instinctively while large organizations find it more uncomfortable. In this domain leadership cannot be imposed, it is emergent based on natural authority and respect but it is not democratic, it is matriarchal or patriarchal.



Chaos

Chaos represents the consequence of excessive structure or massive change, both of which can cause linkages to sunder. As such it is a space that requires crisis management and is not comfortable or entered with any enthusiasm by other than the insane.

However it is one of the most useful spaces, and one that needs to be actively managed. It provides a means by which entrainment of thinking can be disrupted by breaking down the assumptions on which expertise is based.

It is also a space into which most management teams and all knowledge programs will be precipitated; however, regular immersion in a controlled way can immunize the organization and create patterns of behavior that will pay dividends when markets create those conditions.

We also need to remember that what to one organization is chaotic, to another is complex or knowable. 

In the chaotic domain the most important thing is to act, then we can sense and respond. Leadership in this domain is about power – either tyranny or charisma. Both models impose order, and if order is imposed without loss of control, then the new space is capable of being used to advantage.

[Dave Snowden]
'Complex Acts of Knowing: Paradox and Descriptive Self-Awareness'




The more orderly, less random, patterned, and narratized a series of words and symbols, the easier it is to store that series in one’s mind or jot it down in a book so your grandchildren can read it someday.

With so many brain cells - one hundred billion (and counting) - the attic is quite large, so the difficulties probably do not arise from storage capacity limitations, but may be just indexing problems. Your conscious, or working, memory, the one you are using to read these lines and make sense of their meaning, is considerably smaller than the attic. Consider that your working memory has difficulty holding a mere phone number longer than seven digits.

Change metaphors slightly and imagine that your consciousness is a desk in the Library of Congress: no matter how many books the library holds, and makes available for retrieval, the size of your desk sets some processing limitations.

Compression is vital to the performance of conscious work […] By finding the pattern, the logic of the series, you no longer need to memorise it all. You just store the pattern. 

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
The Black Swan, p. 68




System 1, the experiential one, is effortless, automatic, fast, opaque (we do not know that we are using it), parallel-processed, and can lend itself to errors. It is what we call “intuition” […] It produces shortcuts, called “heuristics,” that allow us to function rapidly and effectively. Dan Goldstein calls these heuristics “fast and frugal.” Others prefer to call them “quick and dirty.”

System 2, the cogitative one, is what we normally call thinking. It is what you use in a classroom, as it is effortful, reasoned, slow, logical, serial, progressive, and self-aware (you can follow the steps in your reasoning). It makes fewer mistakes than the experiential system, and, since you know how you derived your result, you can retrace your steps and correct them in an adaptive manner.

You have to make an effort (System 2) to override your first reaction. Clearly Mother Nature makes you use the fast System 1 to get out of trouble, so that you do not sit down and cogitate whether there is truly a tiger attacking you or if it is an illusion. You run immediately, before you become “conscious” of the presence of the tiger.

Emotions are assumed to be the weapon System 1 uses to direct us and force us to act quickly. It mediates risk avoidance far more effectively than our cognitive system.

Note that neurobiologists make, roughly, a similar distinction to that between System 1 and System 2, except that they operate along anatomical lines. Their distinction differentiates between parts of the brain, the cortical part, which we are supposed to use for thinking, and which distinguishes us from other animals, and the fast-reacting limbic brain, which is the centre of emotions, and which we share with other animals.

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
The Black Swan, p. 82




'Inattentional blindness' - we do not see what we do not expect to see.

The most anybody [...] will scan of the available data before you make a decision is about five percent. That’s on a good day, if you’re really focused. If you’re Chinese it is ten percent (there are actually different evolutionary processes in the brain as a result of symbolic as opposed to non-symbolic language).

You then make a decision based on a first-fit pattern match privileging your most recent experiences - that’s called conceptual blending. You scan five percent of the data, that causes trigger of memories of your own experience - things you were taught, things you learned from other people in narrative form - you blend that together and you come up with a unique form of action.

That’s how you make decisions - unless you’re fully autistic. The only people who make rational decisions by assessing all available data are autistic, which is why they can’t operate.

If you think about it in evolutionary terms, you can see why this happens. If you imagine the first hominids on the savannahs of Africa, something large and yellow with very sharp teeth runs toward you at very high speed. Do you want to autistically scan all available data, look up a catalogue of the flora and fauna of the African veldt, and having identified ‘lion’ look up best practice case-studies on how to avoid lions?

We evolved to make decisions very quickly based on a partial data scan, privileging our most recent experiences.

In modern cognitive science we don’t call these biases, we call them heuristics. Evolution doesn’t produce things that have no utility. So-called biases are actually heuristics that allow us to make decisions faster.

[Dave Snowden]
'Dealing with unanticipated needs – Dave Snowden'




Man, like every living being, thinks continually without knowing it; the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this - the most superficial and worst part - for only this conscious thinking takes the form of words, which is to say signs of communication, and this fact uncovers the origin of consciousness.

In brief, the development of language and the development of consciousness (not of reason but merely of the way reason enters consciousness) go hand in hand […] The human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. It was only as a social animal that man acquired self-consciousness—which he is still in the process of doing, more and more.

My idea is, as you see, that consciousness does not really belong to man's individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature; that, as follows from this, it has developed subtlety only insofar as this is required by social or herd utility. 

Consequently, given the best will in the world to understand ourselves as individually as possible, "to know ourselves," each of us will always succeed in becoming conscious only of what is not individual but "average.” Our thoughts themselves are continually governed by the character of consciousness - by the "genius of the species” that commands it - and translated back into the perspective of the herd. Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be.

This is the essence of phenomenalism and perspectivism as I understand them: Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalisation. 

Ultimately, the growth of consciousness becomes a danger; and anyone who lives among the most conscious Europeans even knows that it is a disease.

We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for “truth”: we “know” (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful in the interests of the human herd, the species: and even what is here called “utility” is ultimately also a mere belief, something imaginary, and perhaps precisely that most calamitous stupidity of which we shall perish some day.

[Friedrich Nietzsche]
The Gay Science, 354




Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence also what is most unfinished and unstrong. 

Consciousness gives rise to countless errors that lead an animal or man to perish sooner than necessary, "exceeding destiny," as Homer puts it. If the conserving association of the instincts were not so very much more powerful, and if it did not serve on the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to perish of its misjudgments and its fantasies with open eyes, of its lack of thoroughness and its credulity - in short, of its consciousness; rather, without the former, humanity would long have disappeared.

Before a function is fully developed and mature it constitutes a danger for the organism, and it is good if during the interval it is subjected to some tyranny. Thus consciousness is tyrannized - not least by our pride in it. 

One thinks that it constitutes the kernel of man; what is abiding, eternal, ultimate, and most original in him. One takes consciousness for a determinate magnitude. One denies its growth and its intermittences. One takes it for the "unity of the organism."

This ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness has the very useful consequence that it prevents an all too fast development of consciousness. Believing that they possess consciousness, men have not exerted themselves very much to acquire it; and things haven’t changed much in this respect. 

To this day the task of incorporating knowledge and making it instinctive is only beginning to dawn on the human eye and is not yet clearly discernible; it is a task that is seen only by those who have comprehended that so far we have incorporated only our errors and that all our consciousness relates to errors.

[Friedrich Nietzsche]
The Gay Science, 11




The purpose of consciousness is to create coherence in your perceptual representations, remove conflicts, predict the future, [and] construct counterfactual representations so that you can coordinate your actions and so on.

[Joscha Bach]
'Joscha Bach: Nature of Reality, Dreams, and Consciousness | Lex Fridman Podcast #212'




When the reformers tell us that society can be improved by education, by increasing men's knowledge, by projecting the correct program and then taking action to realize that program, they are wrong because men in society do not act that way.

Their actions, their socially decisive actions, spring not from logical but from non-logical roots.

Pareto not only shows that non-logical conduct is predominant; his crucial point is that the conduct which has a bearing on social and political structure, on what he calls the “social equilibrium," is above all the arena of the nonlogical.

What happens to society, whether it progresses or decays, is free or despotic, happy or miserable, poor or prosperous, is only to the slightest degree influenced by the deliberate, rational purposes held by human beings.

Taboos, magic, superstition, personified abstractions, myths, gods, empty verbalisms, in every culture and at every period of history express man's persisting non-logical impulses. The forms change, but the fundamentals remain.

Gods and goddesses like Athena or Janus or Ammon are replaced by new divinities such as Progress and Humanity and even Science; hymns to Jupiter give way to invocations to the People; the magic of votes and electoral manipulations supersedes the magic of dolls and wands; faith in the Historical Process does duty for faith in the God of our Fathers.

[James Burnham]
The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, p.158-9, 63




Humans are capable of reason yet most of our thinking is intuitive and emotional, both prone to systematic confirmation biases and various other heuristics.

Empirical data has proven David Hume right, that reason is the slave of the passions. The vast majority of reasoning proves to be post-hoc justification for decisions already made by instinctual intuition. Furthermore, our relative blindness to these heuristics leads to a systematic overrating of our capability, our contributions to projects, our capacity to assess risks, and our capacity to predict the future.

Humans are thus guilty of endemic hubris, which likely explains why the tale of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun, was codified into a narrative by ancient wisdom.

 [Academic Agent]
'Groyper Meta-Analysis Part 2: Replying to Keith Woods'




In a truly distributed representation, the informational content of any specific weight is the result of such a dispersed process that it cannot be said to constitute anything specific. There are definitely not different kinds of weights (nomic, constitutive, inductive, etc.).

It is also a misunderstanding of the nature of distributed representation to think that it implements concepts or features by using clusters of components. That would merely be a refinement of a system of local representation. Instead of having one set of symbols with specific semantic interpretations, you now have another, perhaps with more symbols. Distributed representation allows you to discard this whole theoretical framework.

Instead of working with concepts or clusters of concepts, you work with a system of relationships at a sub-conceptual level that cannot be given, or rather, is not in need of a semantic interpretation at all.

'Distributed representation does not give you an invariant, context-independent representation.’ Since the initial state of two systems may vary, they will never be able to represent exactly the same concept. This is of course only a problem if you think that invariant, context-independent representations are necessary or should exist.

Postmodern or post-structural theories of meaning deny this by claiming that both synchronic and diachronic contexts are not only necessary, but constitutive of meaning. Since there are no theoretical limitations on the amount of information that can be fed into a network (given that the network has sufficient capacity), one can include as much of the context as one wishes.

Moreover, since the information is distributed, no explicit distinction between concept and context has to be made - they are encoded together; context is always already part of the representation.

Adding up the characteristics of distributed representation we have now worked through, it becomes clear that the very notion of representation has been undermined.

A distributed representation is not a representation in the conventional sense of the word. It dispenses with all the components of a representational system. There are no symbols that 'stand for’ something, there are no grammatical relationships between them, and the system itself has no need of a semantic level of interpretation at all.

Most philosophical positions throughout the Western intellectual tradition have been sceptical about the spontaneous emergence of order and structure.

In the absence of a rational explanation for such emergence, some kind of organising agent - God (as the ultimate designer) or some other a priori principle - was usually postulated. Yet self-organisation is neither a mystic process nor a random one, and should not be in conflict with any of our normal sensibilities [...] We need neither a central processor nor an outside observer.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.71-2,  89




A self-organising system reacts to the state of affairs in the environment, but simultaneously transforms itself as a result of these affairs, often affecting the environment in turn. Processes in the system are therefore neither simply passive reflections of the outside, nor are they actively determined from the inside. The very distinction between active and passive, as well as that between inside and outside, comes under pressure.

In a complex system, control does not emanate from a single source. Should this happen, the system would become degenerate, lose its adaptability and survive only as long as the environment remained stable.

Since the certainty with which the future can be predicted has been greatly reduced, any plan of action has to be adapted continuously.

If the plan is too rigid - too much central control - the system will not be able to cope with unpredictable changes. On the other hand, it will also be disastrous if the system tries to adjust itself to every superficial change, since such changes may easily be reversed without notice. The system will waste its resources in trying to follow every fluctuation instead of adapting to higher- order trends.

Being able to discriminate between changes that should be followed and changes that should be resisted is vital to the survival of any organisation (or organism). This is achieved optimally when the control of the system is not rigid and localised, but distributed over the system, ensuring that the positive dynamics of self-organisation is utilised effectively.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.108, 110




Does a theory of self-organisation claim that it is possible to describe human behaviour without recourse to a general system of values? If this question refers to values that are separate from, or prior to, the contingency of our existence, the answer has to be yes.

There is, however, another understanding of values which is not only compatible with a theory of self-organisation, but which can be viewed as a result of it. In this view, values are understood as emergent properties of the social system.

We have seen that distributed, decentralised control makes a system more flexible, and therefore increases its survivability. If we apply this notion to social systems, it would seem that we have an argument against rigid, centralised control mechanisms in, for example, the management of a company or the running of a state. Once again, this kind of critique against autocratic management or a fascist government is based not on the idea that these things are 'bad' per se, but rather on the knowledge that they will ultimately lead to the degeneration of the system in question.

Do these properties imply an ethics of self-organisation? I would be very hesitant to use the word 'ethics' here, unless it is an ethics in the sense of ‘principles that constitute a system', closer to the way in which Levinas would use the term.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.111




"The great activity is unconscious". Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reactive; this is why we do not know what a body can do, or what activity it is capable of.

It is inevitable that consciousness sees the organism from its own point of view and understands it in its own way; that is to say, reactively. What happens is that science follows the paths of consciousness, relying entirely on other reactive forces; the organism is always seen from the petty side, from the side of its reactions.

What makes the body superior to all reactions, particularly that reaction of the ego that is called consciousness, is the activity of necessarily unconscious forces: "This entire phenomenon of the body is, from the intellectual point of view, as superior to our consciousness, to our spirit to our conscious ways of thinking, feeling and willing, as algebra is superior to the multiplication table".

The only true science is that of activity, but the science of activity is also the science of what is necessarily unconscious. The idea that science must follow in the footsteps of consciousness, in the same directions, is absurd. We can sense the morality in this idea. In fact there can only be science where there is no consciousness, where there can be no consciousness.

[...] Nietzsche wished to remind consciousness of its need for modesty: its origin, nature and function are wholly reactive.

[Gilles Deleuze]
Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.41-2, 113



Related posts:-
Centre / Periphery
Simple / Complex
Separations and Bridges
Which difference makes a difference?
A Difference that makes a Difference
Everything and Nothing
Discrimination
Living in Hazard
Rational / Irrational
Balancing Art
Chinese Whispers
A Tough Act to Follow
Everything is Connected 
Search the Depths
Small Part/Large System
Masters of the Universe 
Digging Deeper
Get Real

Top-down / Bottom-up



Top down                 -           Bottom up
Order                        -           Chaos
Conscious                 -          Unconscious
Solid                         -           Liquid
Determined               -          Undetermined
Planned                     -          Emergent
Known                      -          Unknown
Certain                      -          Uncertain
Closed                       -          Open
Theory                       -          Story  
Intentional                 -          Accidental
Centralised                -          Distributed
Authoritarian             -          Anarchic
Spiritualism               -         Materialism
Limited                      -         Unlimited
Mono                         -         Poly
Familiar                     -         Novel
Left hemisphere         -         Right hemisphere




The more intentional something becomes, the more idiosyncratic and limited it also becomes.

Cilliers - "instead of a program you have memory." Memory over a program; past over future. Memory implies learning from mistakes (traditional approach), whereas a program implies setting an ideal future goal (modern approach). The traditional approach is "unconscious", because it has no sense of an overall scheme - it 'tinkers' when necessary. The modern approach is "conscious" because it purposely plans to make the future different from the present/past.





Classical music, like classical architecture, like many other classical forms, specifies an entity in advance and then builds it. Generative music doesn't do that, it specifies a set of rules and then lets them make the thing.

In the words of Kevin Kelly's great book, generative music is out of control, classical music is under control.

Now, out of control means you don't know quite what it's apt to do. It has it's own life. Generative music is unpredictable, classical music is predicted. Generative unrepeatable, classical repeatable. Generative music is unfinished, that's to say, when you use generative you implicitly don't know what the end of this is.

Generative music is sensitive to circumstances, that is to say it will react differently depending on its initial condition, on where it's happening and so on. Where classical music seeks to subdue them. By that I mean classical music seeks a neutral battleground, the flat field. It won't be comfortable -- with a fixed reverberation, -- not too many emergencies, and people who don't cough during the music basically.

Generative forms in general are multi-centered. There's not a single chain of command which runs from the top of the pyramid to the rank and file below. 

There are many, many, many web-like modes which become more or less active. You might notice the resemblance here to the difference between broadcasting and the Internet, for example.

[Brian Eno]
'Evolving metaphors, in my opinion, is what artists do'




Our complexity-inspired workshop techniques make intensive use of the boundary between the complex and the chaotic, in effect cycling between the dynamics of the two states as a sort of pattern generator to create a rich variety of patterns among which to choose—to stabilize and to disrupt—in order to facilitate sense-making.

[Cynthia Kurtz & Dave Snowden]
'The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world'




Introspection's course and limits were set by a consciousness that insisted on unity. To hear the deeps not only affronted Christian tradition; it invited what had been declared the Devil, Hell, and madness.

Here we begin to see the staggering consequences of denial of the daimons: it leaves the psyche bereft of all persons but the ego, the controller who becomes super-ego.

No spontaneous fantasy, image, or feeling may be independent of this unified ego. Every psychic happening becomes 'mine.' Know Thyself shifts to Know Myself.

What Philemon taught Jung, however, was that there are things in the psyche that are no more "mine" than animals in the forest ... or birds in the air." Moreover, without images, the imaginative perspective itself withers, only reinforcing the ego's literalism.

The images which could teach the ego its limits, as Philemon taught Jung, having been repressed, only return unimaged as archetypal delusions in the midst of subjective consciousness itself.

The ego becomes demonic. It fully believes in its own power.

[James Hillman]
Healing Fiction, p.65




There's a necessary inferiority when you're in psychic reality.

[...] soul means inferiority - something sensitive, something ... well ... pathologized. Soul makes the ego feel uncomfortable, uncertain, lost. And that lostness is a sign of soul.

You couldn't have soul or be a soul if you couldn't feel that you have lost it. The person as the strong ego [...] doesn't feel that he's lost anything.

That's one reason I question the psychiatric process of developing a strong ego. That seems to me a monstrous goal for psychotherapy because it attempts to overcome the sense of soul which appears as weakness, a weakness that seems almost to require symptoms.

Violence or power or sadism or domination keep us from sensing soul, and until they crack from inside, don't work anymore, fall apart, as I have called it, we can't work with them.

[...] when you are suffering, when there's failure, dejection, and you are cast down, thrown back on yourself, left alone, wet, in one way or another - then you begin to feel, Who am I? What is going on? Why can't I? Why doesn't my will work?

The Great Western Will - that I have been trained ever since I was a child to know what I want, to get it, and do it. To be independent!

It doesn't matter whether you're a man or a woman here. You're taught to be independent, to stand on your own two feet, to take what you need, to know what you want, and to know where you're going.

Now all of that gets defeated by the syndromes or the symptoms I'm talking about, the pathologizing. Suicide is one. Betrayal is one. Masturbation is another one [...]


[James Hillman]
Inter Views, p.12, 17




Adam and Eve then became almost drunk with excitement. This was the way to do things. Make a plan, ABC and you get D.

They then began to specialize in doing things the planned way. In effect, they cast out from the Garden the concept of their own systemic nature and of its total systemic nature.

[...] Eve began to resent the business of sex and reproduction. Whenever these rather basic phenomena intruded upon her now purposive way of living, she was reminded of the larger life which had been kicked out of the Garden.

[...] there is humility, and I propose this not as a moral principle, distasteful to a large number of people, but simply as an item of a scientific philosophy.

In the period of the Industrial Revolution, perhaps the most important disaster was the enormous increase of scientific arrogance. We had discovered how to make trains and other machines. We knew how to put one box on top of the other to get that apple, and Occidental man saw himself as an autocrat with complete power over a universe which was made of physics and chemistry.

But that arrogant scientific philosophy is now obsolete, and in its place there is the discovery that man is only a part of larger systems and that the part can never control the whole.

[Gregory Bateson]
Steps to an Ecology of Mind ('Conscious Purpose versus Nature'), p. 441, 443 




Mechanisation, bureaucracy, the increasing complexity of technology and scientific specialisation are […] typical phenomena of mass society today, ‘yet they seem to vitiate the authority of the individual, as well as the democratic power of the majority, in favour of an anonymous principle of organisation and discipline.’

If this is the case, the artist can’t hope for any privileges from mass society, or even from the concession of a marginal status […] Such a society won’t recognise the need of a safety valve.

[…] a mass society won’t have any need of the artist, and presumably won’t even bother to domesticate his mystery.

[Denis Donoghue]
The Arts Without Mystery, p. 91-2




Mill’s model of society follows his view of science as bottom-up: people express their sentiments, debate them, and negotiate compromises. There’s no predefined model of society, it emerges out of the discourse.

You can’t ban certain people from speaking, because you can’t know beforehand whether or not they have something of value to say. At the very least, people must be allowed to express their sentiments, which is information in itself.

Marcuse’s model of society, of course, follows his view of science, and his view is top-down.

For him, the desired end-state of society is defined in advance, so there is little need to listen to what people have to say; he can evaluate every person or movement on whether or not they are perceived to be working towards or away from his end-goal (which correlates strongly with Left and Right, respectively), and promote or censor them accordingly.

[Uri Harris]
'Wilfrid Laurier and the Creep of Critical Theory'




One theory from Thomas Sowell is that intellectuals tend to like systems where you can articulate a theory in a bunch of verbal propositions, and the government implements them.

Whereas there are certain phenomena in social life, like market economies, where the intelligence is distributed across millions of people. No-one actually knows how to make the system work, but people make things, look for buyers, set the price, and then over the entire society things kind of work out - but no single individual has the theory as to how that ought to work.

A language is another example - there’s no committee that designed the English language, there’s no theory of how the English language ought to work. It’s hundreds of millions of people just talking - and they invent new slang, and they slur, and they emphasise, and they borrow from other languages - and the language changes. And it works pretty well - here we are speaking in English, and no committee ever designed it.

So according to Sowell’s theory - I think he was influenced by Hayek - systems of distributed intelligence - where no one genius designed it, but millions of people cooperating give rise to a collective intelligence - run against the grain of the way intellectuals often think.

If your first impulse is “What’s the theory? What are the set of principles?”, then you’re going to gravitate to planned systems and be a bit oblivious to distributed systems.

[Steven Pinker]
Joe Rogan Experience #1073




If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them.

We cannot expect that this problem will be solved by first communicating all this knowledge to a central board which, after integrating all knowledge, issues its orders.

We must solve it by some form of decentralization.

[Friedrich Hayek]
'The Use of Knowledge in Society'




Hillman: ... "You are out of control," "I am out of control," are big sentences now in this culture.

And the important thing is to be able to control your behaviour, get your shit together. I think control is one of the most dangerous words we've got right now in our vocabulary.

First of all, it's a word that belongs with Honeywell, it's a "control systems" idea - that the controls (not the psyche or the Gods) are what run everything, run the ship, run the air conditioner, run the factory.

Second of all, it's a word that belongs in the police world. So it's a combination of technological and bureaucratic or oligarchic or fascist. And it's become an ideal of therapy!

Ventura: When you're falling in love your life's out of control. And when you're falling out of love [...] You get fired or let go or have an accident, your life's out of control.

Hillman: When you have a breakdown of any kind - bankruptcy, a death, a big illness - your life's out of control. Do you realize the conditions we've just described are the great dramatic moments of life?

Ventura: Which we're supposedly living for!

Hillman: That's what we're living for. Falling in love, being heartbroken by love -

Ventura: - revelations that turn you inside out -

Hillman: - mourning and grief -

Ventura: - victory, defeat - because when you get a big victory you're often as out of control as when you're badly defeated -

Hillman: - losing it, finding it -

What is all this emphasis on control? Isn't that what they call secular humanism, to ban the Gods?

Ventura: We're banning the Gods -

Hillman: - with that control system.

Ventura: We want to control all the things you supposedly live for - all those things that, if you get to be an old person, and have not had them, you go, "What was my life about?"

So on one level what you want is to be out of control, and on another level you're fighting that. That's your dialectic.

[James Hillman]
with Michael Ventura
We've Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy - And the World's Getting Worse, p.203, 204




[...] it has been widely believed, and in our century more than any other, that rationality, logic, the scientific approach, call for a society which is centrally organized, and planned and ordered as a whole. Popper has shown that this, besides being authoritarian, rests on a mistaken and superseded conception of science.

Rationality, logic and a scientific approach all point to a society which is 'open' and pluralistic, within which incompatible views are expressed and conflicting aims pursued; a society in which everyone is free to investigate problem-situations and to propose solutions; a society in which everyone is free to criticize the proposed solutions of others, most importantly those of the government [...]

[...] the perpetual search for, and admission of, error at even the organizational level is hardest of all for authoritarian structures.

[Bryan Magee]
Popper, p. 77-8




Intentional fallacy, term used in 20th-century literary criticism to describe the problem inherent in trying to judge a work of art by assuming the intent or purpose of the artist who created it.

'Intentional Fallacy'


The conceptual operation that extracts 'themes' from writing has its counterpart in the notion that books exist as self-enclosed systems of meaning and reference, their signifiers all pointing back toward some 'transcendental signified' or source of authentic and unitary truth.

The traditional idea of the book is of a writing held within bounds by the author's sovereign presence; a writing whose integrity of purpose and theme comes from its acceptance of these proper, self-regulating limits.

What is at issue is not the intentionality of language - the precondition of all understanding - but the belief that texts must always point back to their source in a moment of pure, self-authorized meaning.

Language is intentional through and through, but not in the sense that its meanings either could or should be confined to what the author (supposedly) intended.

[Christopher Norris]
Derrida, p. 63, 113




[...] our acceptance of a degree of uncertainty is the very essence of being alive in the universe.

Many system have evolved through processes of self-organization. They were not put together in a mechanical way, by bringing various parts together and arranging them according to some hierarchical scheme and overarching law.

Rather they emerged through the interlocking of feedback loops and out of flows to and from the external environment. In this sense, the stabilities of our lives, of our organizations and our social structures, do not arise out of fundamental certainties but from out of the womb of chance, chaos, and openness.

Patterns in a pan of heated water and the vortex in a river are particularly simple examples of order emerging out of chaos. Likewise human society itself, with its cities, international governments, and global economics can only exist through this dynamical dance between chaos and order.

The contrast between versatility and flexibility of self-organization and the behaviour of mechanical systems can be illustrated by comparing life in a village to that within a traditional army.

To function effectively during war, an army must have a predetermined and well-understood hierarchy [...] Each person entering the army fits neatly into a particular slot, so that during battles and campaigns the army machine continues to function despite a turnover in personnel. This also means that, with the exception of the highest ranks or individual acts of heroism, the skills and personalities of any particular individual have little significance.

Soldiers fit into the army, rather than the army accommodating them.

Whereas, in the army, soldiers are forced to sacrifice a measure of their personal freedom so as to fit in and obey, within the village a wide range of behaviour, even verging on the eccentric, can be tolerated. The former type of structure is a metaphor for mechanical, hierarchical organization; the latter stands for the self-organization seen in many natural and social systems.

[F. David Peat]
From Certainty to Uncertainty, p. 138-9




[...] in the first months following surgery, split-brain patients reported some rather disconcerting experiences. These took the form of an apparent conflict of will, displayed in so-called intermanual conflict.

Such was the case of a man who found himself in the unfortunate position of going to embrace his wife with one arm and pushing her away with the other. Other patients [...] reported instances in which the left hand closed doors the right hand had opened, unfolded sheets the right had folded, snatched money the right had offered to a store cashier, and disrupted [...] reading by turning pages and closing books.

What the stories of the split-brain patients in their first few months after operation also reveal is that it is the left hemisphere, Gazzaniga's interpreter, that is in control, at the conscious level, of the consistent nature of ‘our’ experience, even though we may have differing views, desires, and values in either hemisphere.

In inter-manual conflict, it is never the right hand that is experienced as the rebel, the ‘naughty’ hand, the one that is ‘out of control’: it is always the left, that pushes the other way, grabs the wheel, chooses the ‘wrong’ clothes.

[...] Once the script has been written and the play half performed by the left hemisphere, an incursion from the right hemisphere is bound to be disruptive and unwelcome from its point of view. 

It's the left hemisphere, ignorant of what is going on in the right hemisphere, that both decides what it is that ‘I’ want, and then judges any interruption from the right hemisphere as contrary to ‘my’ best interests.

But set it in another context, and who knows what might have happened had he actually listened a long while back to his right hemisphere and left his wife rather than embrace her; or – in another patient's story – had she closed the door, driven the other way, worn the flame-coloured dress?

At any rate, at least we can deduce that when she says ‘I know what I want to wear’, she means ‘My left hemisphere knows what it wants me to wear, and I am identified with my left hemisphere.’

Despite the asymmetry in their roles, in favour of the right hemisphere, there is an important opposing asymmetry of power, in favour of the left hemisphere [...] and it may even, mistakenly, see the right hemisphere's world as undoing its work, challenging its ‘supremacy’.

[Iain McGilchrist]
The Master and his Emissary, p. 211, 218-19




The mention of material substance naturally suggests the doctrine of 'materialism,' but philosophical materialism is not necessarily knit up with belief in 'matter,' as a metaphysical principle.

One may deny matter in that sense, as strongly as Berkeley did, one may be a phenomenalist like Huxley, and yet one may still be a materialist in the wider sense, of explaining higher phenomena by lower ones, and leaving the destinies of the world at the mercy of its blinder parts and forces. 

It is in this wider sense of the word that materialism is opposed to spiritualism or theism. The laws of physical nature are what run things, materialism says. The highest productions of human genius might be ciphered by one who had complete acquaintance with the facts, out of their physiological conditions, regardless whether nature be there only for our minds, as idealists contend, or not. Our minds in any case would have to record the kind of nature it is, and write it down as operating through blind laws of physics. This is the complexion of present day materialism, which may better be called naturalism.

Over against it stands 'theism,' or what in a wide sense may be termed 'spiritualism.' Spiritualism says that mind not only witnesses and records things, but also runs and operates them: the world being thus guided, not by its lower, but by its higher element.

[William James]
'Some Metaphysical Problems', Pragmatism and Other Writings, p. 44




Historically we find the terms 'intellectualism' and 'sensationalism' used as synonyms of, 'rationalism' and 'empiricism.' Well, nature seems to combine most frequently with intellectualism an idealistic and optimistic tendency. Empiricists on the other hand are not uncommonly materialistic, and their optimism is apt to be decidedly conditional and tremulous.

Rationalism is always monistic. It starts from wholes and universals, and makes much of the unity of things. Empiricism starts from the parts, and makes of the whole a collection - is not averse therefore to calling itself pluralistic. 

Rationalism usually considers itself more religious than empiricism, but there is much to say about this claim, so I merely mention it. It is a true claim when the individual rationalist is what is called a man of feeling, and when the individual empiricist prides himself on being hard-headed. In that case the rationalist will usually also be in favor of what is called free-will, and the empiricist will be a fatalist - I use the terms most popularly current.

The rationalist finally will be of dogmatic temper in his affirmations, while the empiricist may be more sceptical and open to discussion.

[William James]
'The Present Dilemma in Philosophy', Pragmatism and Other Writings, p. 10




The wisdom of the crowd is the collective opinion of a group of individuals rather than that of a single expert. 

This process, while not new to the Information Age, has been pushed into the mainstream spotlight by social information sites such as Wikipedia, Yahoo! Answers, Quora, Stack Exchange and other web resources that rely on collective human knowledge.

An explanation for this phenomenon is that there is idiosyncratic noise associated with each individual judgment, and taking the average over a large number of responses will go some way toward canceling the effect of this noise.

Wisdom-of-the-crowds research routinely attributes the superiority of crowd averages over individual judgments to the elimination of individual noise, an explanation that assumes independence of the individual judgments from each other. Thus the crowd tends to make its best decisions if it is made up of diverse opinions and ideologies.

[...] when the diversity in a group is large, the error of the crowd is small.

Experiments run by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology found that when a group of people were asked to answer a question together they would attempt to come to a consensus which would frequently cause the accuracy of the answer to decrease. i.e. what is the length of a border between two countries? One suggestion to counter this effect is to ensure that the group contains a population with diverse backgrounds.

Crowds tend to work best when there is a correct answer to the question being posed, such as a question about geography or mathematics.When there is not a precise answer crowds can come to arbitrary conclusions.

'Wisdom of the crowd'
Wikipedia




In his book You Are Not a Gadget, Jaron Lanier argues that crowd wisdom is best suited for problems that involve optimization, but ill-suited for problems that require creativity or innovation.

In the online article Digital Maoism, Lanier argues that the collective is more likely to be smart only when

1. it isn't defining its own questions,

2. the goodness of an answer can be evaluated by a simple result (such as a single numeric value), and

3. the information system which informs the collective is filtered by a quality control mechanism that relies on individuals to a high degree.

Lanier argues that only under those circumstances can a collective be smarter than a person. If any of these conditions are broken, the collective becomes unreliable or worse.

'The Wisdom of Crowds'
Wikipedia



Lanier accuses Web 2.0 developments of devaluing progress and innovation, as well as glorifying the collective at the expense of the individual.

Lanier also argues that there are limitations to certain aspects of the open source and content movement in that they lack the ability to create anything truly new and innovative. 

For example, Lanier argues that the open source movement didn't create the iPhone. In another example, Lanier further accuses Web 2.0 of making search engines lazy, destroying the potential of innovative websites like Thinkquest, and hampering the communication of ideas like mathematics to a wider audience.

'Jaron Lanier'
Wikipedia




Swarm Intelligence


Swarm intelligence systems consist typically of a population of simple agents or boids interacting locally with one another and with their environment.

The inspiration often comes from nature, especially biological systems. The agents follow very simple rules, and although there is no centralized control structure dictating how individual agents should behave, local, and to a certain degree random, interactions between such agents lead to the emergence of "intelligent" global behavior, unknown to the individual agents.

Examples of swarm intelligence in natural systems include ant colonies, bird flocking, hawks hunting, animal herding, bacterial growth, fish schooling and microbial intelligence.

Enabled by mediating software such as the SWARM platform [...] networks of distributed users can be organized into "human swarms" through the implementation of real-time closed-loop control systems.

[...] such real-time systems enable groups of human participants to behave as a unified collective intelligence that works as a single entity to make predictions, answer questions, and evoke opinions. Such systems [...] have been shown to significantly amplify human intelligence, resulting in a string of high-profile predictions of extreme accuracy.

Academic testing shows that human swarms can out-predict individuals across a variety of real-world projections. Famously, human swarming was used to correctly predict the Kentucky Derby Superfecta, against 541 to 1 odds, in response to a challenge from reporters.

'Swarm Intelligence'
Wikipedia



“Sometimes it seems like everyone’s a manager,” says Karl Marginson, who has been FC’s team manager since the club was established, as he sits on the team bus on the way to a fixture at Whitby.

“Everybody who comes along to football has an opinion. They’re very quick to tell me how I should be doing things. I’m sure it’s the same for Louis Van Gaal.”

Marginson says he will listen to anyone’s opinion. Though rather like Brian Clough, once he has listened, he then does what he believes is right. A couple of years ago, the then Conference club Ebbsfleet did an experiment whereby they invited supporters to vote weekly on who should be in the first team. Had FC’s members not been tempted to try the same thing?

“There’s a difference,” Walsh says of the Ebbsfleet idea. “We’re serious.”

“Listen, that could never work,” adds Marginson. “If you give out 200 pieces of paper to 200 people and asked them to work out a team, you’d get 200 different combinations. At some point there’s got to be one person making those decisions.” 

[Jim White]
'How FC United rose to the brink of the big time'




There’s a whole world of philanthropy out there and I think its one of the least well functioning sectors of the American economy.

So much of it is bureaucratic and risk averse, and people doing the same things. I thought, let’s go back to earlier models of giving, from the Renaissance or the eighteenth century, where in essence there was no bureaucracy.

One person says yes or no […] the evaluator is me, there’s no panel, no bureaucracy, it’s thumbs-up or thumbs-down. I think far more philanthropy should work this way. 

[Tyler Cowen]
'Tyler Cowen on Rationality, COVID-19, Talismans, and Life on the Margins | The Tim Ferriss Show'




The libertarian-authoritarian axis on the Political Compass is a tradeoff between discoordination and tyranny.

You can have everything perfectly coordinated by someone with a god’s-eye-view – but then you risk Stalin. And you can be totally free of all central authority – but then you’re stuck in every stupid multipolar trap Moloch can devise.

The libertarians make a convincing argument for the one side, and the monarchists for the other, but I expect that like most tradeoffs we just have to hold our noses and admit it’s a really hard problem.

[Scott Alexander]
'Meditations on Moloch'




FAT TONY: “Then, my good Socrates, why do you think that we need to fix the meanings of things?”

SOCRATES: “My dear Mega-Tony, we need to know what we are talking about when we talk about things. The entire idea of philosophy is to be able to reflect and understand what we are doing, examine our lives. An unexamined life is not worth living.”

FAT TONY: “The problem, my poor old Greek, is that you are killing the things we can know but not express. And if I asked someone riding a bicycle just fine to give me the theory behind his bicycle riding, he would fall from it. By bullying and questioning people you confuse them and hurt them.”

“My dear Socrates… you know why they are putting you to death? It is because you make people feel stupid for blindly following habits, instincts, and traditions. You may be occasionally right. But you may confuse them about things they’ve been doing just fine without getting in trouble. You are destroying people’s illusions about themselves. You are taking the joy of ignorance out of the things we don’t understand. And you have no answer; you have no answer to offer them”

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
Antifragile, p. 253




[…] things that grow in a natural way, whether cities or individual houses, have a fractal quality to them. Like everything alive, all organisms, like lungs, or trees, grow in some form of self-guided but tame randomness.

[…] fractals induce a certain wealth of detail based on a small number of rules of repetition of nested patterns. The fractal require some jaggedness, but one that has some method to its madness. Everything in nature is fractal, jagged, and rich in detail, though with a certain pattern.

The smooth, by comparison, belongs to the class of Euclidean geometry we study in school, simplified shapes that lose this layer of wealth.

Alas, contemporary architecture is smooth, even when it tries to look whimsical. What is top-down is generally unwrinkled (that is, unfractal) and feels dead.

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
Antifragile, p. 324-5




Evolution proceeds by undirected, convex bricolage or tinkering, inherently robust, i.e., with the achievement of potential stochastic gains thanks to continuous, repetitive, small, localised mistakes. 

What men have done with top-down, command-and-control science has been exactly the reverse: interventions with negative convexity effects, i.e., the achievement of small certain gains through exposure to massive potential mistakes.

Our record of understanding risks in complex systems (biology, economics, climate) has been pitiful, marred with retrospective distortions (we only understand the risks after the damage takes place, yet we keep making the mistake), and there is nothing to convince me that we have gotten better at risk management.

Simply, humans should not be given explosive toys (like atomic bombs, financial derivatives, or tools to create life).

If there is something in nature you don’t understand, odds are it makes sense in a deeper way that is beyond your understanding. So there is a logic to natural things that is much superior to our own. Just as there is a dichotomy in law: innocent until proven guilty as opposed to guilty until proven innocent, let me express my rule as follows: what Mother Nature does is rigorous until proven otherwise; what humans and science do is flawed until proven otherwise.

[Nassim Nicholas Taleb]
Antifragile, p. 348-9




Although Kant criticized Leibniz and the rationalists for believing that reason alone without sense experience can calculate the universe (for, Kant argued, knowledge requires acquaintance with particulars), he also criticized Locke and the empiricists for believing that sense impressions alone, without a priori concepts of the understanding, could ever lead to knowledge (for particulars are meaningless without general concepts by which they are interpreted). 

Locke was correct to deny innate ideas in the sense of mental representations of physical reality, but wrong to deny innate formal knowledge. As thought without sensation is empty, so is sensation without thought blind. 

Only in conjunction can understanding and sensibility supply objectively valid knowledge of things.

[Richard Tarnas]
The Passion of the Western Mind, p. 345




Samuel Johnson famously said that "the first Whig was the Devil." If the left is chaos and the right is order then naturally things tend toward entropy over time, right? But human institutions aren't closed thermodynamic systems - there must be a mechanism causing chaos to emerge

To understand the mechanism, you must first understand what "left" and "right" mean. Some people say that this is a vestigial artifact of the French Revolution. In specific details, that's correct. But it doesn't explain why you can look at the Roman Republic and tell who's who

I submit to you that there is substance to the concept of "right" and "left." I say that being "right" means believing in the superiority of *evolved* systems and being "left" means believing in the superiority of *planned* systems.

The right is the philosophy of tradition, of religion, of hierarchy, of burkean incrementalism, of survival of the fittest, of primitivism. Each of these are in tension with each other on specific points, but they are all about the maintenance of evolved value systems.

The most fundamentally right-wing thinker is Nassim Taleb. #Lindy is a right-wing ideology. The rightist understands that the world is a strange and horrifying place and that the tools we use to navigate it were bought with generations of human suffering

We do not have complete theories of anything. All we have are heuristics. Man cannot produce absolute truth, it is the domain of God alone. The best that man can do in this world is "true enough." True enough to survive. True enough to be filtered until it becomes tradition.

The left is the philosophy of expertise, of science, of "progressing" past the beliefs of our hidebound ancestors, of individual freedom and self-expression outside inherited rules, of caring for those who cannot survive, of man as the beginning and the end of all things

The left believes that man is perfectible in principle. That man's ability to reason can produce better and more effective morality than what has been selected for over the generations. That the "rational" maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain is the whole of morality

If this were so wrong that anyone who embraced it died quickly and painfully, we wouldn't have a problem. But human societies are like commercial jets - they can glide for a long time before they crash. And in the meantime, you don't have to listen to those dreadful engines

So, back to our original question. Why does Cthulhu
always swim left? Because to *do* politics is an essentially left-wing act. To make changes to what has been selected for in favor of particular human interests is to trade the robust for the ephemeral.

Sometimes it's not a big deal. Plenty of beliefs are probably pretty arbitrary, and taken individually rather than as part of an interconnected system they may seem especially meaningless. But over time - and that is all that matters - the tendency is toward chaos and fragility.

Democracy accelerates this process because it makes power (always desirable) contingent regular concessions to particular ephemeral human desires. But monarchies face this pressure as well. The gap between the interest of a person and the interest of a people - that is politics.

And that is why you live in a time that offers you great somatic pleasures, but faces collapse on all fronts. Collapse of families, collapse of institutional trust, collapse of supply chains in the face of even predictable complications. All the result of Cthulhu's endless drift.

[@kwamurai]




To "give style" to one's character - a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye.
 
[…] In the end, when the work is finished, it becomes evident how the constraint of a single taste governed and formed everything large and small. Whether this taste was good or bad is less important than one might suppose, if only it was a single taste!

It will be the strong and domineering natures that enjoy their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of their own; the passion of their tremendous will relents in the face of all stylized nature, of all conquered and serving nature. Even when they have to build palaces and design gardens they demur at giving nature freedom.

Conversely, it is the weak characters without power over themselves that hate the constraint of style. They feel that if this bitter and evil constraint were imposed upon them they would be demeaned; they become slaves as soon as they serve; they hate to serve. 

Such spirits—and they may be of the first rank—are always out to shape and interpret their environment as free nature: wild, arbitrary, fantastic, disorderly, and surprising. 

And they are well advised because it is only in this way that they can give pleasure to themselves. For one thing is needful: that a human being should attain satisfaction with himself, whether it be by means of this or that poetry and art; only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold.

[Friedrich Nietzsche]
The Gay Science, 290




Our scientists incessantly tell us with the utmost assurance that everything around us has evolved by small mutations sieved out through natural selection. Even the Almighty is not credited with having been able to create anything complex. Every complexity, we are told, is the result of evolution. 

Yet our development planners seem to think that they can do better than the Almighty, that they can create the most complex things at one throw by a process called planning, letting Athene spring, not out of the head of Zeus, but out of nothingness, fully armed, resplendent, and viable.

[E.F. Schumacher]
Small is Beautiful, p.138




Unlike covering-law explanations of behaviour, which abstract away time and space in favour of universalities, hermeneutics explains by highlighting and showing the concrete and temporal, context-dependent dynamical interrelationships that give the action its unique character.

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p. 231


Theory - explains through generalities, top down, compressed (cooked)
Story - explains through specifics, bottom up, uncompressed (raw)




Dupré (1993) is […] correct in proposing that we think of free will as human ability to project meaningful distinctions into behavior. To act top-down from the intentional level in which meaning is embodied is thus to exercise free will […] 

Because all self-organizing systems select the stimuli to which they respond, behavior constrained top-down is to that extent increasingly autonomous of forceful impacts from the environment. Self-organized systems act from their own point of view. 

The more structured the entity, the more complex its organization and its behavior, and the more decoupled from and independent of its environment: the more autonomous and authentic, in short. 

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p. 249




As a distributed whole, a self-organized structure imposes second-order contextual constraints on its components, thereby restricting their degrees of freedom. 

As we saw, once top-down, second-order contextual constraints are in place, energy and matter exchanged across an autocatalytic structure's boundaries cannot flow any which way. The autocatalytic web's dynamical organization does not allow any molecule to be imported into the system: in a very important feature of self-organizing dynamical systems, their organization itself determines the stimuli to which they will respond. 

By making its components interdependent, thereby constraining their behavioral variability, the system preserves and enhances its cohesion and integrity, its organization and identity. As a whole it also prunes inefficient components.

[...] By correlating and coordinating previously aggregated parts into a more complex, differentiated, systematic whole, contextual constraints enlarge the variety of states the system as a whole can access [...] Second-order contextual constraints are thus in the service of the whole. 

[Alicia Juarrero]
Dynamics in Action, p.138, 143




Whereas formal systems apply inference rules to logical variables, neural networks apply evolutive principles to numerical variables. Instead of calculating a solution, the network settles into a condition that satisfies the constraints imposed on it.

Neural nets have no central control in the classical sense. Processing is distributed over the network and the roles of the various components (or groups of components) change dynamically.

Every symbol in a rule-based system has a precise, predefined meaning - this constitutes a local representation. In a connectionist network individual neurons have no pre-defined meaning. Changing patterns of activity over several nodes perform meaningful functions. This is often referred to as distributed representation.

Formal systems have well-defined terminating conditions and results are only produced when these conditions are reached. Connectionist systems tend to dynamically converge on a solution, usually in an asymptotic fashion. The process does not have to terminate; as a matter of fact, usually it will not arrive at a single, final conclusion.

Apart from the fact that formal rule-based models have to be interpreted on a semantic level, the model itself is divided into two levels: that of the symbols and that of the rules; or the data and the program. In connectionist models there is only one level, that of the neurons and their weights. Instead of an 'active' program and 'passive' data, you have numerical weights that are dynamically adjusted through interaction. Instead of a program you have memory.

For those accustomed to the high level of abstraction and the crispness of logical inference, the connectionist approach often appears vague, shallow and too sparse.

[Paul Cilliers]
Complexity and Postmodernism, p.19



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